on logical terms pari passu with the contemporary Western philosophies. Third, this study provides an occasion to appreciate and celebrate the common concerns of humanity as elucidated in threads that run across a range of humanistic Western perspectives on justice and Islam. In fact, it is very clear from the research presented that the differences of opinion among multiple secular positions are starker than those between them and Islam. As the author argues, the Islamic position lies somewhere in the middle of a range of secular liberalisms and Marxian perspectives. Fourth, it is important to reflect deeply on the differences between the Western and the Islamic perspectives, too. In my view, some of these differences stem from an ad hoc and inherently fragmented approach to knowledge and society imbued in the conventional social science approach. As ‘empirical’ evidence grows on the connection between human actions on the one hand and social disruption and environmental disasters on the other, humanity is compelled to belatedly admit its bounded rationality. At this critical juncture, Islam can play a role in holding the hands of the ‘rational animal’ and connect him back with the Superior Intellect without Whose Guidance the human mind cannot transcend oneself and rise above the compulsions and attractions of ‘here and now’ in order to reconcile self-interest with communal harmony and values of justice, freedom and world peace.
In the end, I hope this study will be of interest to students and scholars of diverse interests including those focusing on Islamic economics, political philosophy and global social movements. Equally, I hope it stimulates a series of attempts to provide a more expanded version of Islamic principles of economic and political justice to serve the dual purpose of developing a characteristically Islamic alternative to modernity and participating fully in the global inter-civilizational dialogue on the future shape of the world.
| Leicester | Khurshid Ahmad |
| December 14, 2006 | |
| Dhu’l-Qaʿdah 23, 1427 AH |
Humanity is in a state of confusion. It is torn apart by conflicting claims of civilizational superiority. In the twentieth century alone, the rival views on how society should organize itself have been contested, in the words of Stiglitz (1994, p.1), not just in the debating halls of academe but on the battlefields of (Europe, Japan,) Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Central America. And, as this conflict reaches the Middle East and Central Asia, the focus has shifted increasingly to the weakest link in the chain, i.e. Islam. Contemporary Islam is under attack from all directions. Its claim of furnishing a blueprint for an egalitarian social order has turned it into a villain of a host of competing secular and religious interests. Its unfailing capacity to stir the hearts and minds of people has facilitated its association with terrorism. And, its hold on lands rich in natural resources has made it a prime target of those perpetually unsatiated with over consumption.
The question arises, therefore, as to how Muslims ought to respond to these challenges? How should they positively engage with this worldwide Hobbesian struggle for political, social, economic and military control? One possible answer lies in Muslims clarifying and justifying their vision of a social order in a language understandable to modernity. For, to the extent that misunderstandings lie at the core of the East-West relationship, clarification of ideas can play a pivotal role in alleviating hostilities and providing a focal point for intellectual debate and dialogue among civilizations.
This monograph has been written precisely with this objective in mind. It brings together and integrates key elements of Islam on organizing various dimensions of a good society. This synthesis is undertaken against the backdrop of different philosophical traditions that have influenced the contemporary Western concept of political order. The idea of justice on which, to the joy of Islam, Western moral philosophy has dwelled over the past four decades to articulate its position(s) on this issue, provides the common thread around which this entire study is formulated.
Islamic and Western Perspectives
WHAT IS JUSTICE?
The idea that a society should organize itself on principles of justice and that government ought to play a primary role in securing such justice is well known in history. In the fifth century CE, St. Augustine remarked: ‘Remota justitia, quid sint regna nisi magna latrocinia’ (Removed from justice, what be rulers if not large-scale robbers?). But, what is justice? According to Miller (1991, p.260), the best general definition comes from the Byzantine emperor, Justinian (482-565 CE): justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to everyone his due. One aspect of justice, called distributive justice, attempts to elaborate ‘what it means to give people what is due to them’ by identifying a morally correct principle that connects the characteristics of people with their rights and obligations. Some principles that can serve this purpose are listed in Table 1.1 below.
Table 1.1: Alternative principles of justice
| • To each according to merit | • To each according to need |
| • To each according to individual effort | • To each according to societal contribution |
| • To each according to rights | • To each an equal share |
Based on Beauchamp and Bowie (2001, p.642).
A theory of justice might accept only one, more, or all of these principles as legitimate (Beauchamp and Bowie, 2001). Sen (1992, pp.73-75) refers the characteristics across which a theory of justice establishes – explicitly or implicitly – a ‘basal equality’ amongst human beings as the substantive content or the informational basis of a theory of justice. But as he argues, focus on this basis alone is insufficient to comprehend the demands of justice. What matters also is the information that is excluded from a view of justice and which does not have a direct bearing on assessing alternative social arrangements and policies. It is this perspective that we shall keep in mind while examining different theories of justice advanced since the ancient Greeks.
PRE-MODERN THOUGHT
Greek thought
Plato (427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) were the first systematic political theorists of the Greek era. Plato in his Republic, the prototype of all utopias, considers that most people do not possess the intellect to conduct their affairs properly and need to be told what is good for them. Nevertheless, human beings are essentially social beings who find a natural fulfillment in political association. These premises lead Plato to conceive of an absolutist state that is led by a philosopher king or knowledgeable elite whose impartiality and commitment to Plato’s ideals is secured through grooming, renunciation of family life and affections, as well as, abdication of private property. Such an elite would strive to actualize the moral perfection of citizens by the development of private and public virtue. The concept of individual freedom, as we are aware of it today, does not find its way into Plato’s model of societal organization and if that contradicts with human nature, Plato is deliberately indifferent to it (Bowle, 1961, pp.40-42; Harmon, 1964, pp.29-52).
To Aristotle, Plato’s student, the search begins with the concept of ‘good’. Good is the goal, purpose, or aim to which something or somebody moves. And insofar as human beings are concerned,
