Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
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July 22, 1812: [Upper Canada] Upper Canada governor, Major General Isaac Brock, issues an official rebuttal and repudiation of General Hull’s demands for the surrender of Upper Canada to the Americans.
August 1, 1812: [Lower Canada] News arrives at Quebec City that the British government has repealed its contentious Orders-in-Council affecting American maritime trading rights with Britain’s wartime enemy, France. Because these issues were cited by the American government as the principal reason and cause for the war being declared, Sir George Provost writes to Major General Henry Dearborn, recommending an armistice until the U.S. government’s position on settling the outstanding issues between the two governments is known. As a result, a regional suspension of hostilities is established.
August 11, 1812: [Detroit frontier] Hearing that Major General Brock is sending reinforcements to the Detroit frontier, Brigadier General Hull abandons the American invasion into Upper Canada and retreats back across the Detroit River
August 13, 1812: [Washington] President Madison and Secretary of War William Eustis officially reject the armistice proposals made by Sir George Prevost and order a recommencement of hostilities to conquer Canada.
August 16, 1812: [Detroit frontier] British forces under Major General Brock, supported by Native allies under Tecumseh, cross the Detroit River, advance on Detroit, and intimidate Brigadier General Hull into surrendering his entire garrison. In addition, the Territory of Michigan is deemed as being ceded to the British Crown and becomes a de-facto part of Upper Canada.
October 13, 1812: [Niagara frontier] The Battle of Queenston Heights. U.S. forces invade Upper Canada at Queenston and succeed in establishing a beachhead that controls the village and the “heights.” Major General Brock is killed leading a direct frontal counterattack. Later in the day, Major General Roger Sheaffe arrives with reinforcements from Fort George at Newark, leads a successful flanking counterattack upon the American position, and routs their line. During the course of the battle, many U.S. militia troops stand on their constitutional rights and refuse to cross into Upper Canada to participate in the invasion.
November 28, 1812: [Niagara frontier] The Battle of Frenchman’s Creek. U.S. forces make landings at Fort Erie and Frenchman’s Creek in an attempt to create a bridgehead for an invasion. While initially successful and overrunning the riverside batteries, British countermoves cause many American troops to abandon the attempt and leave in the remaining boats, stranding the remainder of the American force. As a result, British counterattacks quickly retake the positions and fend off a follow-up wave of American boats bringing reinforcements. In response, U.S. forces at Buffalo effectively mutiny against their commander, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, and the threat of invasion of Upper Canada collapses on the Niagara frontier.
December 3, 1812: [Washington] U.S. Secretary of War William Eustis resigns under a cloud of criticism for his mishandling of the American war effort to date.
CHAPTER 2
Pre-emptive Strikes
As 1813 began, the military events of 1812 played a major role in the plans developed by both sides for the upcoming campaign season. To the American government, its previous military defeats were embarrassments, but ones that could be rectified by the provision of future victories. On the other hand, the loss of the Territory of Michigan to the authority of the British Crown as part of the surrender at Detroit was a political disaster that almost toppled the administration and was looked on as a stain upon the national pride of the United States.
Furthermore, following Hull’s surrender, reports accumulated of Native warriors from the British alliance robbing and attacking wounded or sick American soldiers, terrorizing civilians, and looting isolated homes. Although these reports also repeatedly documented that whenever they were around, the British troops and their officers tried to restrain or prevent these depredations, these details of fact were not allowed to mitigate the political advantage these events gave to the War Hawks in calling for a massive retaliatory expansion of the American war effort.
One particularly vehement congressman, Henry Clay, stated:
Canada innocent? Canada unoffending? Is it not in Canada that the tomahawk of the savage has been moulded into its death-like form? Has it not been from Canadian magazines, Malden [Amherstburg] and others, that these supplies have been issued? Supplies which have enabled the savage hordes to butcher the garrison of Chicago and to commit other horrid murders? Was it not by the joint co-operation of Canadians and Indians that a remote American fort Michilimackinac, was assailed and reduced while in ignorance of war? What does this war represent? The united energies of one people arrayed against the combined energies of another![1]
North of the border, Sir George Prevost, the senior British commander, also saw this ceding as a worst-case scenario. Only from his point of view, his troops’ occupation of Michigan would become a cause that would unite the chronically divided political cabals in Washington, and precipitate a major backlash of American public opinion in favour of the continuation of the war. Despite his personal desire to withdraw his military forces back across the Detroit River and hand the territory back to American control, the need to maintain the vital Native support in preserving Upper Canada effectively forced Prevost to maintain the occupation. On the other hand, he was just as determined not to send any of his extensive reserves of troops or supplies west into Upper Canada, or beyond, to bolster the British positions; instead, his principal focus of protecting and maintaining Lower Canada and the Maritime colonies remained paramount.
At the same time, Prevost’s local commander, Colonel Henry Proctor, was in a no-win situation. Isolated at the far end of a tenuous and intermittent supply line with a miniscule force of worn-out regular troops and a militia of varying degrees of enthusiasm and loyalty, Proctor was expected to not only defend his frontier in Upper Canada, but also occupy, control, and defend a huge new undefined border against the threat of American military retaliation. He was also responsible for maintaining an alliance with an unreliable and constantly changing balance of power within the Native nations, who demanded he uphold their claims on the newly occupied territory; not to mention supply their warriors and dependents with their every need in food and supplies. At the same time, he had inherited a huge region of American territory, occupied by potentially or actively hostile civilian settlers who demanded his protection against the hostilities of his Native allies. Finally, he had reliable intelligence that the U.S. military were indeed preparing a large expeditionary force to retake Michigan, Detroit, and press on into Upper Canada.
As a result, he recognized that if he maintained his extended positions, he could not possibly hold out against an American counter assault. On the other hand, if he retreated it would mean abandoning Michigan’s civilian populace to probable escalating Native violence; while at the same time alienating those same Natives as being an abandonment of his treaty obligations. This, in turn, would threaten their further support of the British war effort and make them more likely to commit the very atrocities he was desperate to prevent in the first place.
THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER RAISIN