Virtuosity in Business. Kevin T. Jackson
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So how does the person having a good character render a decision when faced with morally complicated situations in the real world? To address this important question, we will benefit from having a look at a philosopher who hails not from the peripatoi of ancient Athens but from the Parisian cafes of post-World War II France, the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre.
Chapter 2
Authenticity and Freedom
How could it be an exercise of true freedom to refuse to be open to the very reality which enables our self-realization?
—John Paul II, Fides et Ratio
Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.
—Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness
JAMES IS A branch manager for the Manhattan division of an international commercial bank. His boss tells him that the Manhattan offices are slated to close in a couple of months, soon after the first of the year, and the branch's functions will henceforth be handled in India, where labor costs are considerably cheaper. The executive asks James to keep the news to himself, since regulatory documents will need to be filed first. James promises to keep quiet. A few days later, James's colleague and trusted friend of many years asks him if a rumor floating around the office that the branch is shutting down is true. When James casts his eyes askance, the colleague gets irritated and says, “Hey c'mon, this is serious stuff. In this economic downturn there aren't a lot of jobs out there. Should I be cutting back on the holidays this year and sending out my resume? Just let me know what's up, OK?” What should James do? As a corporate manager, James is bound to uphold confidentiality, and in fact he vowed to do so. However, he's one of only a privileged few who knows about the firm's future plans, and the employee questioning him is his trusted friend.1
According to the Aristotelian view presented in the previous chapter, practicing virtue—that is, finding the right blend of reasons and motives (including emotions) in the face of practical problems or moral dilemmas, such as the one facing James, the fictitious branch manager in the scenario sketched above—produces or leads to the greater perfection (or at least definition) of moral character, as if one's character is somehow a fixed attribute or objective feature of oneself.2 On such a view, for instance, if James decides to help his friend by informing him of the plans for downsizing, such a choice is prompted by the nature of James's underlying character, which reveals the virtues of compassion and loyalty to friends. However, deciding to honor the obligation of confidentiality would be the result of a more dominant component of James's character winning out, a character revealed in the exercise of the virtues of promise keeping and loyalty to the firm. It is against this conventional conception of virtue ethics, which treats a person's character as a collection of objective facts about her, that we should view Sartre's view of human freedom, for Sartre provides a radically different perspective on the nature of character.
To anticipate Sartre's conclusion, the deployment of neither reason nor motives (including emotions) in the pursuit of moral virtue provides an ultimate ground for human action. Reason and motives are placed relative to something much more basic: the agent's freedom. According to a Sartrean point of view,3 a businessperson like James confronting a moral choice, like the one set out above, is free to choose, and by making a free choice, he is creating his existence, much like a writer inventing the characters and plot of a novel. Values such as happiness, the good life, success, getting along with others, and economic security tend to fall by the wayside as justifying ends of action; rather, the authenticity with which we face our freedom seems to be the chief criterion for judging persons and their actions as good or bad. Thus, if moral character—that is, authenticity—has a treasured meaning in Sartre, it is to be found, not in narrow instrumental reason, but in being reflectively conscious of our human condition and standing well in relation to our essential freedom.
For the contemporary businessperson, the main obstacle to realizing an authentic character (as a realized vow and capacity to be reflectively conscious of our human condition) is the attitude of “bad faith” in its myriad forms. The questions to be explored in this chapter, on the basis of this forecast, are: (1) If we abandon the assumption that a person's character is made up of fixed, objective virtues, or “givens,” by reference to what can we judge the actions of businesspeople, such as our hypothetical manager James, who confront hard moral choices in ambiguous or extreme situations? (2) What sense can be made of the notion of authentic character for people working in modern organizations? (3) In what guise does bad faith arise in business decision making and in the structure of the modern corporation? (4) How might a Sartrean approach direct us in fostering authenticity in business ethics education?
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In light of the widespread neglect of Sartre's thought in the business ethics literature, Part 1 provides an exposition of Sartre's point of view, centering on his treatment of human freedom and character.4 Part 2 explores the implications of Sartre's perspective for business ethics. Specific attention is paid in the second part as to how a Sartrean vantage point might suggest changes in the way that business ethics is taught, changes in the way businesspeople deal with ethical issues, and changes in business organizations.
Part 1: Sartre's Account of Human Freedom and Character
Sartre begins his treatment of the role of reason and motive in Being and Nothingness by remarking on how they are related to action. To explicate the idea of action, Sartre uses an historical event: Constantine's act of founding Constantinople as a new home for emperors. To see the relevance of such an apparently archaic example for our reflections on contemporary business ethics, just imagine that we are analyzing the proposed action of a CEO reestablishing his multinational firm's corporate headquarters from the United States to the Far East, and we are inquiring into the leader's intentions or underlying motives for the reorganization, which might be complex and ambiguous, ranging from reducing the firm's worldwide tax obligations, to creating a new image, to leveraging the political environment in the new region for competitive advantage. “We should observe first that an action is on principle intentional,”5 and Constantine intended to create a countervailing power to Rome.6 Further, Sartre develops this example to show that intention is to be understood as “seeing a lack.” As he writes, “Action necessarily implies as its condition the recognition of a ‘desideratum’; that is, of an objective lack or again of a negatite [negation].”7 Constantine acts in view of a desirable state of affairs not yet realized; in view of which, the current state of affairs is seen as lacking. Intentions are not constituted of the “simple consideration of the real state of things.”8 The statement that 60 percent of the projected tax revenues have been collected, implies in itself no judgment. But to claim that taxes are badly collected in Rome is to deem the situation as lacking. Seeing Rome's attributes as negatives compared to a desirable possibility provides the ground for Constantine's intention to establish a counterweight to Rome.
Sartre draws two conclusions: (1) No factual state of affairs, whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, a person's psychological “state,” the forces