Club, the exclusive meeting place of Argentina’s landed elite. Police and firemen were standing by passively as the fire burned priceless libraries and art treasures. The greatest loss was caused by two anonymous bombs that killed seven people and wounded ninety-three at the Plaza de Mayo. The arrest of around four thousand anti-Peronists intensified the polarization in Argentine society.62
Two weeks later, during his speech at the 1 May demonstration, Perón tried to rein in the street violence by asking the crowd to leave matters to him. However, he also threatened the opposition with unleashing the crowd’s destructive force: “I ask you, comrades, not to burn down anything anymore, not to do those things. Because when something needs to be burned down, then I will go ahead of you. But then, if this would be necessary, then history will record the greatest bonfire that humanity will have lit until today.”63 The fears of those weary of 17 October seemed to be coming true. Perón had the people in his grip. He had inculcated a leader-crowd model that allowed him to manipulate the popular masses. Perón’s militant language drove his opponents into one camp, a camp that became reinforced with the powerful Catholic Church when Perón directed his attention to Argentina’s youth.
Perón repeated often that the youth held the future of the Peronist movement, and his words proved prophetic in the 1970s.64 The Union of High School Students or UES (Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios) was the principal organization to captivate the youth. The UES was conceived in 1953 as a sports organization with separate branches for boys and girls. The combination of rumors about Perón’s more than normal interest in the adolescent girls using the sport facilities of the presidential summer home at Olivos in January 1954, and the annoyance of anti-Peronist parents at the growing hold of the State on their children, led to the charge that the Peronist rule was morally corrupt. When priests advised parents from the pulpit to keep their daughters away from the UES clubs, time was ripe for a showdown in the streets of Argentina.65
The crowd became an obvious choice of weapons in a society in which “to win the street” (ganar la calle) had been a successful Peronist tactic since 17 October 1945. The Student Day celebrations on 21 September 1954 in Córdoba became the first major occasion for a public contest. The march of the Peronist UES drew an estimated 10,000 high school students, while the rally organized by the Catholic Action (Acción Católica) gathered 80,000 participants.66 This shocking defeat worried Perón. On 10 November 1954 he pointed an accusing finger at Córdoba’s Bishop Lafitte as an enemy of the government and threatened to release the Peronist masses into the streets.67
The surprising defeat of the Peronist mobilization in Córdoba was followed by an even stronger blow in Buenos Aires. On 8 December 1954 the Church was to celebrate the Feast of the Immaculate Conception and the end of the Marian Year. That same day, the Argentine people were invited to accompany Perón to the Aeroparque airport for a homecoming welcome of Pascual Pérez, the new world champion boxer. The arrival of the flyweight boxer had been deliberately planned to coincide with the religious ceremony at the Plaza de Mayo. A crowd of 100,000 to 200,000 faithful greatly surpassed the reception crowd of 4,000 at the airport. The people overflowed the cathedral and inundated the Plaza de Mayo.68 The crowd had symbolically ousted Perón from the square he had dominated for nine years. In revenge, Perón annulled the 1946 legislation that had made religious education compulsory in public schools.
No longer able to win the street, Perón harassed the Church by legalizing divorce and prostitution. These reprisals drove larger crowds of disaffected Argentines into the streets, and coalesced an array of anti-Peronist forces around the Church. In the ten months following the Immaculate Conception victory, twelve large Catholic demonstrations took place in Buenos Aires. These crowds formed generally after mass in the cathedral at the Plaza de Mayo, often resulted in violent confrontations with Peronist supporters, and ended in the arrest of Catholic demonstrators. Meanwhile, the retaliatory exchanges between the Peronist government and the Argentine Catholic Church continued unabated. Perón declared on 20 May 1955 the official separation of Church and State. The Church responded with a pastoral letter postulating the divinity of the Church and prepared for a massive show of force that developed into a tragic crowd contest.69 Many factors contributed to Perón’s downfall in 1955, such as a lackluster economy, military discontent, the restriction of civil liberties, and Perón’s growing authoritarianism, but most scholars agree that the ongoing power struggle with the Argentine Catholic Church was the most important cause.70 This conflict was fought out prominently in the street as crowd competitions between Peronists rallied around Perón and anti-Peronists galvanized around the Church.
June 9, 1955, was the day for the traditional Corpus Cristi procession around Plaza de Mayo. Pretending concern about the disruption of traffic in the business center, the archdiocese asked for permission to postpone the procession to Saturday June 11. The real objective was to maximize attendance. The request was denied but the Church went ahead as planned. A combative Perón responded to this challenge: “For every person our enemy can bring out, we shall bring out ten.”71 The boxer Pascual Pérez was enlisted to draw the competing crowd. Pasqualito had successfully defended his title in Tokyo, and a celebration was organized on June 11.
Perón’s bluff ended in total failure. Only a small Peronist crowd appeared at the Luna Park celebration against 100,000 to 250,000 people who gathered at the Plaza de Mayo. The crowd walked in silence through Avenida de Mayo to the National Congress, carrying the yellow papal flag and waving white handkerchiefs.72 The crowd was religious in name but political in nature. Even noted anti-Catholics participated in this demonstration congregating anti-Peronists from all political persuasions and walks of life.73
The Peronists had to respond to this public humiliation. An analogy with the 19 September 1945 Constitution and Liberty March was forced upon them. Perón warned that “those who sow winds can reap storms,” and added fuel to the situation by expelling two bishops from Argentina for inciting the troubles of 11 June. The CGT union central announced a 24-hour strike on Tuesday 14 June as a show of support to the government, and began to prepare its members for mobilization.
On Thursday morning 16 June 1955 Perón was warned of a possible navy insurrection. In fact, the coup d’état had been in the making since February but the organizers had not succeeded in gaining enough support from the army, even though there were widespread anti-Peronist sentiments in the force ever since the failed rebellions of September 1951 and February 1952. The discovery of the plot demanded swift action. An air strike on the presidential palace had been planned for 16 June at 10:00 A.M. to assassinate Perón. Armed civilian groups would move in to secure the seat of government. The attack planes would take advantage of a fly-over planned in tribute to the Argentine flag which had allegedly been burnt during the Corpus Cristi demonstration.74 Dense fog prevented the planes from taking off on time, but when they finally did and released their fragmentation bombs at 12:40 P.M., the devastation among the people assembled to watch the fly-over was horrendous. One bomber made a direct hit on the Casa Rosada. The first civilians were killed by the shattered glass of the Treasury Ministry. Many more casualties fell when a bomb hit a trolley. Perón was unhurt. He had taken refuge in the War Ministry that morning after hearing of rebellions at the Navy Mechanics School (ESMA) and Ezeiza international airport.75
A second bombardment was carried out at 1:10 P.M. which again caused many deaths. Meanwhile, groups of Peronists began arriving at the Plaza de Mayo. Shouting “Perón, Perón,” they gathered in front of the Casa Rosada. Was this crowd spontaneous or organized? A parallel appears with 17 October 1945. The rank and file had been put on the alert and acted when the crucial moment arrived. A small crowd had already congregated at the Plaza de Mayo before the call for a general mobilization went out. At 1:12 P.M., the CGT issued an urgent broadcast: “Comrades, the CGT gave a slogan on Tuesday: On the alert! The moment has arrived to carry it out. All workers of the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires must gather immediately near the CGT building [Independencia and Azopardo streets]. All means of transport must be taken, willing or unwilling. Comrades! Instructions will be given at the CGT building.
