decentralized unionism with political overtones of shop floor mobilization had developed. Ideological differences between Peronist and non-Peronist workers made space for a common opposition to the government. Labor demands continued to be made after 1969 but they must always be understood within a larger political framework that created an alliance among various social sectors. The working class became increasingly militant and was joined by middle class students. It was this grass roots protagonism that was feared most by the military. As Perón had already said in 1944, a leaderless crowd was dangerous to society because it could be taken advantage of by agitators and revolutionaries. The military, the union leaders, and the revolutionaries all concluded that the Cordobazo revealed that the fighting spirit of the Argentine working class remained unbroken despite years of military repression, and that its capacity for resistance had neither been domesticated by the Peronist hierarchy nor paralyzed by Perón’s prolonged absence. On the contrary, the Cordobazo showed that the people could become violent, that the violence might be spontaneous, and that this collective violence was begging for the direction of a revolutionary vanguard. Those who succeeded in captivating the potentially violent collectivity could overthrow all principal institutions of society.
Cordoban Violence and Euphoria
The months preceding the Cordobazo had been turbulent. The Cordoban unions associated in the combative CGTA union central had held numerous street mobilizations against the deterioration of worker rights and called for mass mobilizations and armed resistance.5 Cordoban students were protesting the restrictions on student enrollment, the raise in meal tickets, and the deaths incurred in Rosario and Corrientes. Metal workers were complaining about the unfavorable pay scale differences between Córdoba and Buenos Aires, while auto workers were angry about the increase of the work week by four hours. Cordoban bus drivers were intermittently on strike about a planned reorganization of public transport, and electricians were opposing the privatization of the provincial electricity company. Finally, Córdoba’s middle class was upset by the higher property taxes imposed in early 1969.6 Each social sector had its ax to grind with the Onganía dictatorship, but they shared a resentment of the abuses and injustices suffered. Their specific economic grievances were framed in a dissatisfaction with the political proscription and cultural patronizing by a dictatorial government which even forbade certain types of bathing suits.7 Working class, middle class, and student resentment coalesced in May 1969. Two events in the streets of Córdoba set the tone of the protests and established the practice of violent engagement that was to erupt on an unimaginable scale.
The rescindment of the English Saturday was received with much indignation by the Cordoban auto workers. The English Saturday (sábado inglés) meant that certain categories of industrial workers in several provinces received a forty-eight-hour remuneration for a work week of forty-four hours. This privilege had been won in 1957, and the auto workers of the SMATA union assembled on 14 May to decide about their protest strategy. In the middle of a heated debate, the police launched tear gas into the enclosed space. Six thousand asphyxiated workers ran for the only major exit and once in the street were attacked. The workers responded with such force that the police fled from the scene.8
The second violent street confrontation occurred during protests against the death of Juan José Cabral in Corrientes. Together with workers from various Cordoban labor unions, thousands of students took to the streets on 23 May. Just as had happened a week earlier at the auto workers assembly, the police attacked with tear gas to disperse the crowd. The students retreated to the Clínicas neighborhood in downtown Córdoba and began to erect barricades. The police tried to overrun the makeshift obstacles but were repelled with molotov cocktails. It would take until the early hours of the next day before the police succeeded in conquering the area.9 These two street victories enhanced the confidence of workers and students, sealed their political pact, and motivated them to press their demands with even more vigor. Street battle practices—mobilizations, barricades, molotov cocktails—that were established then were used with even greater intensity a week later.
On 28 May, student and union leaders met to coordinate the massive protest of 29 May. They anticipated a considerable police repression and divided the city into four zones of contestation in order to disperse the security forces. The workers of Luz y Fuerza (electricians), the UOM (metal workers), SMATA (auto workers), and UTA (bus drivers) would march upon the center of Córdoba from two directions, while the students were planning to gather near the university buildings in the city center or join the worker columns along the way. The final meeting place was the center (casco chico)of Córdoba where all major political, financial, and cultural institutions were located. The SMATA and Luz y Fuerza unions would supply their men with metal bars, ball bearings, caltrops (miguelitos), molotov cocktails, sling shots, and small firearms in case the police would try to repress the street mobilization.10
At around eleven o’clock on Thursday morning, 29 May, a column of four thousand auto workers depart on foot under the leadership of the Peronist SMATA leader Elpidio Torres from the IKA-Renault plant at Santa Isabel, eight kilometers outside the city. Their number swells with thousands of students and workers as they walk on the Avenida Vélez Sarsfield to the CGT union central headquarters in downtown Córdoba. Other groups of students advance from Avenida Colón together with the electricians and bus drivers, but are forced to take an alternative route when the police blocks their way. Elsewhere, workers abandon factories and also converge on the city. Meanwhile, the two principal columns are informed by motorized workers about the police forces ahead of them. Unlike the case of the Rosariazo where the police tried to prevent the crowd from taking shape, the police forces in Córdoba are determined to defend the center against the penetration of the advancing protesters. The situation escalates when the auto worker column reaches the Plaza Vélez Sarsfield several blocks from the CGT building, and only five blocks from Plaza San Martín. A large police force lies in wait. A confrontation becomes inevitable. The police shoot tear gas at the protesters, and are pelted in return with homemade tear gas bombs. As the crowd diverts to another boulevard, the police open fire and kill the worker Máximo Mena. Indignation reverberates through the crowd and angry protesters charge at the police who withdraw in haste to the Plaza San Martín.
The other column of workers and students headed by Agustín Tosco also encounters stiff police opposition. They are attacked at their gathering point outside the headquarters of the electricians’ union. They succeed finally in crossing the six blocks that separate them from the autoworkers near the Plaza Vélez Sarsfield.
At one o’clock in the afternoon, the united crowd turns violent. Union leaders Tosco and Torres try to get a grip on the collective violence, but to no avail. Cars are overturned to erect barricades. Furniture is taken from stores and offices to reinforce the obstructions. Middle class residents participate actively in the protest, and throw paper on the street to feed the inflamed barricades. Every large display window in sight is smashed. When a car dealer tries to prevent his cars from being burnt in the street, one of the participants responds: “No complaints, sir. If you have so much money, then you must have taken it from the people. We are destroying what is ours. Because we can’t take it home, we simply smash it to pieces.”11 The violence of the people is specifically directed at the symbols of repression and privilege: banks, government buildings, police stations, foreign companies, and luxury stores.
Tosco remarks that afternoon: “This can’t be possible. This is incredible. The people went by themselves. Here, the leaders died…. the people went by themselves. Nobody is in charge now. It all slipped through our fingers.”12 The same day, an official communiqué reads: “The city of Córdoba has been ruined by popular hordes that destroyed everything in their way, without respecting private property and without taking fundamental differences between large, small and middle-size businesses into account.”13
A quarter after one o’clock in the afternoon, the commander of the Third Army Corps of Córdoba, General Sánchez Lahoz, installs martial law and orders the protesters to abandon the barricades and return home. Many workers leave but others remain to witness what
