gridlock. Rebus sic stantibus, the size of the European Parliament would swell towards eight hundred deputies; the number of commissioners rise to forty; a ten-minute introductory speech by each minister attending a Council yield a meeting of five hours, before business even started. The legendary complexity of the already existing system, with its meticulous rotations of commissarial office, laborious inter-governmental bargains and assorted ministerial and parliamentary vetoes, would be overloaded to the point of paralysis.
In such conditions, would not widening inevitably mean loosening? This is the wager in London, expressed more or less openly according to venue, from the FCO to the TLS. In the long term, the official line of thinking goes, expansion must mean defederalization. Yet is this the only logical deduction? Here we encounter the final amphibology. For might not precisely the prospect of institutional deadlock impose as an absolute functional necessity a much more centralized supranational authority than exists today? Coordination of twelve to fifteen member states can just about operate, however cumbersomely, on a basis of consensus. Multiplication to thirty practically rules this out. The more states enter the Union, the greater the discrepancy between population and representation in the Council of Ministers will tend to be, as large countries are increasingly outnumbered by smaller ones, and the weaker overall decisional capacity would become. The result could paradoxically be the opposite of the British expectation—not a dilution, but a concentration of federal power in a new constitutional settlement, in which national voting weights are redistributed and majority decisions become normal. The problem of scale, in other words, might force just the cutting of the institutional knot the proponents of a loose free trade area seek to avoid. Widening could check or reverse deepening. It might also precipitate it.
Each of the three critical issues now facing the European Union—the single currency, the role of Germany, and the multiplication of member-states—thus presents a radical indeterminacy. In every case, the distinctive form of the amphibology is the same. One set of meanings is so drastic it appears subject to capsizal into its contrary, giving rise to a peculiar uncertainty. These are the political quicksands on which the Europe to come will be built.
1. Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, London 1984, p. 492.
2. Alan Milward and Vibeke Sorensen, ‘Interdependence or Integration: A National Choice’, in Alan Milward, Frances Lynch, Ruggiero Ranieri, Federico Romero, Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontiers of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945–1992, London 1993, p. 20.
3. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London 1992, p. xi.
4. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, p. 447.
5. ‘Conclusions: The Value of History’, in The Frontiers of National Sovereignty, pp. 194, 201.
6. For the extent of the hostility to integration in the administrative elite, see Gérard Bossuat, ‘Les hauts fonctionnaires français et le processus d’unité en Europe occidentale d’Alger à Rome (1943–1958)’, Journal of European Integration History, No. 1, Vol. 1, 1995, pp. 87–109.
7. Christian Pineau, Le grand pari: L’aventure du traité de Rome, Paris 1991, pp. 221–23.
8. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, p. 334.
9. François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York 1994, pp. 226–8, 198.
10. Duchêne, Jean Monnet, p. 228.
11. Jean Monnet, p. 364.
12. Jean Monnet, p. 270.
13. Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris 1976, p. 577.
14. Jean Monnet, p. 357.
15. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, p. 375.
16. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, p. 433.
17. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, pp. 395, 432.
18. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, p. 433.
19. The Frontiers of National Sovereignty, p. 195.
20. ‘Allegiance: The Past and the Future’, Journal of European Integration, 1995, No. 1, Vol. 1, p. 14.
21. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, p. 186.
22. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, pp. 446–7.
23. Duchêne, Jean Monnet, p. 390.
24. Jean Monnet, p. 20.
25. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London 1993, pp. 727, 729–730.
26. The Downing Street Years, p. 536.
27. The Downing Street Years, pp. 549–51.
28. The Downing Street Years, pp. 765–6.
29. The Downing Street Years, p. 742.
30. The Downing Street Years, pp. 70, 742, 736.
31. Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago 1948, pp. 264–5. Retrospectively, Hayek’s clairvoyance is all the more striking for the distance between the context in which he was writing and the arrival of European Monetary Union. His essay published in September 1939, was a contribution to the debates around differing conceptions and schemes of federal union in the leading forum devoted to these, The New Commonwealth Quarterly. Its immediate background was the sudden wave of enthusiasm in the wake of Munich for schemes of federal union as a barrier against Nazi expansion, set off by the American publicist Clarence Streit’s call for the world’s fifteen democracies to league together against the Axis powers (see below p. 497). Intellectually, Hayek was inspired by the case made by Lionel Robbins for the “deplanning’’ of the interventionism of the past half century’ (Economic Planning and International Order, London 1937, p. 248; The History of Freedom and Other Essays, London 1907, p. 98), and by Acton’s belief that ‘of all checks on democracy, federalism has been the most efficacious and the most congenial’. Politically, he seems to have viewed Streit’s proposal for a Democratic Union stretching from the United States through Britain to Australia with understandable scepticism, plumping instead, along with Robbins, for an Anglo-French union once the war had broken out. By the time of The Road to Serfdom (1944), he was commending Ivor Jenning’s now forgotten treatise A Federation for Western Europe (1940) for post-war consideration. But when European integration eventually got under way with the Schuman Plan, the Coal and Steel Community was too dirigiste to win his sympathy.
32. Wynne Godley, ‘Maastricht and All That’, London Review of Books, 8 October 1992.
33. Friedrich Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined, London 1978, pp. 19–20.
34. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, L’Europa verso l’unione monetaria, Turin 1992, pp. xii, 189.
35. ‘Macro-coordination of fiscal policies in an economic and monetary union’, Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, Luxembourg 1989, p. 101.
36. Conor Cruise O’Brien, ‘Pursuing a Chimera’, Times Literary Supplement,
