Never Let A Serious Crisis Go to Waste. Philip Mirowski
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With regard to the crisis, one wing of neoliberals has appealed to natural science concepts of “complexity” to suggest that markets transcend the very possibility of management of systemic risk.78 However, the presumed relationship of the market to nature tends to be substantially different under neoliberalism than under standard neoclassical theory. In brief, neoclassical theory has a far more static conception of market ontology than do the neoliberals. In neoclassical economics, many theoretical accounts portray the market as somehow susceptible to “incompleteness” or “failure,” generally due to unexplained natural attributes of the commodities traded: these are retailed under the rubric of “externalities,” “incomplete markets,” or other “failures.” Neoliberals conventionally reject all such recourse to defects or glitches, in favor of a narrative where evolution and/or “spontaneous order” brings the market to ever more complex states of self-realization, which may escape the ken of mere humans.79 This explains why the NTC has rejected out of hand all neoclassical “market failure” explanations of the crisis.
[4] A primary ambition of the neoliberal project is to redefine the shape and functions of the state, not to destroy it. Neoliberals thus maintain an uneasy and troubled alliance with their sometimes fellow-travelers, the anarchists. The contradiction with which the neoliberals constantly struggle is that a strong state can just as easily thwart their program as implement it; hence they are inclined to explore new formats of techno-managerial governance that protect their ideal market from what they perceive as unwarranted political interference. Considerable efforts have been developed to disguise or otherwise condone in rhetoric and practice the importance of the strong state that neoliberals endorse in theory. As Peck puts it, the pursuit of neoliberal policies is “a self-contradictory form of regulation-in-denial.”80 One implication is that democracy, ambivalently endorsed as the appropriate state framework for an ideal market, must in any case be kept relatively impotent, so that citizen initiatives rarely are able to change much of anything.81 As Hayek said in an address before the MPS in 1966: “Liberalism and democracy, although compatible, are not the same . . . it is at least possible in principle that a democratic government may be totalitarian and that an authoritarian government may act on liberal principles . . . [A state] demanding unlimited power of the majority, has essentially become anti-liberal.”82
One way to exert power in restraint of democracy is to bend the state to a market logic, pretending one can replace “citizens” with “customers” (see point 5). Consequently, the neoliberals seek to restructure the state with numerous audit devices (under the sign of “accountability” or the “audit society”) or impose rationalization through introduction of the “new public management”; or, better yet, convert state services to private provision on a contractual basis.83 Here again our commandments touch directly upon the crisis. The financial sector was one of the major sites of the outsourcing of state supervision to quasi-private organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA) or the credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s.84 Indeed, the very “privatization” of the process of securitization of mortgages, which had started out in the 1960s as a government function, has become a flash point in explanations of how the financial sector lost its way. The willful blurring of the line between a private firm and a political instrument in the United States in the cases of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will be treated in chapter 5.
One of the great neoliberal flimflam operations is to mask their role in power through confusion of “marketization” of government functions with the shrinking of the state: if anything, bureaucracies become more unwieldy under neoliberal regimes.85 Another is to imagine all manner of methods to “shackle” the state by reducing all change to prohibitive constitutional maneuvers (as with the “public choice” school of James Buchanan). In practice, “deregulation” always cashes out as “reregulation,” only under a different set of ukases.
[5] Skepticism about the lack of control of democracy is periodically offset by recognition of the persistent need for a reliable font of popular legitimacy for the neoliberal market state. This is a thorny problem for neoliberals: how to maintain their pretence of freedom as noncoercion when, in practice, it seems unlikely that most people would freely choose the neoliberal version of the state. As Hayek once wrote: “It would be impossible to assert that a free society will always and necessarily develop values of which we would approve, or even, as we shall see, that it will maintain values which are compatible with the preservation of freedom.”86 In one sense, the NTC is itself one practical political solution to this conundrum: the Russian doll exists, in part, as a conscious intervention to change the culture in a direction more favorable to the neoliberals by disarming political opposition. However, since the very project itself could be regarded as violating a precept of the inviolability of individual volition, the neoliberals also have proposed a conceptual “fix” for the audacity of intervention.
Neoliberals seek to transcend the intolerable contradiction of democratic rejection of the neoliberal state by treating politics as if it were a market, and promoting an economic theory of “democracy.” In its most advanced manifestation, there is no separate content of the notion of citizenship other than as customer of state services.87 This supports the application of neoclassical economic models to previously political topics; but it also explains why the neoliberal movement must seek to consolidate political power by operating from within the state. The abstract “rule of law” is frequently conflated with or subordinated to conformity to the neoliberal vision of an ideal market. The “night watchman” version of the state is thus comprehensively repudiated: there is no separate sphere of the market, fenced off, as it were, from the sphere of civil society. Everything is fair game for marketization.
The neoliberals generally have to bend in pretzels to deny that in their ideal state, law is a system of power and command, and is, rather, a system of neutral general rules applicable equally to all, grounded in something other than the intentional goals of some (that is, their own) group’s political will. As Raymond Plant explains, for the Rothbard anarchists, this is something like natural law; for the Buchanan-style public-choice crowd, it is contract theory; for Chicago economics, it is a world where the economy is conflated with the universe of human existence; and for Hayek, it is his own idiosyncratic notion of cultural evolution.88 In everyday neoliberalism, the Chicago story seems to win out. However, in the recent crisis, the evolution story has been brought out of mothballs, as we shall observe in chapter 6.
[6] Neoliberalism thoroughly revises what it means to be a human person. Many people have quoted Foucault’s prescient observation from three decades ago: “In neoliberalism . . . Homo Economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself.”89 However, they overlook the extent to which this is a drastic departure from classical liberal doctrine.
Classical liberalism identified “labor”