the U.S. attorney involved in the case for more information.3 After receiving his report, Wickersham sent a short and firm reply: “Department thinks Judge Hanford has committed grave error in cancelling Oleson’s certificate of naturalization upon grounds stated in his opinion. You are instructed to cooperate with respondent in effort to have case responded and judgment set aside.”4
Wickersham was again proving himself a defender of civil liberties. A few weeks earlier, he had refused to prosecute the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or Wobblies) under federal law for “seditious conspiracy” in a Southern California free speech case.5 Despite strong pressure from the superintendent of the San Diego Police Department, Senator John Works of California, and President Taft himself “to show the strong hand of the United States”6 against the IWW, Wickersham followed the advice of his assistant attorney general, William Harr: he instructed the reluctant local U.S. attorney not to prosecute the IWW.7 Harr had argued that despite the fact that the Wobblies were “self-confessed liars and lawbreakers,” there was nothing indicating a specific attack on the U.S. government.8
A few weeks later, in regard to the Oleson case, Wickersham explained his position:
As I read Judge Hanford’s opinion, it proceeds upon the idea that Oleson is disqualified because he is a socialist and advocates radical changes in the institutions of this country—specifically communal instead of individual ownership of land, buildings and industrial institutions, such changes to be brought about by the use of the ballot. This view rests upon the theory that the Constitution of the United States is immutable, whereas it provides in itself for amendment by the people through the use of the ballot. If Oleson is disqualified because he advocates communal ownership of certain property, to be brought about by the use of the ballot, so also are they disqualified who advocate the direct election of United States Senators and Government ownership of railroad, which is to be accomplished in the same way. It needs no citation of authority to demonstrate the right of every citizen to seek within the Constitution, to accomplish such changes in the structural Government as he thinks wise. The fact that the doctrines avowed by Oleson may be repugnant to the majority of the people is no reason for denying to him the equal protection of the laws.9
Wickersham also thought that the suit to cancel Oleson’s certificate of naturalization was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law. The Naturalization Act required from the applicant that “he has behaved as a man . . .attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States.” In other words, it requires behavior and not belief.10 Judge Hanford’s opinion indicates that he regarded the question as one of “belief” rather than “behavior,” which was for Wickersham clearly erroneous.11 Congress had disqualified on account of belief only those who “disbelieve[d] in or [were] opposed to organized government.” Oleson denied that he was an anarchist or opposed to organized government; he also denied that he was in favor of overthrowing the government by force or violence. “There is nothing in the facts as found by Judge Hanford,” Wickersham wrote, “to indicate that during the period mentioned Oleson had behaved in a manner indicating that he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States.”12
After his opinion was made public, letters of protest arrived in droves at the Department of Justice. Wickersham replied that he relied in his actions “entirely upon Judge Hanford’s own opinion which says that Oleson stated that he proposed to accomplish the objects of his views through the power of the ballot.”13 Immediately after Judge Hanford’s decision, socialists all across the country also protested, and on June 7, 1912, at the request of the Socialist congressman from Wisconsin, Victor Berger, a unanimous House of Representatives directed an inquiry into Hanford’s conduct—the first step in impeachment proceedings. He had been charged with “a long series of corrupt and unlawful decisions”14 dating back twenty-two years and including the Oleson case, and also with “being in a drunken condition while presiding the court.”15
On June 19, Judge Hanford refused to vacate and set aside his previous judgment in the Oleson case. Eight days later a three-member investigating committee sent to Seattle to conduct the inquiry opened its hearings on the Oleson case. The first witness called was Oleson himself. He testified that Hanford had asked him if he was “devotedly attached to the Constitution of the United States,” and that he had replied that although he had no “superstitious reverence for the document,” he was “willing to abide by the laws of the country.” He testified also that he was a member of the Socialist Labor Party and of the Detroit wing of the IWW, drawing a sharp line between the two wings—his being socialistic, the other one being anarchistic—of the latter organization.16
On July 22, by agreement with the congressional committee, Hanford resigned and the impeachment procedure was stopped.17 Hanford was about to face documentary evidence showing that the Northern Pacific Railroad had sold him land “on very favorable terms shortly after Hanford had rendered a decision that saved the company more than $60,000 in taxes.”18 Hanford’s judgment was reversed and a new hearing ordered by the Court of Appeals on the Oleson case on February 13, 1913.19 The case was reassigned for trial on March 9, 1914, but was dismissed by the newly appointed U.S. attorney Clay Allen. Oleson’s citizenship had been reestablished and was no longer at risk. This position was imposed on Allen against his will by the Labor Department opinion that the evidence was insufficient to properly establish a case for the cancellation of naturalization.20
As a consequence of this case, Wickersham and Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel decided that all requests for cancellation proceedings on political, racial, and religious grounds should be presented by the Department of Commerce and Labor to the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., and not to the U.S. attorneys. Instructions were given to naturalization examiners to report such cases to the Department of Commerce and Labor.21
Recalling the Oleson case in 1921, John Speed Smith, chief naturalization examiner for the Ninth District, Seattle, gave the following statement: “When the case came up for a hearing on the cancellation proceeding, our judge went off into the question of socialism. . . . That got all the Socialists arrayed against us. . . . At that time, in our country out there, there were a lot of people that thought that a man had a right to be a member of the IWW. While we were fighting them a lot of good citizens . . .thought that a man under the Constitution could be an IWW and a Socialist. I could not ask a man in court whether he had any Socialistic tendencies and one judge barred me from asking a petitioner if he was an IWW . . .he considered it immaterial. . . . The whole sentiment of the people has changed, and I think the war has a lot to do with it.”22 In April 1917 when the United States entered World War I, the climate became more ominous, and the reaction of the Wilson administration’s attorney general, Thomas Gregory, changed completely.
During World War I, some German Americans were denaturalized because they expressed sympathy for their country of origin. They were condemned as having lacked “complete renunciation of all foreign allegiance at the time citizenship” was granted.23
Pressure had increased on the U.S. government to curtail the free speech rights of Americans of German origin both because of the general fear of disloyalty and a recent change in the German nationality law. By virtue of the law of July 22, 1913, known as the Delbrück Law, Germans living abroad would lose their nationality if naturalized in their new country, unless they obtained explicit prior authorization from the German government. Authorization would be granted only to candidates who agreed to carry out their military service.24
However, once war broke out, the adoption of that provision—the explicit right for Germans naturalized abroad to keep their German nationality—provoked very strong reactions in all Western countries; it contributed to the development of legislation on denaturalization for disloyalty in France (in 1915) and in the United Kingdom (in 1918) that was aimed in particular at naturalized persons of “enemy” origin.
In
