mourning through public recitation and the chanting of elegies (rowzeh-khani); ta‘ziyeh (a theatrical representation of the tragedy); and the Moharram procession (dasteh).
It is no exaggeration to say that the whole Iranian population, more than 90 percent of them Shiite Muslims, go through the ritual every year. Even the lives of nonbelievers and religious minorities are affected by the ritual. Moharram is the first month of the Arabic/Islamic lunar year. It is often called mah-e azadari, the month of mourning or “the time of sin.” Public morale forbids weddings and marriage preparations during the month of Moharram. No joyful ceremonies take place; TV and radio programs are cheerless, “weighty” (sangin), and “serious” (jeddi). During the ten days of Moharram, the whole society is driven into a state of depression. TV and radio broadcast programs about the Karbala tragedy and the rituals. Thus, even non-Muslims are involved, albeit indirectly.23
The Karbala tragedy has also affected Iranian art and literature. Ta‘ziyeh has been praised and developed as a particularly Iranian style of drama. There is a painting style related to the Karbala tragedy, known as pardeh or “coffeehouse painting,” that visually narrates the battle. A new generation of artists have developed “coffeehouse painting” into a modern art genre known as the “Saqakhaneh School” (see Chelkowski and Dabashi 1999). The main purpose of the Ashura rituals is to maximize lamentation. Shiite tradition encourages and promotes weeping as a way to salvation. Weeping for Hossein, called the “Lord of Martyrs” (Sayyed-ul Shohada), not only brings divine forgiveness, but also contributes to the triumph of the Shiite (see Enayat 1982: 182). A recurrent expression in official speeches is that “Islam needs tears.” Tears would even help Imam Hossein: “A learned man saw in a dream that the Imam [Hossein] had recovered from all the wounds [inflicted on him at Karbala]. He asked the Imam how his wounds had healed so miraculously. ‘With the tears of my mourners,’ replied the Imam.”24
As Motahari formulates it, the Karbala tragedy is a “school” (maktab) and a “culture” (farhang) (see Motahari 1379/2000). Another Islamist, Emalduldin Baghi, in his book Jamm‘e Shenashi Qiyam-e Emam Hossein (Sociology of Imam Hossein’s Movement), agrees that the rituals of Ashura fulfill various social functions. They protect the society from cultural impurity and alienation and revive ethical values, such as “faith,” “martyrdom,” “sacrifice,” “dignity.” The cult of Ashura guarantees social cohesion and represents an “ideal lifestyle.” It imposes a norm and is a means for social control and guidance of the young people (1379/2000: 76–82). Thus, the Karbala tragedy is more than a historical event. As Michael Fischer puts it, it provides a paradigm, because it is
(a) a story expandable to be all-inclusive of history, cosmology, and life’s problems; (b) a background contrast against which the story is given heightened perceptual value: in this case, primarily Sunni conception, but other religions at times serve the same function; and (c) ritual or physical drama to embody the story and maintain high levels of emotional investment. (Fischer 1980: 27)
Good et al. (1985) and Good and Good (1988) also believe that the Moharram ritual organizes a “prototypical” view of the social order and the self in Iran. The central concept of the Karbala paradigm is “self-abasement.” Mourning and self-flagellation represent the feelings of guilt of all Shiite Muslims who were not there to help Imam Hossein. They represent the Kufan people repenting their abandonment of Hossein. How a “sense of guilt” and “valued dysphoria” has been manipulated and utilized in the political mobilization before and after the Revolution will be examined below. A recurring slogan since the Revolution has been “We are not like Kufans to abandon the Imam alone” (Ma ahl-e Kufe nistim Emam tanha bemanad).
Before discussing the role of the Karbala tragedy in the emergence of the current social order in Iran, I want to comment that, despite the fact that the shadows of the overwhelming ritual of Moharram reach out into all parts of the nation, there are subtle variations in the interpretation of the Karbala tragedy. For instance, in rural areas the Moharram ritual is only an excuse for teenage boys to have fun. Being together in long nights spent at the hosseinye, they make jokes or play cards (Fischer and Abedi 1990: chap. 1).
One way to avoid a fatalistic and static representation of Iran—as entirely subject to the ubiquitous sadness (e.g., in Good et al. 1985; Good and Good 1988)—is by “historicizing” the process whereby the Karbala tragedy has been transformed from a central symbol of folk religion into the focus of a state ideology.
The Politicization of Karbala
For Ayatollah Khomeini, the Karbala events had transformed not only the history of Islam, but the whole of human history. Imam Hossein’s heroic movement was depicted as an archetype representing the eternal struggle of Goodness against Evil, injustice, and tyranny. This new interpretation of the Karbala tragedy became popular among young people, despite the disapproval then shown by orthodox clerics.
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
