must walk the fine line of asserting a conscientious dissent from the dominant moral consensus, but not going so far as to exceed the bounds of reasonableness. Because conscience is considered a natural faculty, it is entirely subjective. It is also why attempts to change cultural norms on the basis of claims to conscience are taken as such an affront. People frequently perceive these attempts as trying to have one’s cake and eat it too, and accuse conscientious objectors who conduct activism of hypocrisy or question the authenticity of their conscience. As a result, conscientious objectors are often torn between self-protection and public influence on ethical-political matters. Conscientious objectors often end up replicating state forms of power and dominance, including military patterns of obedience and heroism.
The word for conscience in Hebrew, matzpoon, is etymologically related to the word for compass, matzpen. The word thus invokes the image of a personal moral compass. Despite a vocabulary that focuses inwardly, on self-interrogation and revelation, the social life of conscience involves a relationship between the individual and the community. We can see the sleight of hand at work in conscience’s sui generis vocabulary in writing of Emile Durkheim. For Durkheim, moral rules are social because they arise through collective sentiments, and manifest in a way that is not only coercive, but also compelling to the individual (1995: 223, 438). His use of the French conscience combines the English meanings of conscience and consciousness, implying that the moral is inseparable from awareness. The normative order, then, is expressed in the conscience collective, a shared moral awareness or consensus (1984: 319). As such, despite its articulation and legal status as a solitary exercise, conscience cannot escape its social underpinnings in morality. However, the conceptualization of conscience as a radically inward activity, in Israeli law and policy and often for my interlocutors, creates unique challenges and contradictions when the legitimacy and authenticity of this faculty are contested in military refusal.
The belief in an inward conscience is especially difficult because the refusal of military service violates central Israeli norms and values, including democracy, shared sacrifice, and a general ethos of Jewish self-protection. The military has a special significance in Israel and structures many parts of Israeli life (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999; Kimmerling 2001). The centrality of self-defense in Zionist thought temporally precedes the the mass arrival of Jews in Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even when Uganda was being considered as a possible site for a Jewish homeland, self-protection was central to the vision of the project. The basis of this emphasis is the Zionist perception of a continual history of European persecution, expulsion, and pogroms against the Jews for centuries. Fighting against racist stereotypes of Jews as weak, vulnerable, and avoiding physical activity or conflict, mainstream Zionism sought to create a New Jew, who was physically active, strong, and not dependent on non-Jews for safety (Weiss 2005). Palestinian resistance to Jewish settlement, and increasingly antagonistic interactions with the British colonial government ruling Palestine, translated this ethos into a literal military force that subscribed to a Realpolitik worldview. This focus on political power and expediency would come to define much of Israeli policy, and would displace other forms of Zionism, such the visions of Brit Shalom, Martin Buber, or Yeshayahu Leibowitz (Buber 2005; Leibowitz 1992).
The Israeli Defense Forces was formed from the various Jewish defense and anti-British fighters present in Palestine before 1948: the Haganah, the Irgun, the Lehi, and the Palmach. After the 1948 war, during which Israel gained its independence and Palestinians lost their homeland, the national defense laws were drafted. Many of these laws would crystallize what would become dominant features in Israeli culture, such as the military draft of both men and women, reserve duty, and the exemption from service of Palestinian citizens and the ultra-Orthodox Jews. It was decided that men would serve three years in the IDF, and women two years. Women who sign up for combat roles (a more recent phenomenon), or other roles involving extensive training, serve three years. Women who serve in combat roles can be called for reserve duty. Exemptions are given to women if they are married. or have children, and to anyone for certain medical conditions, including psychological problems. Israeli government policy divides the Palestinians of the region into Druze, Bedouin, and Arab, and encourages the naturalization of such categories. Druze are required to perform military service (except Syrian Druze communities), and Bedouins are often encouraged to do so. Arabs, who may be Christian or Muslim, can volunteer for service, though few do so, and they cause great controversy within their communities when they do (Kanaaneh 2009). At the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel gained control Egyptian territories of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River, and Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. Though it was claimed that the intention was to trade back this land for political recognition and stability, only the Sinai Peninsula left Israeli control.4
The occupation is the most tangible catalyst for many young Israelis to refuse military service for reasons of conscience. As we will see, however, the occupation is not a single policy issue, but instead a proxy for broader disputes in Israeli society regarding ethical responsibility and its limits. Much military refusal goes undetected because people can be released from their service obligations under certain conditions, real or feigned. Conscientious objection has always been present in Israel, but not always organized as a movement. In the early years, evasion was highly individual and private. When someone did not want to fight, they would often self-inflict injury or even desert. Anat Stern has investigated legal cases in the aftermath of the 1948 war, in which the parents of draft evaders were held legally responsible for their children’s actions (2008). Joseph Abileah and Amnon Zichroni were lonely pacifists when they were tried for evasion in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
After the occupation had carried on for years, and the promise of land for peace had faded, a number of small movements against service were established. One of the first was that of Gadi Algazi, who went to jail for conscientious objection in 1979 to demonstrate solidarity with Palestinians beyond mere words by sacrificing something valuable. The conscientious objector organization Yesh Gvul was founded in 1982 by combat soldiers refusing to serve in the Lebanon War. This group challenged the popular image of sensitive Israeli soldiers who “shoot and cry,” a state propaganda construct meant to demonstrate the compassion of Israeli soldiers and the practice of purity of arms (tohar ha’neshek), the humanitarian clause of IDF ethical doctrine.5 Cheekily, Yesh Gvul’s slogan claimed, “We don’t shoot, we don’t cry, and we don’t serve in the occupied territories.” This was the first time that refusal was organized as a movement and had a major impact on public awareness. Yesh Gvul still operates and provides support for refusers, though it is no longer the only or the most active organization.
The refusal movement has always defined military refusal as a question of conscience. Some have referred to themselves as soldiers of conscience (chialey matzpoon) playing on the two possible meanings of the term: military soldiers who have a conscience (as opposed to those who do not), or the militarized image of soldiers fighting to defend conscience. Refusal organizations have published philosophical texts by noted thinkers such as Slavoj Zizek and Susan Sontag, defending the acts of Israeli conscientious objectors on moral, ethical, legal, and democratic grounds. The military has even extended partial recognition of refusers’ claims by allowing conscientious exemption from military service for pacifists who can prove their status. The reason for the focus on conscience is clear: as controversial as military refusal is in Israel, conscience is a strong enough defense that it gives pause to those who would condemn the refusers, including the military.
A major wave of refusals surfaced in 2002 and 2003, during Operation Defensive Shield (Mivtza Homat Magen), in which several military units—including elite pilots and commandos—submitted letters to the military announcing their refusal.6 Some of these refusers formed the group Courage to Refuse, but the group disintegrated over time, due to widely varied political positions with regard to Zionism and the ideal relationship with Palestinians. Some leaders of the failing group made contacts with Palestinian groups in the West Bank and formed the joint Israeli and Palestinian organization, Combatants for Peace. The Palestinian side of the organization is made up of ex-fighters against Israel or the IDF, many of whom spent time in Israeli prisons before deciding on
