solidarity-oriented behavioral patterns of disproportionately greater significance in China than in other countries. Moreover, market allocation is not merely an appendage of a system governed mainly in the interests of needs-based production.
Or has a new hybrid form perhaps emerged in China? Does the economy have to be subdivided into capitalist private sectors and quasisocialist state sectors? Or should China be referred to as a “noncapitalist market economy”? According to Arrighi, a capitalist market economy differs from a noncapitalist market economy “in the greater power of capitalists to force their class interests onto others at the expense of national interests” (Arrighi 2008, 120, my translation). It is not the “presence of capitalist institutions and dispositions” that defines “the capitalist character of market-oriented development but the relationship between state power and capital” (Arrighi 2008, 412, my translation; see also Smith 1993). As long as the state is not subordinate to capitalist class interests, the market economy remains noncapitalist.
A stark juxtaposition between market economy and state economy or communist state is flawed, however. As state theorists have discovered, the term “national interest” used by Arrighi cannot be seen as an objective category. According to Arrighi, the state is an apparatus that is an expression of general social interests except when the capitalists impose their restricted interests onto market development. “What this inadequate definition does not take into account is the specific organizational approach taken by a capitalist state and definitions of state functions relating to the safeguarding of property and ownership rights, the reproduction of relations between workforce and capital as well as the preservation of accumulation” (Panitch 2009, 20, my translation). In contradiction with the expectation that the almost unstoppable market dynamics would undermine or even topple the bureaucratic balance of power, the bureaucracy has, to a certain extent, proven capable of reconciling market and plan during the reform process.
It is clearly difficult to establish a theoretical basis for the development of a capitalist economy within the framework of a “socialist” state and society. Consequently, it would appear that many authors are content with continuing to describe the development in China in reference to the transition factor alone, in other words, the hybrid transformation character that is not yet completely formed (see Meyer 2011; Hartmann 2006, 10; Taube 2001, 167–68). Without questioning the appropriateness of an approach that seeks to represent the complexity of linking various institutional forms in China, the term “hybrid” nonetheless appears to be an unfortunate expression to use. After all, every social entity is hybrid or, in other words, made up of different forms. In addition, the word “hybrid” does not reveal which institutional forms are more dynamic than other parts of the complex whole.
It was not until the 2000s that more authors began to use the term “capitalism” when describing China’s development, albeit often more fleetingly than systematically, as pointed out by McNally (McNally 2007c, 3–7). For example, the term is often found in the titles of studies without its being elaborated on in the work itself. Sometimes capitalism is merely equated with a market economy (Yasheng Huang 2008), or social phenomena such as Chinese overseas networks are analyzed as “capitalist” (Guthrie 2002). Within the framework of a restrictive definition of the term “private property,” authors tentatively speak of quasicapitalism and continue to see state property as having noncapitalist characteristics (Breslin 2007b, 79–80).
The main body of this work (Chapters 2 and 3) shows that it is plausible to systematically examine the Chinese economy and, by extension, Chinese society, using theories of capitalism. The political economy framework developed for this purpose is introduced below.
Researching China from a Political Economy Perspective
Although only limited to date, political economy studies with a focus on China have provided a framework for examining the country’s development. The following presents a contingency-sensitive research framework based on a synthesis of diverse theoretical approaches. Using this framework, the present work takes a holistic perspective—for “only in a panoramic view can one truly recognize the details” (Streeck 2009, 17).
Over the next few sections, I will first look at different aspects of research into capitalist dynamics, which have also been the subject of recent comparative capitalism research.
I will then outline the concept of capitalist-driven modernity, that is, the assumption that the path to modernity or modernities over the past one hundred years in various parts of the planet can be described as a process in which drivers of capitalism extensively shape the structure of social order. This will serve to introduce key characteristics of global capitalist socialization and its unstable dynamics.
Subsequently, I will present a few observations on the reality of historical institutional change and how this can impact the capacity to act on the part of social actors. I will also discuss the roles of sociocultural idiosyncrasies or past traditions and social structures that give a specific face to political economies and create various forms of coordination between economic, political and other societal actors.
Finally, five key dimensions of capitalist systems are outlined, which will largely provide the structure for the remainder of this work.
Varieties of Capitalism and Comparative Capitalisms
In order to move closer to a conceptualization of capitalism or of its different guises in the past, I will first refer to theories and concepts found in comparative political economy (CPE), in particular, but not restricted to, varieties of capitalism (VoC) theory, which has become well known in recent years.
VoC theory (Hall and Soskice 2001) includes a differentiation between liberal (US and UK) and coordinated market economies (Germany and Japan) and serves as a contrast to the notion of a (liberal) best-practice model.5 According to this theory, market economies are composed of a cluster of functionally coordinated subsystems. Production systems, corporate governance and financing, and corporate and industrial relations, as well as training and education initiatives are examined for their institutional complementarities. Functioning complementary relationships are seen as the source of comparatively long-term institutional stability and economic growth.6
In addition, a number of insights have been developed in the CPE field over the past years that are relevant for research on China (see Bohle and Greskovits 2009; Coates 2005; Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007; Streeck 2010a). These include the following:
• The knowledge that an in-depth examination must go beyond a strict market and enterprise focus. China’s dynamic economic development is not only a result of resurgent entrepreneurship in parts of the mainland or among the community of overseas Chinese but is also based on, and indeed very much defined by, action taken by state actors.
• The realization that the role played by power relationships, the state, and state regulation cannot be neglected. This will be examined in further detail in the remainder of this chapter.
• The identification of different types of capitalism that cannot be aligned with liberal market or coordinated market economies (LMEs/CMEs) (for examples that attempt to do this nonetheless, see Ahrens and Jünemann 2006; Wilson 2007a; Witt 2010). In critical confrontation with and yet emerging in parallel to the VoC approach, several other models have been employed to describe further (efficient) varieties of capitalism besides LMEs and CMEs that are not limited to the West. These include state-controlled, consensus-oriented, or Asian capitalism, for instance (Coates 2000, Boyer 2005, Amable 2003). Forms of state capitalism or state-permeated capitalism lend themselves particularly well for use as templates for comparative analysis (see Crouch 2005; Fligstein and Zhang 2011; May, Nölke, and ten Brink 2013; V. Schmidt 2000).
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