the Centre then effectively disintegrated and entire companies of men simply deserted in disgust. Smyth was burnt in effigy by mobs of infuriated militiamen, while others went searching for their erstwhile commander, calling for a lynching. According to the diary of Naval surgeon, Usher Parsons:
Monday Nov. 30
The army returned in the course of the day to the Navy Yard, embarked in the boats long after dark with the professed object of going down to Fort Schlosser to cross.
Tuesday Dec. 1
The army did not descend the river but this morning rowed above Squaw Island under the pretence of crossing when all were suddenly and unexpectedly ordered to debark. This enraged the soldiers against Gen’l Smyth, particularly the volunteers. And when he retired to his camp, advertisements were posted offering 1000 dollars for him, dead or alive. All of the volunteers commenced firing in the air which induced the enemy to think they were firing among ourselves and three cheers were given by them expressive of ridicule and contempt.[13]
Brigadier General Porter, previously a supporter of Smyth in the removal of Van Rensselaer, did an about-face and repudiated Smyth’s official report on the debacle. He also publicly called his senior officer a poltroon, scoundrel, and coward, prompting a subsequent face-saving duel in which neither party suffered a scratch. Nevertheless, Smyth was effectively disgraced and within a week was forced to decamp from his own army in fear for his life as unhappy soldiers took potshots in his general direction. He was subsequently “disbanded” from the army (which was a face-saving term used by the army to cover up the otherwise embarrassing need to hold a court martial or official enquiry) whereupon he retired to his home in Virginia, where he sat out the remainder of the war, writing his self-justifying memoirs for posterity.
Politically, the ramifications of the litany of military failures in 1812 shook the American political administration. President Madison held onto his office in the autumnal elections, but was forced to remove Dr. Eustis as secretary of war on December 3, 1812. In his place, Madison offered the post to several senior politicians, but none of them would touch the job. Eventually a former senator and brigadier-general of militia, John Armstrong, was appointed. Militarily, the administration’s claims of having an army, supposedly fully equipped and trained to fight and win a war against the vastly more experienced British army, had been exposed as cruel joke, while its incompetent leadership had become the butt of vitriolic lampoons and political cartoons within the American press. Furthermore, the balloon of myth that had been created during the Revolution, expounding the value of the “Minuteman” militia as the backbone of the “American” army, was now effectively popped. Nevertheless, while several American senior officers thought that a wholesale overhaul of the military system was urgently needed, the political and military leadership was not so perceptive and failed to learn from these disasters, thus creating the conditions for further failures in the future.
Even today the isolated position of the garrison of Fort Erie in winter is clearly seen.
U.S. Secretary of War John Armstrong, who reluctantly accepted the appointment of secretary of war in replacement of the inept Dr. Eustis, but who subsequently failed to improve the record of the American military in the year to come.
From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
On the other side of the border, the New Year’s loyal toasts given by the residents of Upper Canada were made with additional fervour this season. By their reckoning, they had:
been forced into a war for which they were unprepared and under-supplied in military manpower and equipment;
been dismissed as potentially treasonous and expendable by their own governor in Quebec; and
defeated three American invasion attempts.
With these “facts” before them, some of the more devout amongst the populace believed that the only obvious answer to the question of why they were not now living under an American flag was nothing less than divine intervention on their behalf.
On the other hand, while equally pleased with the results of the year’s actions, the more objective of the civilian leadership and military commanders saw things in a more sober light; starting with the recognition that the war was only just beginning. Furthermore, the existing manpower reserves, not to mention the supplies of military food, ammunition, clothing, and equipment, were all severely depleted as a result of the previous year’s campaigning. As a result, until such time as these vital resources could be replaced, it would be practically impossible to consider pursuing any form of offensive action in early 1813. Then there was the problem that the civilian population still contained a sizeable proportion of pro-American sympathizers, headed by several members of the current provincial legislature. But perhaps most serious, in their judgement, was the fact that the senior military commander and now provincial administrator, General Sheaffe, although an able battlefield commander and strict disciplinarian over his troops, was far less able to adapt to the political and social manoeuvring required of his new political responsibilities.
As a result, he was unable to hold together the alliances that his predecessor, Brock, had painstakingly forged. Nor could he persuade Prevost to send vitally needed supplies and ammunition for his troops and Native allies, leading an increasing number of his own officers to question his leadership, discontent amongst his Native allies, and calls from certain members of the Upper Canadian Legislature for his replacement. Matters grew so serious that Sheaffe’s health deteriorated under the strain of the responsibility and, for a short time in January 1813, the various departmental and administrative functionaries did the real administration of the war effort in Upper Canada. Receiving word of these troubles in Upper Canada, Prevost took the extraordinary measure of travelling up to York from his headquarters at Quebec during the coldest and worst part of the winter. After meeting with Sheaffe, Prevost went on an inspection tour of the Niagara positions before returning to express his full support and confidence in Sheaffe, temporarily squashing the incipient revolution.
As the winter progressed, the various strategists and campaign planners on both sides of the conflict looked to their maps to determine where the next stage of the fight for control of the Canadas was to take place, once spring had arrived and the new campaign season had begun. The story of which will be told in the second part of this series.
NOTES
Abbreviations:
LAC: Library and Archives of Canada.
AOO: Archives of Ontario.
CRDH: Ernest Cruikshank, The Documentary History of the Campaigns upon the Niagara Frontier 1812–1814, 9 Volumes (Welland, ON: Tribune Press, 1896–1908).
CGMC: Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Archives, B00-11, A. Conger Goodyear War of 1812 Manuscripts, 1779–1862.
SBD1812: William C.H. Wood, Select British Documents of the War of 1812 (Toronto: Champlain Society
