106 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 42])
A commonplace is therefore a source of a formal argument directed at one who has made a particularly bad (or good) moral decision. It is ‘formal’ in that Theon suggests a specific structure for a commonplace (see Theon, Progymnasmata 107 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 44]). In this passage one sees the structure which Theon proposes, as well as suggestions for the proofs. Although he does not specifically use the term topos, the language that Theon utilizes concerning the selection of proofs sounds much like the description of a topos that I have been considering.
In the descriptions of other preliminary exercises, however, Theon does use the term topos in the sense of a particular theme or motif used within an argument. For example, in his discussion of refutation and confirmation (found within the section on narrative in Kennedy’s edition of the Progymnasmata), Theon states:
As for refutation and proof, we said that the same topics [οἱ αὐτοὶ τόποι]137 are useful in fables, but in narratives the topics of the false and impossible [ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀδυνάτου τόποι]138 are also fitting. (Theon, Progymnasmata 93 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 40])
Theon’s use of the term topos is certainly different here than in the section on commonplace. Here, rather than being a complete formal argument, the topoi constitute the subject matter used to construct the refutation or confirmation of the narrative. This usage of the term topos is more akin to the predominant definition of locus in Cicero’s writings and as seen in Quintilian.139 Thus, to understand Theon’s use of the term topos correctly, the context in which Theon uses the term is extremely significant. For Theon, a topos can be a formal exercise in which a person is blamed (or less often, praised) for a particular moral choice. This exercise requires a fairly rigid structure, which Theon describes. He also, however, uses the term topos in a manner similar to Cicero; namely, a topos can be the source of a line of argumentation, used in support of any of a number of preliminary exercises. These topoi are many and varied, one of which is the testimony of others.
Topos in other Rhetorical Treatises
Theon’s view, namely that a topos is a form of proof that provides the content of epicheiremes, is echoed in the treatise by Anonymous Seguerianus. The writer of ΤΕΧΝΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΥ, a document most likely written around the beginning of the third century,140 discusses topoi in the section of the treatise entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΝ. The author makes the same distinction between artistic and non-artistic proofs141 that we have seen in other ancient rhetoricians. It is in the subsection describing the artistic proofs (that is, the proofs that are composed by the orator) that the author describes the topos. For this author, the topoi represent those proofs from which one composes epicheiremes.
A second treatise written at approximately the same time as Art of Political Speech and entitled Art of Rhetoric is attributed to Apsines of Gadara.142 In this treatise, the author also discusses the concept of topos. In the first section in which the author treats the prooemium, he lists several θεωρήματα out of which one can compose the prooemium. The way in which these are described is similar to the lists of topoi/loci seen in Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, as the author provides various arguments that can be used within the prooemium to address a specific situation within the speech.143 For example, the author suggests that the θεώρημα of “from what follows” is an appropriate argument when the judge has made a previous judgment on a case from which the current case is derived. Thus these themes suggest possible arguments of which the orator can take advantage in the prooemium of the speech.
Later in the work the term τόπος is explicitly used in several contexts. The refutation “by reversal is supported from the following topics [ἐκ τόπων τούτων]” (Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 5.1). What follows is a listing of possible proofs, both artistic and inartistic, that will assist the orator in refuting the claims of the opponent through the negation of the charges. In the chapter entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΨΗΣ, Apsines writes: “[N]ow let us look at the most important headings, considering from what topics they are composed [ἐκ τοίων τόπων σύγκειται] and by what kind of arguments they are confirmed, and first let us speak about final headings” (Art of Rhetoric, 9.1). Here, one sees that each heading144 can be elaborated through the use of various topoi; in each case the topoi are suggested arguments one can employ to demonstrate the legality, rightness, advantage, etc. of one’s case.
Finally, in the section on epilogues, topoi are mentioned once again. Here, the concept of topos has the widest range of meanings in the treatise. For example, the author claims that the epilogue itself is a topos (“The epilogue is a topic in three parts [Ὁ ἐπίλογος τόπος τριμερής ἐστιν]” [Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 10.1]). The epilogue has three subdivisions: “recapitulation [ἀνάμνησις],” “pity [ἔλεος],” and “indignation [δείνωσις]” (Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 10.1). However, of these three, both recapitulation and pity are called topoi.145 And in the section in which the author discusses pity, he mentions the “common topic from judgment and actions of the past [ἀπὸ κρίσεως καὶ ἀπὸ ἔργων γεγενημένων τὸν κοινὸν τόπον τοῦτον]” (Art of Rhetoric, 10.16). Therefore, for this author, a topos is a major part of the speech (the epilogue), which is subdivided into topoi, and each of these topoi can be supported through other (common) topoi!
This survey of the ancient rhetoricians’ views of topos/locus has demonstrated that this concept enjoyed a rather wide range of meaning. For Aristotle, the topos represented a source of logical argumentation, the topos serving as the structure of the argument. For Cicero and Quintilian, a locus was the place in which the orator would find a source of arguments from which the orator would select the ones appropriate for arguing the case at hand. But Cicero and Quintilian both differentiate between loci as sources of arguments and loci communes, which were stock, self-contained arguments useful for any case. Also, Cicero demonstrates that he is familiar with the locus being used as a theme or example to which the orator refers in the course of the speech.
Theon and other rhetoricians show that they are familiar with this range of meanings as well. Theon describes the preliminary exercise of topos, in which the student is instructed to blame, or praise, a person or thing through the use of a specified, structured argument. But he also uses the term topos more in line with Cicero and Quintilian’s predominant use of locus, that of a source of possible arguments. These uses (and others) are also found in later treatises authored by Anonymous Seguerianus and Apsines. Given the rather wide semantic range for the term topos among the ancient rhetoricians, it is not surprising that a multiplicity of meanings for the term topos can be found in modern NT scholarship, as was demonstrated earlier.
Above, in my review of J. Thom’s investigation of topos, I noted that his study did not include Cicero’s concept(s) of loci. From the analysis of Cicero’s treatment of loci in Topica, one sees that his complete concept of locus does not perfectly fit any single criterion within Thom’s schema. Internal loci, those which are inherent to the subject of the argument, line up with Thom’s first category, the strategic, or rhetorical topoi. However, Cicero’s external loci, those arguments that are drawn from outside of the subject,
