begins the Groundwork by examining the source of moral worth in human actions and dispositions. He points out that all “virtues” and characteristics, such as strength and coolness, can be used for vicious purposes, rendering their value only conditionally good—dependent on certain purposes, situations, and so on. What is morally good must be absolutely good for Kant; even considerations of specific outcomes desired by an agent do not hold as unconditional, as these results can be thwarted by unfortunate luck, natural circumstances, and so forth. They also do not necessarily hold for all desiring agents. The ultimate conclusion of Groundwork I is that the good will is the highest, unconditioned good. The notion of the good will is integrally connected to the notion of duty, which “contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which . . . bring it [the good will] out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly” (GMM 4:397). A human being can possess this good will, but having such a will requires a constitution that includes alternate motivations and temptations, such as the inclinations or desires. These factors result in the human being not being subjectively necessitated by the moral law; in other words, it is not specified in advance that they will do the right thing. Duty is a command on agents, one that they may or may not actually follow. Individual agents are objectively determined by this notion of duty, which stems from the imperative of the moral law. Subjective determination appears to be the uncertain domain of control of individual agents with their reason and inclinations. What is crucial to Kant’s conception of duty is that an action is done from duty, not merely in accord with duty. Only the former has moral worth, whereas the latter could be done for less-than-worthy reasons (self-love, greed, etc.). Kant’s well-known example of this from his Groundwork is that of the honest shopkeeper who doesn’t raise his prices just to take advantage of an immature (or gullible) client. When is such an external action (not manipulating prices) morally worthy? Kant’s basic answer is that it is morally worthy when an agent does it out of respect for that action being the right thing to do, as opposed to doing it simply to avoid gaining a bad reputation. The former motivation is moral; the latter is merely prudential—simply another way to sate one’s own desires through business activities.
For Kant, individual agents are subjectively determined by their maxim, a principle of volition within the subjects themselves. We choose to be kind to our friend Paul, say, since we make it a rule to be kind to our friends. We may act from this general maxim with a very specific action, such as providing them a drink in a favorite cup. Such maxims may or may not attain the functional status of a practical law, which is an objective principle of volition that all should have (GMM 4:401). Kant maintains that individuals are objectively, but not subjectively, necessitated by the moral law—otherwise such agents would be “holy wills,” constrained to will from duty on every occasion. Individual agents can have moral worth if and only if they choose to act from duty. But what is duty? To answer this question, Kant provides his analysis of the moral law in Groundwork II.
Duty, for Kant, is integrally connected to the source of determination of individual rational agents and thereby is connected to the sense of freedom that Kant is interested in fostering (viz., autonomy). A brief sketch of how human agency is related to the moral law in Kant’s scheme suffices for our purpose of delineating his notion of freedom.5 In Groundwork II he analyzes the concept of the moral law and its relation to rational beings to discern the possibility of such a moral imperative. Kant operates on the assumption that everything in the world that we can experience (including our own actions) must operate according to some sort of law. The unique feature of rational beings is that they can represent their possible actions in accordance with a representation of laws (principles), such as “always be kind to friends.” This capacity to formulate principles or maxims on which the subject acts is constitutive of the agent’s will (Wille). One’s will is subjectively contingent, since reason does not always determine it (GMM 4:412). All rational beings are subject to objective principles of action, which Kant labels as “imperatives.” Some of these are hypothetical, which command a certain action in certain conditions. For instance, if agents want to win a baseball game, they should attempt to score more runs than their opponents. This will not do for a moral command, since one may not desire the initially stated goal (e.g., winning that game). What Kant wants for the foundation of morality is a moral law (imperative) that commands categorically and in an unconditioned manner. Such a categorical imperative is found in the moral law; all other imperatives are conditioned and have the status of a principle, but only the categorical imperative has the status of a practical law (4:420). Such an imperative must be removed from any sensuous conditions, such as desires and inclinations, since those would render it conditioned—not everyone has those traits, nor are their desires always the same. Instead, the moral law (the categorical imperative) contains nothing beyond the form of universal law and the necessity that individual maxims be in conformity with this law. This has historically been a problematic move for Kant, but it is where he starts. Kant provides the first formulation of this categorical imperative, referred to as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL)—“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” Kant further explains this law with respect to the state of nature; just as everything in the physical world occurs according to laws, so one should “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (4:421). This second formulation can be referred to as the Formula of the Universal Law of Nature (FULN). It simply amplifies the former with an analogy to the operation of laws in the realm of nature or the physical universe. Overall, the objective determinant of rational willing is this categorical imperative, even though we are not actually necessitated (subjectively) to follow it. Duty consists in the demand that individuals make their subjective maxim of volition conform to this universal form of willing.
These two delineations of the first formulation of the categorical imperative may not be as clear as one would hope.6 This problem, however, is alleviated somewhat when Kant discusses the other formulations of the moral law. Before those formulations are discussed, a few important details of this formulation (taking FUL as subsuming the essential features of FULN) should be noted. One notices that the formal aspect that Kant is drawing on in this formulation is nonsensuous and does not include material from the physical world. It is the mere form of one’s maxim that is tested by FUL. This form must be capable of being universalized, which provides two important tests of a maxim—it must either be able to be thought without contradiction or it must be able to be coherently willed by the agent. As Kant indicates, “Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become such” (GMM 4:424). The first test involves the logical possibility of the universalization of a certain maxim to all rational agents involved. For instance, false promises to others cannot be consistently willed as universal law (or as a universal law of nature) because doing so would result in the putative collapse of the institution (promising) that allows promise breaking to happen. Additionally, suicide operates on a maxim that also would be impossible to be thought as universal law, as Kant finds that it involves a contradiction with the same maxim that preserves life (4:422). What the examples of false promising and suicide represent are the classes of perfect duties to one’s self and to others. They are negative in that they forbid a certain maxim and its entailed action (lying, suicide) because the maxim cannot be conceived of as universal law.
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