detainees).
The degree to which officers issued explicit orders remains uncertain. It’s possible that mid-level officers ordered some of the abuse. However, at present, there isn’t proof that high-ranking officers sanctioned abuse at Bagram. The soldiers’ lawyers did not introduce such orders as exculpatory evidence during courts-martial. Dilawar’s experience shows that directives, written or otherwise, weren’t needed to enable abuse. Officers merely had to look the other way to facilitate the abuse—and they did, according to military reports.55 In that regard, the stories of Dilawar and Habibullah reinforce the impression that overlooking abuse can (and did) help facilitate torture just as much as issuing orders.56 Indeed, failing to stem abuse would contribute to more abuse elsewhere during the war on terror.57
In the end, some military personnel felt that the intelligence collected from Bagram’s detainees during that period was dubious. According to a report on US detainee abuse in Afghanistan produced by the McClatchy Newspapers, Major Jeff Bovarnick, a legal adviser at Bagram from November 2002 to June 2003, “said in a sworn statement that of some 500 detainees he knew of who’d passed through Bagram, only about 10 were high-value targets, the military’s term for senior terrorist operatives.”58
There was another dimension to this story that I hadn’t fully understood until my journey to Khost: the Afghan perspective.
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