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hitler & AMERICA
hitler & AMERICA
Klaus P. Fischer
PENN
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
Copyright © 2011 University of Pennsylvania Press
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher.
Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Fischer, Klaus P., 1942–
Hitler and America / Klaus P. Fischer. — 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8122-4338-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Hitler, Adolf, 1889–1945—Political and social views. 2. Hitler, Adolf, 1889–1945—Psychology. 3. Germany—Foreign relations—1933–1945. 4. Germany—Foreign relations—United States. 5. United States—Foreign relations—Germany. 6. World War, 1939–1945. I. Title.
DD247.H5F525 2011
327.4307309’043—dc222011011167
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. Hitler’s Split Image of America
CHAPTER 2. Hitler Takes Risks and America Legislates Itself into Neutrality: 1933–1937
CHAPTER 3. Hitler’s Year: 1938
CHAPTER 4. Hitler’s War against the West: 1939–1941
CHAPTER 5. The World Will Hold Its Breath: 1941
CHAPTER 6. The Tide of War Shifts in Favor of Hitler’s Opponents
CHAPTER 7. Prospects for a Separate Peace in 1943
CHAPTER 8. Hitler and the “Unnatural Alliance”: 1944–1945
CHAPTER 9. “This War against America Is a Tragedy”
CONCLUSION: Hitler and the End of a Greater Reich
INTRODUCTION
A book about Hitler and America? The brief title calls for an explanation. Half a dozen books have been written about Hitler and the United States, most of them dealing with German-American foreign policy between 1933 (the year Hitler came to power) and 1941 (the year he declared war on the United States). Diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States between 1933 and 1941 should, of course, play an important role in any discussion of Hitler and America, but not at the expense of exploring the origins and development of Hitler’s views. Many things in America during the 1930s caught his attention and influenced his decisions. They include American isolationism; the activities of Nazi sympathizers in America, especially the German-American Bund; American public opinion; American Jewish reactions to anti-Semitic events in Germany; and American-German business connections. Did Hitler have rigid prejudices against the United States that he never modified? Or did his perceptions change over time? Historians who have dealt with the subject of Hitler and the United States have often argued that Hitler was either ignorant or misinformed about America.
I hope that mine may be a fresh approach to this subject. It is now more than sixty years ago that Hitler committed suicide in his bunker beneath the Reich chancellery, sufficient time to permit us to assess his intentions with a greater degree of clarity than was possible a generation ago. The vast amount of material now available may be sufficient to fill out the record on almost any aspect of World War II. It is highly unlikely that many “new” documents will be found. What may be valuable now are reconsiderations of certain crucial issues.
One of these issues is Hitler’s view of America and its role in world affairs. Most historians have argued that Hitler did not pay any attention to the United States in the 1930s, that if he thought of America at all, he did so through the prism of his ideology, which necessarily compromised his vision. Many have claimed that Hitler felt contempt for Americans because they were a mongrel people, incapable of higher culture or great creative achievements. Yet Hitler had considerable respect for the industrial power of the United States and its people’s capacity for work. Whatever his distorted perceptions may have been, it is wrong to think that Hitler paid no attention to the United States. Indeed, he was better informed about political developments in America than has been customarily assumed.
Hitler did not want a war with either Britain or the United States; he believed that he could achieve his continental ambitions without drawing them into a direct confrontation. He hoped that his reach for hegemony in Europe would not have to lead to the loss of empire for the British. What did he think America would do if he dragged Britain and France—America’s allies in World War I—into a general European war? Hitler hoped that the United States, militarily unprepared and officially neutral, would not intervene before he won his, necessarily short, European war. People close to Hitler said that he had everything calculated beforehand (hat jede Möglichkeit von vornherein einkalkuliert).
