system based on the decimalized dollar. In British North America this was calculated on values established at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Thus, in 1812 the standard exchange rate stood at four “Halifax” dollars to the pound.
VARIATIONS
In writing a military history and using original quotations, every author on this subject has to deal with a certain set of problems in presenting their material. First, there is the fact that in the original documents one is dealing with historical personalities, each with varied levels of education and skills of writing and spelling, not all of which correspond to our own modern forms. Second, there are the inevitable references to official military formations, regimental affiliations, ranks and appointments, battlefield tactics and manoeuvres, etc. that can sometimes appear alien to a modern reader unfamiliar with the subject. Third, there is the reality that place names have sometimes changed entirely or have gained different spellings over the years.
To address these points, this author has chosen to adopt the following position in the presentation of his accumulated materials:
On the matter of varied spellings in quotes, the material has been repeatedly checked to ensure its accuracy and is presented just as I found it in the original documents. I have therefore not included the highly distracting term [sic] after each variant word, as it drives me to distraction when I see it used in other works and, in my opinion, effectively destroys the integrity and meaning of the quote to me as a reader. As I see it in reading works of this kind, either I trust that the author did his job properly and the quote is accurate, or I don’t and I go and look it up for myself if I’m so inclined.
On the second point, while generally recognized military terms are presented as is, some of the more archaic or jargon-type words are followed by a modern equivalent word. In a similar manner, maintaining the differential identification of military units from the two principal combatant nations (when both used a system of numbers to designate their regiments) has forced many modern writers to develop a system that will maintain a clear identity for their readers. I have adopted this convention, and within this work British Regimental numbers are shown as numerals (41st Regiment, 89th Regiment, etc.) and where required with their subsidiary titles (1st [Royal Scots] Regiment, 8th [King’s] Regiment), whilst the American Regiments are expressed as words (First Regiment, Twenty-fifth Regiment, etc.)
Finally, where place names appear with a number of variants (e.g., Sackett’s Harbour, Sacket’s Harbour, Sakets Harbor, or Sacket’s Harbor) I have adopted a single format for each case, based upon a judgment of what I felt was the predominant version used at the time. Where names have changed entirely, or would cause needless confusion (Newark becoming Niagara and currently Niagara-on-the-Lake), I have generally gone with what would clarify the location and simplify identification overall or included a reference to the modern name (Crossroads becoming Virgil.)
In a similar fashion, in including images where there is both a period and modern image combined for a then-and-now effect, I have tried, as far as possible, to obtain the same relative perspective, subject to the limitations imposed where the physical landscape and property ownership make it possible to do so.
THE 1812 BATTLEFIELD
To anyone not already knowledgeable about the details of the historic military uniforms, weapons, and systems of drill and manoeuvre referred to in this work, the facts presented may not always make sense to the modern mind. This is not surprising, for according to the current methods of waging war, the concept of having your soldiers stand out in the open in long straight lines, dressed in brightly coloured uniforms and polished brasswork, may be appropriate for a parade square or a military tattoo. But to do it in on a battlefield, only a short distance from a similar line of enemy troops who are shooting at you, seems contradictory to the survival of the individual fighting man — suicidal, in fact! What must be understood, however, is that the battlefield tactics of the early nineteenth century were entirely different from that of the modern-day and were based on the technologies then available for weapons production.
Today, armies can sit miles apart from each other and use radar, satellite, and aerial reconnaissance, long-range artillery, missiles, and air support to destroy entire military formations in a matter of minutes. As a result, battlefield camouflage and concealment is an essential element of tactical deployment. By contrast, at the time of this story, there were no long-range weapons of rapid-fire or mass destruction. Instead, the heavy weaponry of the day consisted of heavy and cumbersome pieces of muzzle-loading cannon. Consequently, military commanders had to rely upon hauling their artillery within clear visual range of the enemy in order to pound them into submission, flight, or destruction with cannonballs — one shot at a time! In the same manner, modern combat troops carry at least one lightweight personal firearm that usually incorporates a rifled barrel, automatic loading and firing mechanisms, multiple-shot magazines, and other high-tech gadgets that produce devastating rates of fire and effective killing ranges that cover hundreds of yards (metres). In contrast, apart from units equipped with the slightly more accurate and longer-range, but significantly slower-to-load rifled weapons of the day, the standard infantry weapon for most armies in 1812 was a heavy, muzzle-loading, smoothbore, flintlock musket. This weapon had an extreme killing range of less than 250 yards (137 metres); was basically inaccurate beyond 150 yards (229 metres) and had a single-shot capability that even under ideal conditions then took at least fifteen seconds to reload. Furthermore, climatic variables, such as wind and rain, or mechanical problems (such as a dull flint, powder residues fouling the ignition system, or any one of a dozen other factors), could reduce the firing rate for a musket from a satisfactory eight successful ignitions out of ten times of pulling the trigger, to a frustrating one in ten. If one was lucky.
Because of these technological limitations, the only effective way to use an infantry force was to form the men into long lines that allowed the maximum number of muskets to be pointed at the enemy. This formation would then be marched to an effective firing range and, upon the word of command, fire a massed volley of soft lead musketballs toward the enemy; then they would go through the complicated process of reloading and firing again as quickly as possible. In response, the enemy, using virtually the same technologies and weaponry, was obliged to use the same tactics and formations in its attempt to achieve victory. This produced the classic “Napoleonic” battlefield, with lines and columns of troops moving as unified formations, firing at fairly close ranges, and generally ignoring the self-preservational method of lying down or sheltering behind a solid object to fire.
That is not to say, however, that these latter “modern” tactics were not used. In fact, the terrain and dense forests of Upper Canada encouraged the use by both opposing armies of smaller and more manoeuvreable formations of soldiers, referred to as “Light” troops. These men were trained to fight as both line infantry and as independent detachments, moving and fighting as circumstances and opportunity dictated. This style of fighting was also used extensively by the Native allies, who perhaps had a more realistic concept of how fighting an enemy should be conducted, by using hit-and-run tactics. The fact remains, however, that except in specific instances, the traditional linear and column formations prevailed as the principal functional units for large-scale military engagements throughout the North American War of 1812–1815.
Under these conditions, with contending armies standing in the open, less than 500 yards (300 metres) apart, the use of camouflage or low-visibility uniforms becomes irrelevant. Instead, it was the function of the uniform to make the wearer look taller, broader, and more imposing to the enemy. There was also the fact that the repeated firing of the weapons produced a dense cloud of grey-white smoke that, in the absence of a breeze, could thicken to the point where visibility was reduced to a few yards, creating the oft-referred to “fog of war” that bedeviled many commanders during the course of an engagement. Under these circumstances it was vital, in those days without radio or electronic communication, for senior officers to be able to correctly identify distant troop movements and maintain control of their own formations as a battle progressed. As a result, the use of distinct “National” styles and highly visible colours
