the late 1950s to adopt an expensive program of flight-control modernization, including extensive long-range radar systems. The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA, the forerunner of today’s FAA that regulated air control and safety) also established instrument-controlled transcontinental routes (essentially high-altitude, high-speed highways of the skies) in order to regulate what had been informal, often chaotic use of airspace by commercial, private, and military pilots using their eyes as guides. Airlines benefited from this process by, among other things, making transcontinental routes faster, safer, and more dependable—and ready for the jet age.79
As pilots closed in on Idlewild, there was still danger when landing over the marshes and through Atlantic fogs. In 1955 the Port Authority installed a flasher system on runway 4 on a dock that extended into Jamaica Bay. Pilots would be able to see the runway approach sooner, improving the chances of making a safe landing.80 By the late 1950s the Port Authority was busily extending runways, enhancing lighting, and laying out highspeed taxiway exits. The capacity crisis sparked and encouraged technological innovation. Idlewild was one of the first commercial airports in the country, for instance, to feature advanced instrumentation for landing. Instrumentation boosted capacity because it minimized the amount of circling airplanes had to do under visual navigation in poor weather conditions.
The Port Authority benefited from continuing federal subsidy as it made these upgrades. President Harry Truman authorized $500 million in 1946 for national airport construction and development that would lead to 3,000 new airports and improvement of 1,600 more. New York City was not the only city that benefited, but federal aid was essential to the development of the airport program nationally. Already by 1949 the federal government had spent approximately $200 million on airport development,81 and by 1965 that figure had reached $900 million. While New York’s airports received a relatively small share of this money (of $500 million spent on New York City area airports by 1965, only about 5 percent could be directly linked to federal aid), the creation of a truly national system would have been impossible without federal subsidy.82
Idlewild’s record growth positioned it during the 1950s as the second busiest airport in the country for all operations after Chicago’s O’Hare International and the leading American airport for international travel. The growth in operations was driven by the growing popularity of faster and more comfortable air travel.83 The level of service offered by the major airline companies aimed to turn flying into a predictable, comfortable, and luxurious service that would justify high fares. Most airlines suffered from an overcapacity problem in the postwar era because the growing size and speed of aircraft outpaced the market for seats on many routes. The big companies thus used government regulations to push out the smaller airlines that threatened to make overcapacity an even bigger problem. The government endorsed the objectively anticompetitive protection of the biggest firms, not only because of formidable lobbying by the most powerful airlines but because the government viewed an advanced, large, stable aviation industry (a Civil Air Reserve fleet) as a potential partner in military operations during times of crisis. Government officials wanted the best aircraft, and lots of them, for their troops in the future and were not necessarily worried about supporting what was most profitable.84
Under the regulated system, airfares remained comparatively high for most American travelers throughout the 1950s. TWA, for instance, in the immediate postwar era still prepared entire planes for sleeper service across the Atlantic. Men and women dressed formally and dined on expertly prepared meals. The Lockheed Super Constellations also offered deluxe sleeper-plane service on domestic routes between Idlewild and Los Angeles. A twelve-hour luxurious New York-Paris direct flight added profits in the luxury trade for Air France in 1953. In the early era of flight, wealthy passengers even rode on their own planes with amenities such as separate lounges. Fatality rates from flying dropped so dramatically in the postwar era that plane travel became an acceptable risk even for families.85
At the same time, fares became more reasonable over the course of the 1950s because federal regulators held prices steady (while wages improved), and airlines realized that they could expand the market for international travel beyond the elite.86 Tourist service thus outpaced luxury service by the late 1950s. Tourist-class flights (made possible by cheap fuel, faster planes, and greater capacity) introduced by Pan Am in 1952 between New York and London catalyzed the expansion of lower-fare transatlantic service to the most popular foreign travel destinations.87 Tourist service proved so popular that it accounted for three-quarters of air travelers by 1957. Once airlines realized that planes with mixed levels of seating and higher seat density did not discourage travelers and actually encouraged business, economy (or coach) class was introduced in 1958 in order to crowd even more passengers on planes. A New York-London round trip in first class was very expensive in 1950: $385 ($3,607 in 2012 dollars). By 1960, however, that same trip in a more comfortable and faster jet was more reasonable at $350 ($2,710 in 2012 dollars) and a far better value in terms of time, comfort, and safety. Most jets, in fact, included both first-class and coach seating in order to achieve more efficient operations; by 1960, airlines actually designated half of their seats as coach.88
Flying was not yet for everyman, but by 1960 it was becoming a settled upper-middle-class phenomenon and a necessity for many business managers. In 1960 Idlewild alone handled 248,686 plane movements that shuttled 8.8 million passengers through the airport. Approximately 85 percent of the nation’s transatlantic passengers came through Idlewild that year, a reduced percentage from the immediate postwar years but still impressive for one airport. Perhaps even more impressive was that Idlewild handled approximately half of all of the nation’s international airline traffic that year. Airports, and Idlewild in particular, had been built optimistically, but rapid democratization of air travel quickly tested even those generous boundaries. The fact that Pan Am led the world’s international travel market, for instance, meant that Idlewild was already crowded.89
From Water Ports to Air Ports
The booming consumer society of the postwar years also swelled air-cargo operations at Idlewild. Air cargo boosted Idlewild’s competitive advantages by subsidizing many otherwise unprofitable or under-capacity international routes (air cargo could be stowed in the holds of passenger planes), helping Idlewild remain at the center of global air travel. Air cargo seemed financially promising because, as promoters noted in 1945, the New York metro region was already “one of the great centers of high-class package freight, which is the type most likely to use airplanes in overseas transport.”90 The region’s wealth and extensive trade were key to creating Idlewild’s early lead in the air-cargo industry.
The Port Authority leadership closely calculated the future of trade in the region and the nation. After the war, the Port Authority adopted additional new technologies for the maintenance of the port’s supremacy. These investments, planned by the authority’s able team of economists and engineers, proved crucial to the region’s future health. At the docks, this would mean in the 1950s the creation of a modern, containerized shipping facility in Newark-Elizabeth. These new facilities, made possible in part by generous deals to protect current longshoremen, in the long term eliminated the raison d’être for much of the aging port infrastructure and unionized staff on New York’s waterfront. Air cargo was also a new frontier. The service may have been expensive compared with traditional means of shipping (almost one-third more expensive), but the high value or time sensitivity of the cargo more than compensated for the additional costs. In addition, combining passenger flights and cargo flights kept many routes relatively profitable for airlines.
New York built on its leadership of oceangoing trade as it entered the modern air-cargo era. Freight forwarders of the maritime era, who handled paperwork for international shipping, made a successful transition from ocean vessels to airplanes because they realized that planes represented just another way to move goods faster and over greater distances. They understood that “forwarding is a complex, many faceted service,” and they had to be “expert in paperwork that covers the spectrum of U.S. and foreign government regulations; and had to be capable of performing a full range of ground services between the
