of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās suggests the involvement of the elite behind the scenes. It is also possible, however, that Fāriḥ, who had benefited from Andalusi support in the past, was acting independently of Ibn Sayyid al-Nās and that he was behind the armed commoners. In any case, the “commoners” in question were not completely alien to local politics. If the involvement of non-elites in politics did not produce a complete redrawing of the political map this time, they soon after had a chance to make their presence felt in even more significant ways.
Marīnid Conquests and the Role of the Populace
In 1337, the Marīnid ruler Abū al-Ḥasan (r. 1331–48) took over the ‘Abd al-Wādid capital Tilimsān and became the most powerful monarch in the Maghrib. For the first time since the Almohads (1130–1269), a single dynasty was in the position of being able to bring the entire Maghrib under its rule. Growing Marīnid power threatened the autonomy of Bijāya and other cities in Ifrīqiyā, including Tunis.
Between 1337 and 1346, Abū al-Ḥasan’s influence on Ifrīqiyā expanded greatly.45 For the Ḥafṣid rulers of Bijāya, a consolidation of power on the western frontier did not bode well. Using a strategy that had worked before, the caliph of Tunis, Abū Bakr (d. 1346) sought to placate the Marīnids and hoped that a deal with Aragon would secure naval support in case of an attack.46 In 1342, Abū Bakr officially named his son Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad as heir, and saw it fit to include Abū al-Ḥasan as underwriter of his edict.47 Taking an oath guaranteeing the caliphal succession furthered the Marīnid ruler’s involvement in Ḥafṣid affairs.
At the death of Abū Bakr, his son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar received the pledge of allegiance thanks to the political maneuverings of Ibn Tafrākīn, the leader of the Almohad sheikhs in Tunis.48 Hearing of the death of his father, the official heir to the throne, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad, ran back to the capital to claim his right, but Abū Ḥafṣ would not let that happen and had the heir and another two of his brothers killed. The Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan used this usurpation as a reason to get directly involved in the affairs of Ifrīqiyā.49 He enticed Ibn Tafrākīn to switch camps and join a host of anti-Abū Ḥafṣ groups in support of the Marīnids. In 1347, the Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan led an army to conquer Ifrīqiyā, leaving his son Abū ‘Inān Fāris in charge of his own capital. On his way, he obtained the peaceful submission of the powerful Dawāwida and of governors as far east as Ṭrāblus.
Abū al-Ḥasan took Bijāya from the Ḥafṣid emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh without a fight.50 The Marīnid ruler sent him and his brother, the emir of Qasanṭīna, from Ifrīqiyā to the western cities of Wujda and Naḍrūma, where they “ruled” as his clients. Abū al-Ḥasan then pushed toward Tunis and entered it without much resistance in September of 1347. The Marīnid sultan made a spectacular entry into the city on his horse, flanked on his right-hand side by the leader of the Zughba of the central Maghrib and the Almohad sheikh Ibn Tafrākīn, and on his left by two Ḥafṣid emirs whom he had freed from the jails of Qasanṭīna. He took possession of the palace of Tunis and then left for a campaign in the south to secure the region.
Next, Abū al-Ḥasan ordered an end to a practice that had allowed Bedouins to collect taxes in exchange for their military service, and offered to pay them instead for services rendered. For him, the Bedouins’ regular access to tax revenue gave them too much autonomy. Not wishing to lose this source of income, the Bedouins attempted to overthrow the Marīnids and restore a Ḥafṣid emir in Tunis. A coalition of Bedouin and Ḥafṣid emirs rallied behind the grandson of a former Ḥafṣid pretender by the name of Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām. In 1348, the two armies met and Abū al-Ḥasan’s army, which included many Ifrīqiyāns, disbanded. He barely escaped with his life: loyalty to the Ḥafṣids gained renewed significance in Ifrīqiyā.
