[R3] Smith conflates introducing theses with endorsing those theses.
[R4] Smith uses highly ambiguous labels for the theses under discussion.
While these are relatively self-explanatory, a few words about each is in order. As far as R1 is concerned, Smith’s reduction of NTR to T1–T6 is problematic because “the importance of a complex theory consists at least as much in the interconnections it establishes among its novel elements” and “it is very far from being [a reasonably accurate enumeration of the novelties of the ‘new’ theory]” (Burgess 1998, 125–26). Furthermore, this list is so problematic because of what Burgess points out in R2—that the list comes from insufficient engagement with Kripke’s original texts. Evidence of the fact that Smith has not significantly examined Kripke’s work is given in the form of the fact that “he omits from his list important novelties of the ‘new’ theory”, including the “notable example [of] the historical chain account of the reference of a name to its bearer” (Burgess 1998, 126).
Similarly, R3 is supposed to result from the fact that Smith has not only failed to carefully comb the literature after Marcus (1961), but also failed to carefully comb through prior literature. As Soames (1995) pointed out, some of T1–T6 are in fact endorsed by Marcus (1961), but she could not have originated them as she acknowledged following up on work from Smullyan (1947, 1948) and Fitch (1949, 1950). Finally, R4 is meant to draw our attention to phrases from T1–T6 such as “direct reference” and “necessity of identity.” Burgess takes these to be problematic because they are ambiguous and Smith has not checked to be sure that they refer to the same thing when accurately describing a view of Marcus’ and when accurately describing a view of Kripke’s. Again, putting R1–R4 together, Burgess concludes,
As a result of the four methodological errors just enumerated, Smith approaches the texts asking the wrong question. He simply asks whether there are passages in Marcus (1963) that could be read as endorsements of doctrines to which the labels “direct reference” and “necessity of identity” and so on could be applied. (Burgess 1998, 127)
Hence, according to Soames (1995) and Burgess (1998),
(1) Smith (1995a, 1995b) should not have been published in the first place,
(2) even if their main theses could have been argued for responsibly, these actual attempts would still have methodological problems in arguing through T1–T6 as a stand-in for NTR, and
(3) even if they did not, the individual attributions of T1–T6 would all be problematic.
§1.3 Oddities in Soames’ and Burgess’ Responses
Now that we have sketched the basic contours of this debate, we are in a position to move toward saying something about it. Remember, my ultimate goal is to say that Smith has gotten some things right and some things wrong, with similar claims about Soames and Burgess. I will also argue that part of the explanation for this situation is that all three have had their focus in the wrong place. We should not primarily be concerned with Kripke and we should not be concerned with charges of plagiarism or misunderstanding. Rather, we should be primarily concerned with Marcus (even if occasionally in relation to how much credit she has gotten relative to Kripke). Furthermore, I suspect that, and will argue for the conclusion that, a significant cause of the insufficient amount of credit Marcus has received has been her gender—a social phenomenon. Because of that, we ought to be looking at trends within social groups and institutions, rather than isolated, individual actors. In particular, we will look at the institution of academic philosophy as a whole as culprit and gendered discursive injustice as the charge, which will explain this situation.
Before we get to that explanation, though, we need to show that there is something in need of explanation. For this, we will turn to a critique of some of Soames’ and Burgess’ work, since their work is clearer and more precise than Smith’s. In doing so, we could choose to either give external or internal critiques. External critiques of a view are criticisms that come from an ideology or standpoint different from the view being critiqued. Internal critiques, by contrast, criticize a view on its defender’s own terms. They show that the position taken does not live up the principles that it initially grew out of. Internal critiques like these can sometimes be more powerful due to the fact that they grant many assumptions to the opponent. It is one thing to be able to criticize your view using my own beliefs and ideology. It is quite another to be able to criticize your view using your own beliefs, ideology, and worldview.
Given this rhetorical advantage internal critiques have, I will place my focus there. In particular, I will argue that there are some internal oddities to several of Soames’ and Burgess’ responses such that, even if we accept some of what they have to say, we can still support the claim that Marcus has been underappreciated and underrecognized. These oddities will be part of the case that there is something in need of explanation for which discursive injustice will serve as explanans.
Soames
Turning to that internal critique, it is important to note that Soames admits that a combination of three to four of these six theses (namely, a combination of T1, T3, T4, and T5) originated in Marcus’ work. That is to say, the individual theses—T1, T3, and an implicit acceptance of T5—do not originate with Marcus. Soames holds that Smullyan and Fitch also argued for T1 and T3, while also implicitly endorsing T5. Even on Soames’ picture, the combination of these with T4—the necessity of identity (on the variables, not proper names, reading)—is original with Marcus’ views, though. This is significant on its own. If Marcus can be uniquely credited with more than half of the six theses connected to NTR in the debate, shouldn’t she receive more credit than she has? This is especially the case given that there is the additional oddity that Soames’ hesitation to give complete credit to Marcus on T4 is at odds with Kripke, who says “Marcus says that identities between names are necessary” (Kripke 1980, 100).
Of course, one may obviously respond to this that Soames admits that Marcus, Smullyan, and Fitch, “deserve a degree of recognition that they are often not given” (Soames 1995, 200) and “should be praised for their prescient insights” (Soames 1995, 208). This is not a completely satisfactory response, though. Part of Soames’ point in connecting Smullyan and Fitch to T1, T3, and T5 seems to be that there is something odd about Smith’s singling out of Marcus. Given that Marcus clearly did much more with respect to T4 than Smullyan or Fitch, this is at odds with Soames’ own points. Furthermore, Soames himself gives further reason to single out Marcus as having been particularly wronged in the lack of credit and recognition she has received. As mentioned earlier, part of his justification for saying Marcus is not deserving of “founder” status is that her discussion was not long and detailed enough. That said, Soames also admits that “although Marcus’ discussion of these points is brief, it is more detailed and explicit than those of Smullyan and Fitch” (Soames 1995, 197). Again, putting Soames’ own views together, this would mean Marcus is significantly more deserving of recognition than Smullyan or Fitch.3
While I think the preceding gives reason to believe that Marcus’ contributions to NTR clearly deserve more recognition if T1–T6 is a good way to carry out the debate, more needs to be said about this antecedent. Remember, this is the main thrust of Burgess (1998)—that Smith’s (1995a, 1995b) methodological errors set us out on the wrong trajectory to begin with. So, in order for my responses to Soames (1995) to have as much weight as I would like them to, we will need to have something to say in response to Burgess’ (1998) R1–R4 as well. Again, given its rhetorical advantages, I will focus on internal critiques of Burgess’ thoughts on these four reasons. In particular, I will argue that R1 and R4 are inconsistent with his praise of Soames’ historical work, whereas R2 and R3 are problems that Burgess’ own work falls prey to. Given this, Burgess cannot consistently say we ought to dismiss Smith’s work while promoting his own and Soames’.
