But there was one case in which there was little doubt that his words had contributed to unleashing deadly riots. On 30 June 2014, Wirathu posted on his Facebook page a denunciation of an alleged rape by three Muslims of a Buddhist girl working for one of them in the coffee shop they owned in Mandalay.21
The next day, according to several witnesses, a group of twenty-five to thirty unknown men roamed around the Muslim quarter downtown, hurling insults at Muslims and damaging vehicles and shops, all unimpeded by the riot police who were already present in the area. Some Buddhist monks managed to bring the crowds under control, and three days later the police stopped the riots. Two men had been killed: one Buddhist and one Muslim. It turned out that the rape allegations were false. Even then, Wirathu found a chance to blame Muslims. ‘The rape of Ma Soe Soe on June 28, 2014 at the hands of Sun Cafe owners Nay Win and San Maung is not just a criminal offence but an offence aimed at instigating violence in our country. The July 1 and 2 incidents in Mandalay are not a clash of religions or races but a Jihad. They are gathering in mosques in Mandalay under the guise of Ramadan but in reality they are recruiting and preparing for Jihad against us’, Wirathu posted when the riots were over. He was never prosecuted by the authorities for instigating these riots, as he had been in 2003.
After the riots in Mandalay, episodes of intercommunal violence receded in central Burma; by this time the 969 symbol had almost disappeared from view. The Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee – a body of senior monks appointed by the government to regulate the monastic community – banned its political use in September 2013. But that did not put an end to the activities of nationalist monks like Ashin Sada Ma or Wirathu. In January 2014, in a massive conference of monks in Mandalay, they founded a new organization that replaced the 969 Movement. It was named A-myo Batha Thatana Saun Shauq Ye a Pwe, or Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, better known by the Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha.22 The Association helped to organize Buddhist ‘Sunday school’ classes for children throughout Burma, selling curriculum books to any interested Buddhists. The aim of the schools was to impart Buddhist values to the new generations. Their teachings were usually not explicitly anti-Muslim, but the underlying message was clear: it was necessary to protect Buddhism and, as many Ma Ba Tha monks made clear, the main threat was Islam.23
The crowning achievement of Ma Ba Tha was the passing of four ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’ in 2015.24 The first law bans polygamy. The second makes religious conversion dependant on obtaining approval from a Registration Board for religious conversion at the township level, and punishes forced conversions. The third law regulates the marriages of Buddhist women to non-Buddhist men, mandating local registrars to post marriage applications for fourteen days in public, in order to determine whether there are any objections to the proposed unions – and the couple may marry only if there are no objections. The fourth law imposes a limit on the number of children a woman can bear, but only in certain regions. Muslims are not mentioned explicitly in the laws, but it was clear to everybody that they were directed at them, while the Population Control Bill was to be applied in Arakan to the Rohingya community exclusively. The laws had wide popular support.
A draft of the interreligious marriage law was circulated in the summer of 2013, and monks organized demonstrations in support. A campaign to gather signatures was launched around that time, with stalls set up all around the country, and it was claimed that 2.5 million people signed. There was opposition from some quarters – especially from women’s groups, who regarded the laws as inimical to women’s rights.25 Ma Ba Tha responded with a condemnation of ‘those critics, who are backed by foreign groups, for raising the human rights issues and not working for the benefit of the public and not being loyal to the state’, and some of the critics received death threats.26 But many women had also participated actively in the promotion of the laws, as they now had an opportunity to take a public role.27
The nationalist monks not only succeeded during this period in getting their laws passed, but also managed to determine to a large degree the issues that were considered of national importance and would take centre-stage in public debates throughout Burma.
Meanwhile, other kinds of mobilizations, for workers’ rights or against rampant land-grabbing, were virtually relegated to the margins. Some of them acquired brief prominence, including a series of student protests in early 2014 against a new education law that was to give the government tight control over the universities. The students organized nationwide, coordinating a big march to Rangoon. But they were blocked by the police in Letpadan, 100 kilometres north of the city, and were eventually beaten with great brutality. Many of them were arrested and put in jail for two years.28 The new education law was eventually passed with overwhelming parliamentary support, including that of Aung San Suu Kyi, who during the protests had done little to hide her annoyance, saying: ‘Whether it is in this country or in any country, the best method to resolve problems is to discuss and negotiate.’29 In the context of those protests, of the demonstrations against the Letpadaung Copper Mine, and other mobilizations, the government of Thein Sein was sending a clear message: only movements to protect race and religion were to be allowed in the new ‘disciplineflourishing democracy’. For the rest, the old apparatus of repression was still very much in place.
Ahead of the elections in November 2015, Ma Ba Tha threw its support behind the party in government, the USDP, and actively campaigned against the NLD, accusing it of being controlled by Muslims and being too soft on defending ‘race and religion’. The NLD eventually won the elections, but it was not a victory over the Buddhist ethnonationalism expounded by Ma Ba Tha. The NLD had yielded to them; not wanting to endanger its chances of winning, the party did not file a single Muslim candidate. As a result, there would not be any Muslims in the new parliament.
The census is one of the main instruments the state has to shape the nation, as well as to control its populations. In many senses, the Burmese nation is still a work in progress. Seven decades after independence, many members of the ethnic minorities still feel little allegiance to an overall Burmese identity they see as a project of Burman supremacy. During the Thein Sein period, the state was undergoing a crucial transformation in which, in 2014, the government decided to carry out a nationwide census. The way of classifying the population, particularly its ethnic make-up, would not be merely descriptive, but would have far-reaching political consequences. The list of ethnic categories had been elaborated by the military regime long before, and would potentially contribute to shaping the political voice of its varied population. According to the 2008 Constitution, political representation is based largely on ethnicity, and dividing or conflating ethnic groups could alter the balance of power between the various communities, at both the national and the local levels. The census was bound to create winners and losers, and nobody would lose more than those who were excluded.
It was the first census conducted in Burma since 1983. This was a very long gap, as in most countries censuses are conducted every ten years. It was possible that, with its stringent registration rules, the military junta that had ruled the country since 1988 already had some figures on the Burmese population; but it had never conducted a public, nationwide survey. The fact that it did not bother to do so for all those years could indicate indifference – the generals seemed more keen on cementing their power, strengthening the army and filling their pockets – but it also betrays the incapacities of a state that is extremely authoritarian but highly disfunctional in many aspects.
In the months ahead of the 2014 census, there was a campaign throughout the country presenting it as an exercise of civic duty and part of a common project of nation-building beyond political divisions. The famous comedian and pro-democracy activist Zarganar, who had spent years in prison for his anti-junta activities but had played an increasingly official role during the transition, was appointed ‘census ambassador’, and toured the country