The news of the defeat encouraged those who had rebelled against Abū al-Ḥasan. Meanwhile, his own son, Abū ‘Inān, declared himself sultan of Tilimsān and moved on the western territories.51 As soon as Abū ‘Inān let them, the two Ḥafṣid emirs his father had exiled promptly returned to Ifrīqiyā. Once again, the Bijāyans made Abū ‘Abd Allāh their emir. Other members of the Ḥafṣid house rallied against the Marīnids and took back most of Ifrīqiyā. Abū al-Ḥasan was left with nothing but the area immediately surrounding Tunis. After a series of losing battles against Ḥafṣid supporters and Ifrīqiyān Bedouins, Abū al-Ḥasan fled by sea. On his way back to the western Maghrib, he attempted to stop in Bijāya, but was refused entry. He found refuge in the west among the Hintāta of the High Atlas and died a year or so later, unable to unseat his son Abū ‘Inān.
After Abū al-Ḥasan was defeated, the three Ḥafṣid emirs of Bijāya, Qasanṭīna, and Tunis had to reclaim their dominions. The Marīnid interlude had emboldened some Bedouins and each Ḥafṣid emir needed to reassert his dominance over his domain. So frail was the grip these emirs had on power that when Abū ‘Abd Allāh, Bijāya’s emir, ventured out of the city to lead a campaign against Qasanṭīna, he immediately lost control of the western port city of Tadlis. The Marīnid episode meant that only with difficulty could the emir of Bijāya impose his rule over areas he had once controlled securely. Perhaps discouraged by the political situation in which he found himself, Abū ‘Abd Allāh sought the protection of the Marīnid ruler at Tilimsān, Abū ‘Inān, who offered to take care of him only if he renounced his rights over Bijāya. He accepted. In 1352, Bijāya came under Marīnid control. Abū ‘Inān appointed his relative ‘Umar b. ‘Alī al-Waṭṭāsī as governor—but left Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s ḥājib, Fāriḥ, in charge of the city.52
Fāriḥ traveled to Qasanṭīna looking for support against the Marīnids. In his absence, the new pro-Marīnid governor arrived to take over Bijāya, and Ḥafṣid supporters, backed by the Ṣanhāja, openly rebelled against him. They killed a number of judges and pro-Marīnid notables, and sent for Fārih, urging him to return. Unfortunately for him, the rebels soon after changed their minds and joined the Marīnid camp. When he arrived in Bijāya, they killed him, and sent his head to the Marīnid ruler. They then invited the Marīnid governor of Tadlis to become governor of Bijāya. After the Ṣanhāja left town in direction of Tunis, Marīnid officials arrested Fārih’s supporters, including Hilāl, a client of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās, and the judge Muḥammad b. ‘Umar. They also arrested “the leaders of the mob elements (‘uraf’ al-ghawghā’) from among the people of the city” and sent them to a prison in the western Maghrib.53 While it is not clear who the ghawghā’ were, they clearly had ties to judges and influential Andalusi families; and unlike the Ṣanhāja, the ghawghā’ were “people of the city,” and could not just leave town after their defeat.54 It is difficult, however, to identify the ghawghā’ or their political motivations with any more precision than this.55 Ibn Khaldūn would use the same word to describe the group that took over power in Bijāya later that year. It was not, however, surprising to find powerful groups such as the Ṣanhāja, pro-Ḥafṣid notables, and Andalusis involved in this anti-Marīnid rebellion. They each had reasons to oppose the Marīnids or to support their favorite Ḥafṣid. The end result was the same: the Marīnids controlled much of Ifrīqiyā, but the frail coalition that supported them did not hold together for long. Rather than a return of the Ḥafṣids, however, this time they faced an enemy against whom they were unprepared.
Popular Non-Dynastic Rule in Bijāya (1359/60–64)
The Marīnid Abū ‘Inān had appointed the governor of Tadlis, Yaḥyā b. Maymūn, to be governor of Bijāya. But his administration of the city ran counter to the interests of its notables and they sought to eliminate him. For help in doing so, they contacted the Tunisan ḥājib Ibn Tafrākīn and tried to rally the Ḥafṣids again. The emir of Tunis, Abū Isḥāq heeded their call, readied an army, and marched on Bijāya. “When they neared
