as president of South Korea that the Free World unite against communism would only echo his earlier “program” to check Japan. The stalemate in the Korean War further convinced Rhee that if sufficient force could be brought to bear, his enemies would back down or quit.
Rhee’s get-tough policy was suitable for situations in which the vital interests of a major power were clearly threatened. Had it been adopted by England and France in the 1930’s, the rise of Hitler might have been forestalled. But in seeking allies for Korea, Rhee made no allowance for the unwillingness of any power to commit itself outside its areas of interest; indeed, he regarded the United States as having committed a breach of faith in not having protected his homeland against the Japanese. It is ironic that the threat of communism would bring about Rhee’s wildest hope: that the United States become the guarantor of Korean independence.
5: The
TO THOSE few Americans who thought at all of Korea in the frantic days following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hermit Kingdom was merely an early victim of Japanese aggression, a nation which would presumably be restored to freedom after the defeat of the Japanese. But to Syngman Rhee, Pearl Harbor was a dream come true. With the irrepressible optimism of the political exile, he felt certain that Pearl Harbor, by unleashing America’s industrial might against the Axis powers, foreshadowed the defeat of Japan.
America’s entry into the war, which shifted the center of resistance against Japan from China to the United States, bolstered Rhee’s prestige within the Korean independence movement at a time when his stock had reached a low point. In 1940, a new amalgamation of factions within the Provisional Government had resulted in the formation of the Korean Independence Party, under the leadership of Kim Koo. Shortly thereafter, Kim formally supplanted Rhee as president of the Provisional Government. But now events had placed Rhee in a position more favorable than that of his rivals in Shanghai and Chungking. Korea’s redemption would come not through China but from across the Pacific.
In Washington, Rhee refused to recognize his formal demotion but pressed the cause of the Provisional Government as its Washington representative. When his protestations elicited nothing more than expressions of sympathy from American officials, Rhee condemned them as stupid, pro-Japanese, or pro-Russian. To Secretary of State Hull he wrote:
“The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea is the sole representative of the Korean people, whether they are resident in Korea proper, Manchuria, Siberia, China or elsewhere, and regards itself, on the basis of the treaty of l882, negotiated between the Government of Korea and the Government of the United States, not as a free movement . . . but as the only government agency of Korea in existence.1
Rhee’s claims were, of course, unfounded, The old treaty of friendship between the United States and the Korean monarchy had nothing to do with the American choice regarding which Korean government to recognize. Though it was later demonstrated that it had considerable support within Korea, the Provisional Government had not in any sense of the word been chosen by the Korean people. Rhee’s greatest obstacle, however, was that Korea itself did not enter into Allied war plans and therefore conjured up no sense of immediacy among American officialdom. In early 1942, the Pacific War Council discussed the possibility of granting some form of recognition to the Provisional Government, but decided to postpone any action until it might be more useful in arousing Korean opposition to Japan. As for regular diplomatic recognition, the U.S. position was summarized in reference to Korean participation in the post-war United Nations conference.
“The United Nations which are represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organization all have legally constituted governing authorities whereas the ‘Korean Provisional Government’ and other Korean organizations do not possess at the present time the qualities requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority. The ‘Korean Provisional Government’ has never exercised administrative authority over any part of Korea, nor can it be regarded as representative of the Korean people of today. Due to geographical and other factors its following even among exiled Koreans is inevitably limited. It is the policy of this Government in dealing with groups such as the ‘Korean Provisional Government’ to avoid taking action which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish.”2
An area in which Rhee enjoyed some success, however, was that of gaining recognition of Korean nationality apart from the Japanese citizenship that had been forced upon the Koreans. Through Attorney-General Biddle and Secretary of War Stimson, he pressed for exemption of Koreans in the United States from alien restrictions such as those requiring identification certificates and prohibiting the possession of cameras. The attorney-general issued an order to this effect, and Secretary Stimson acknowledged that he was “fully appreciative of the feelings of the many loyal Koreans now resident in this country who have never been in sympathy with the government imposed upon their homeland by military conquest.”3
Partly as a result of the Anglo-American policy of giving priority to the defeat of Germany rather than Japan, it was not until the Cairo conference of November 1943 that Allied war aims concerning Korea were spelled out. The communiqué—framed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek—stated that “the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” Stalin gave the communique his blessing at Teheran.
Among restless Koreans, the expression “in due course” brought a mixed reaction. From Chungking, Kim Koo denounced the phrase as “absurd,” and demanded independence “the moment the Japanese collapse.” Rhee was equally disturbed. But in Korea, where the qualifying phrase could be interpreted as meaning “shortly,” the attitude was one of jubilation.4
American policy, reflected in the “due course” provision, was conditioned by Roosevelt’s belief in the gradual introduction of self-rule into colonial areas lacking experience in self-government. In 1942 he commented:
“I like to think that the history of the Philippines in the last forty-four years provides in a very real sense a pattern for the future of other small nations and peoples of the world. . . . But . . . we must remember that such a pattern is based on two important factors. The first is that there be a period of preparation through the dissemination of education and the recognition and fulfillment of physical and social and economic needs. The second is that there be a period of training for ultimate independent sovereignty, through the practice of more and more self-government, beginning with local government and passing on through the various steps to complete statehood.”5
This thinking prompted Roosevelt to suggest to Cordell Hull “that Manchuria and Formosa be returned to China and that Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States, and one or two other countries participating.”6
Although Roosevelt’s failure to cite Russia specifically suggested an unawareness of that country’s historic interest in Korea, due allowance was made at Yalta, where the proposal agreed to by Stalin provided for a trusteeship among Britain, Russia, China, and the United States. Nonetheless, the Soviets appeared cool to the prospect of a trusteeship. Averell Harriman quotes the Soviet leader as having asked why there was any need for trusteeship if the Koreans could produce a satisfactory government of their own—which Harriman concluded meant a Communist government. Roosevelt replied that the only experience the United States had in such matters was in the Philippines, where it had taken the people about fifty years to prepare for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be twenty to thirty years. Stalin replied
