occupiers under the rule of ˓Awaḍ ibn ˓Umar al Qu˓aytī, succeeding his older brother ˓Abdullāh, who died earlier in the same year. Both brothers were born in Hyderabad and their interests in the Yemen and India were represented by their various successors in both tribal communities in Ḥaḍramawt and Hyderabad respectively.43 Linda Boxberger quotes a translation of a poem that is said to have been recited by the Kathīrī subtribe, or clan, the Nuwwah, before a battle for the control of the town of Hajr then under their protection. The poem reflects the disdain for the Qu˓aytī muwalladūn44 and their ‘foreign’ take-over of the region, it begins,
Tell the Qu˓aytī: so the souk (al-Mukalla) is not enough for you,
And now you want Ḥajr, the protected.
Tell him: it’s impossible, the notion is rejected,
You Indian, we don’t even understand your language. 45
As the tribal conflict for control of Ḥaḍramawt continued the Kathīrī Sultan tried to internationalize the hostilities and made moves to enlist the help of the Ottomans, trying to bring them into conflict with the British. However, after appeals to the Zaydī Imām, Yahya, failed, the Sultan’s politicking ‘created [a] conflict of interests among different groups in Ḥaḍramawt and the Ḥaḍ ramī emigrant communities overseas.’46 This came about because the Sultan’s advisor, Ibn ˓Ubaydillāh, a prominent member of the ˓ulamā’, wanted to see an Islamic ruler dominating the region rather than a non-Muslim European one. Ibn ˓Ubaydillāh believed that the British had undermined the ˓ulamā’, and therefore Islam, by establishing secular legal and educational institutions. But most Ḥaḍramī Kathīrī communities abroad opposed their own Sultan and instead preferred to support the Qu˓aytī-British rule of al-Mukalla. This choice was devoid of any religious ideological reasoning and was motivated purely by economic pragmatism. The transportation and communication systems between diaspora Yemeni communities in Europe, Indian and the Malaysian Archipelago were controlled by the European powers and opposing them would possibly result in the disconnection of the emigrants and the supply of much-needed remittances to their families and tribesmen back home.47
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the hostilities between Kathīrī and Qu˓aytī tribes over sovereign claims to Ḥaḍramawt and the influence of tribal notables in the diaspora was a major factor in both the continued conflicts and the eventual peace negotiations and brokerage between the opposing Sultans.48 The transnational tribal hierarchy and organization of both the Kathīrī and the Qu˓aytī exemplifies the fluid nature of tribal identity and allegiance in the diaspora. Whilst emigrant Yemeni communities may experience both integration and hybridity in their new geo-cultural environs, maintaining a direct connection and interest into the political affairs of the tribe and homeland have remained a constant feature of migrant Yemenis. Linda Boxberger remarks, ‘in 1939 there were about 80,000 Ḥaḍramīs in the East Indies whose strong ties with their homeland made them follow events there with the greatest attention.’49
Whilst the southern region of Ḥaḍramawt wrestled for tribal hegemony the northern regions of Bāb al-Mandab and Tihāmah were desperately trying to shake off the yoke of oppressive Zaydī Imāmate rule. The Zaydīs were a minority ruling elite who had ruled over the large parts of the Yemen for almost a thousand years. They emerged after the decline of the orthodox caliphate that had directly followed the Prophet Muhammad, a succession of his companions known as al-khulafā’ al-rashidūn (‘the rightly-guided caliphs’),50 when the Yemen became an ideal haven and location for Islamic heterodoxy largely under the influence of the Ismā’īlī and Zaydī Shii sects. Al-Faruqi asserts that the Zaydī school of jurisprudence refers to Zayd ibn ˓Alī Zayn al-˓Ābidīn (d.793CE), the third grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Although Zayd was not the founder of this particular sect, the Zaydī adherents regarded him as worthier than his brother, Muhammad al-Bāqir, to succeed his father in the imāmate of the Shia. Al-Faruqi states that the rise of the Zaydīs in the Yemen is,
a situational consequence of the political isolation, once they [the Zaydīs] took over power in Yaman [Yemen] and practically locked themselves up in its mountains for a millennium and a century.51
Yemen is the only place in the Muslim world where the Zaydī school has followers and as a minority sect it has influenced the whole Yemeni population.52 However, in matters of fiqh, the Zaydīs largely follow the Sunni schools and only differ in particular issues; the negation of ablution when bare feet have been exposed but unsoiled, the killing of animals and preparing of food by non-Muslims, marriage to Christian and Jewish wives, and the concept of temporary marriage, or muṭa˓, practised by the majority of Shia but refuted by the Zaydīs.53
The Ismā˓īlīs historically settled in small enclaves throughout the secluded, rugged and difficult terrain of northern Yemen including Jabal Ḥarāz and Najrān. Although the Southern population are majority orthodox Sunni, following the Shāfi˓ī school, a Zaydī Shii school eventually became a distinct minority and unique theological movement within the north Yemen originating from the ninth-century CE Zaydī state in Tabaristan.54 The first Zaydī
Imām of the Yemen emerged around the end of the ninth century CE and acceded after mediating between two opposing northern tribes.55 However, despite eventually assuming power over the Yemen, the Zaydīs could not control the whole region and their influence was restricted to their strongholds in the northern highlands. Zaydī beliefs are nearer to the Sunnis than the Shia and their theology is largely devoid of the mysticism and occult beliefs of the Ismā˓īlīs and other Shia who subscribe to ‘semi-divine’ Imāms. Robert Stokey has commented on the theological pragmatism of the Zaydī school, saying,
Its practical bent is reflected in its rejection of the idea of a ‘hidden’ [I]mam, expected to reappear with the prophets on the eve of Judgement Day. Rejected also is the notion of an occult exegesis of the Koran and the tradition accessible only to a few and its corollary, the systemic dissimulation practised by the Isma˓iliya and some other shi˓a.56
Zaydī Imāms, although receptive to Sunni traditions, must be Sayyids, blood descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (also known in the Yemen as al-sādah), who are genealogically linked through ˓Alī, the Prophet’s nephew. The Zaydī Imāms claim both Qaḥṭānī and Sayyid lineage, ensuring genealogical credence through Arab tribal purity and religious nobility. The Imām is freely elected by the Zaydī ˓ulamā’ as both religious and political leader, and Zaydī control over the Sunni majority was often imposed through military prowess with occasional periods of peaceful détente. The later Imām, Yahya Hamid al-Din (c.1904–48), was able to exercise his power and increase his influence by presenting himself as a unifying nationalist leader and religious figurehead.57 However, the Imām could not transform the ancient institution of Imāmate, known for its historical suppression of the majority Shāfi˓ī Sunnis, into a modern manifestation – as a national leader of a unified nation-state. His reign witnessed the demise of Ottoman imperial rule in the northern region and his projected image as a popular nationalist leader was founded on his aggressive attempts to usurp Ottoman hegemony. Ironically, the Turks had found a friend in the Imām by creating a mutual enemy in the British, who occupied Aden and the surrounding areas in the south. The Ottomans confirmed Yahya as the legitimate Imām and conceded to his autonomous rule in the northern highlands. The Ottoman–Zaydī alliance may well have defeated the southern British-backed Idrīsī Amirate forces had it not been for the outbreak of World War One, which precipitated the Turkish withdrawal after massive Ottoman defeats elsewhere.
The Zaydī Imāmate was internationally recognized as the legitimate successor state to the Ottoman province of the Yemen, but its control was still limited to the northern highlands.
