war. It would also provoke a drop in the Soviet standard of living which could in turn lead to the first widespread labour unrest in the Soviet Union itself.
It was probably with this in mind that the Soviet leaders decided to back Mr. Gierek, tacitly endorsing his proposals by reporting them in some detail in the controlled Press, even though the mention of political reforms being forced on a communist government by “social dissatisfaction” made astonishing reading for Soviet citizens.
Even if the Polish strikers accepted Mr. Gierek’s proposals for free elections to the government unions, rather than holding out for the establishment of independent unions, the party’s power could be seriously reduced. Poland would then have a degree of political pluralism which does not exist in any other Warsaw Pact country. Under the circumstances, new and tighter restrictions on contacts between Polish and Soviet citizens would be inevitable.
The Soviet leadership can probably live with these changes, provided that Poland’s essential allegiance to the Socialist bloc is not called into question and that no opening is created whereby the party could lose overall control.
The Soviet Union’s policy towards its allies is dictated by the expediencies of maintaining control over a vast and diverse empire. As long as communist regimes keep power, these expediencies can change.
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