yet neither operated as if one were the captive of the other.31 Young stresses that at this juncture, as throughout the 1640s, the way ecclesiastical influence was most exerted upon Parliament was in the form of lobbying, and that this was effected through a body created by the General Assembly for such a purpose, called the Assembly Commission.
General Assembly Commission
According to Young, the Kirk’s need for an executive arm, with powers between Assemblies to negotiate on its behalf at the highest diplomatic levels, arose previously out of the post-1638 political turmoils. Thus he traces its first, formal appointment to 5 August 1642,32 but there are strong indications, however, that the Commission in fact had earlier antecedents. These emerge particularly in Alan R. MacDonald’s book, The Jacobean Kirk, 1567–1625. Although Assembly commissioners, sent out to perform specific remits, are mentioned frequently in the early 1590s, MacDonald notes that from 1596 their function appeared to broaden out into what was, in effect, a standing commission with the capacity to act in a wide range of matters:
They sent delegations to the king and Privy Council, demanding action against Huntly, Errol, their wives and Lady Livingstone, Errol’s daughter and an openly practicing Catholic. Alexander Seton, president of the Court of Session . . . was referred to the commissioners by the synod of Lothian and Tweeddale for dealings with the Catholic earls. They even found time to deal with a dispute over a benefice in the presbytery of Glasgow. The commissioners were acting, and were seen by the rest of the Kirk, as a privy council for the Kirk, wielding the power of the General Assembly between its meetings.33
It was the king himself who then added impetus to this development, since he realized that to enhance the status of such a body was to provide himself with a vehicle on which he could to carry through his plans to restore episcopacy: “King James rewarded those who had loyally served as commissioners of the Assembly by making them bishops. What better way of providing the episcopate with powers which did not require ratification by Parliament or General Assembly? Episcopacy with teeth was thus not reintroduced at a stroke; it was drip-fed into the system via the commission of the General Assembly and ecclesiastical representation in Parliament.”34
The role and powers of the Commission were to be the source of much controversy in the following century, as the number of controverted settlements threatened to overwhelm the Assembly. Returning, however, to the situation of the late 1640s, the Commission’s function of “prosecuting the desires of the Assembly”35 became especially relevant as it utilized the Church’s strengthened position in the aftermath of Preston to press for a programme of reforms which ranged from incest to care of the poor. Also within the agenda was the question of patronages.
The Approach to Abolition
The Commission’s lobbying campaign began on 30 January 1649 with a petition to Parliament. Calling it an old grievance, the petition based its appeal for removal on the grounds that it was a). unconstitutional, b). contrary to Scripture, c). prejudicial to free election and calling of ministers, d). a popish institution and e). condemned by the Books of discipline and the Acts of former General Assemblies. It considered its presence to be an item of unfinished business left over from the Reformation, and asked for its removal—or repeal, if any Act could be found to validate it as a law instead of merely a “corrupt custome.”36
To assist the Estates in their deliberations, the Commission resolved, two weeks later, to have a petition and memorandum drawn up which would demonstrate in detail why patronage was unlawful. The task was entrusted to the much-respected Samuel Rutherford (1600–61), now Principal at St. Mary’s College, St. Andrews, and James Wood (d.1664) third Master of the college. Their finished work was approved on the 28 February and at once sent up to Parliament.
The memorandum’s introduction37 commences with the tactful submission that as the ministers sought no benefit for themselves but only the removal of that which was unlawful and sinful, so they hoped that “your Lordships, in the integrity of your hearts, without any byas or eye to self-interest” would do the same. It then suggests that in doing so, their lordships might thereby free some parochial income, which could be diverted into caring for the poor—a ploy likely to incur no small popularity at a time of widespread want.
There then follows seven reasons justifying the church’s aversion to patronage. First, it is contrary to God’s law. The practice of a great man choosing the minister is as much a usurpation as his choosing the elders and deacons would be. Scripture grants to no one the right, unilaterally, to nominate any officer in the house of God; the New Testament reveals that this is given to the people and presbytery.38 Secondly, it is contrary to the received doctrine of the Kirk. Patronage is a violation of the Books of Discipline and many Acts of the General Assembly, of which last, two examples may be cited, the Acts of 1562 (session 3) and 1570 (session 2), where both imply a rejection of the practice.39 Thirdly, the office of patron is superfluous to the exercise of ministry and therefore unworthy of preservation. Moreover, since he cannot make the laborer worthy of his wages, he can hardly give him right to those wages. As for defending the minister in his maintenance, it is the magistrate’s job to do so. Fourthly, a patron should have no right to meddle in the remuneration of a properly qualified, called and admitted minister, yet as things stand, if the incumbent has not a presentation, the patron may withhold his maintenance. Any other profession would regard such interference as most unjust. Fifthly, to be lawful, patronage has to be either a spiritual, ecclesiastical or civil right. It is none of those. Sixthly, any office that can tempt either its holder or another party into corrupt agreements such as simony, ought to be banned. Seventh, patronage is both unnecessary and a complying with the practice of papists and idolaters.
The contrast with Johnston of Wariston’s treatise of just a few years earlier is interesting, in that the cautious tone is gone. The former is pragmatic, the latter is about principle. For the former, what is important is to seek a modus operandi, for the other, the issue is one of boundaries. Most of all, the latter envisages a remarkable arrangement whereby the secular arm is to protect, preserve and uphold the Church, yet deny itself any interference in its life and work. It was a proposition that did eventually receive the state’s explicit agreement in legislative form, but it was not to come until 272 years later.40
Just over a week after receiving the memorandum, Parliament debated the issue, passing the Act Abolishing the patronages of Kirks [see Appendix II] on the 9 March. The preamble repeated, in much the same language, the justifications contained in the petition and memorandum. However, once again, it should not be assumed that this was a confirmation that the legislature was merely the puppet of the ministers. The Act was part of a programme that the Kirk envisaged for national improvement, but it was also symptomatic of a flexing of muscle by the middle ranks of Scottish society. What made it possible was the dramatic reduction in the presence of the nobility in the Estates after the Preston fiasco. John R. Young’s statistics show how the nobles’ attendance dropped from 56 in the 1648 Parliament to 16 in the one beginning 4 January 1649.41 It was this crucial circumstance that freed the laird class to go on and promote measures characterized by their potential to erode the feudal hegemony of the nobility and large landowners.
Thus it was, in the same parliamentary session, power was given to presbyteries and kirk sessions to pressurize landowners into shouldering concern for the poor in their locality. Again, on the
