Peronist electoral campaign was “Braden or Perón.”3
Some populist leaders incorporate into their discourses colloquial isms and other elements of popular culture. Perón, for example, incorporated lunfardo, verses of Martín Fierro, and the tragic-sentimental structure of tango. Evita used the language of soap operas and transformed the political into dramas dominated by love. “Her scenarios never changed and her characters were stereotyped by the same adjectives: Perón was always ‘glorious,’ the people ‘marvelous,’ the oligarchy egoísta y vende patria [selfish and corrupt], and she was a ‘humble’ or ‘weak’ woman, ‘burning her life for them’ so that social justice could be achieved, cueste lo que cueste y caiga quien caiga [at whatever cost and regardless of consequences]” (Navarro 1982, 59). Gaitán, through his strong oratorical style, with shouts of “Pueebloo aa laa caargaa,” broke with the calm, melodic rhetorical style of his opponents (Braun 1985). Populist leaders often also make creative use of mass media such as radio. Incorporating popular music—el porro—Gaitán succeeded in entering the homes of his followers through his radio spots and transmitted speeches.
Discursive populist events are characterized by repetition of a series of rituals. Gaitán finished his speeches with a ritual dialogue with his audience. He shouted “pueblo” and the crowds responded “a la carga.”
Pueblo.
Por la reestructuración moral y democrática de la república.
Pueblo.
A la victoria.
Pueblo.
Contra la oligarquía. (Braun 1985, 103)
Durkheimian sociology has interpreted massive political acts as rituals that evoke a sense of belonging. During populist political meetings, elements of the participants’ and the leader’s identities are activated and reorganized. The audience recognizes themselves in the leader and projects onto him the solution of their demands and aspirations; in addition, they identify with each other. In these populist mass meetings, where the popular sectors feel themselves participants in the political process, the script has already been written. Most of the time, common people are reduced to follow the lines of a drama that has assigned them a central though subordinate role. They are expected to delegate power to a politician who claims to be the embodiment of their redemption.
Braun’s description (1985, 93–99) of one of the most important Gaitanista meetings illustrates many of these points. On 23 September 1945, forty to fifty thousand Gaitanistas met in Bogota’s Circo de Santamaría, awaiting their leader. The caudillo arrived impeccably dressed, accompanied by his wife and father. The audience saw in their leader one of themselves, el negro Gaitán, who started at the bottom and was now running for president of the republic. The serene tone of Gaitán at this meeting contrasted with the euphoria of the spectators and with most of his previous mass political appearances. In a calm dialogue with the audience, he explained the basic points of his political vision: society’s organic nature, the moral basis of the social, the necessity of regenerating national values, and the importance of meritocracy. Gaitán referred to the struggle of el pueblo that embodied the just and the good with the oligarquía. He placed el pueblo at the center of history, transcending political parties. And he, Gaitán, was the person able to understand their feelings. The impact of the discourse was manifested in the chants of the crowd as they left the event: “En el Circo de Santamaría, murió la oligarquía” (in the Circo de Santamaría, the oligarchy has died) and “Guste o no le guste, cuadre o no le cuadre, Gaitán será su padre” (like it or not, agree or not, Gaitán shall be your father).
MECHANISMS OF CLIENTELISM AND PATRONAGE
Approaches that privilege the concept of charisma tend to ignore the concrete mechanisms of electoral articulation, assigning all expla natory weight to the figure and discourse of the leader. As several authors point out (Menéndez-Carrión 1986; Quintero 1980), this interpretation is only possible if the popular bases are understood as anomic and irrational masses. Studies that employ the concept of political clientelism have discarded the presuppositions of the irrationality of marginal sectors, demonstrating on the contrary their instrumental rationality and the importance of political organizations in the conquest of the vote (Menéndez-Carrión 1986). The usefulness of this perspective is illustrated for the Ecuadorian case in the debate between Martz (1989) and Menéndez-Carrión (1986) about the first phase of Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) in Guayaquil between 1948 and 1960.
John Martz privileges the concept of charismatic leadership, showing Carlos Guevara Moreno’s success in building the CFP. But what Martz cannot explain is why Guevara Moreno lost the leadership of his party. However, Menéndez-Carrión is able to explain both the success and failure of Guevara Moreno, using the concept of political clientelism. According to Menéndez-Carrión, the exchange of votes for goods and services accounts for electoral success. Leadership within the party and therefore control over the political machinery also depend on what particular politicians can deliver. Thus the political actions of popular sectors are in fact rational responses to the precarious conditions—poverty and an unreceptive political system—in which they live.
Although the concept of political clientelism is more useful than charisma in explaining the conquest of votes, it should not become the only frame of reference within which populist appeal is explained, as in Menéndez-Carrión’s work (1986). In its emphasis on formal rationality, political clientelism cannot help us to understand the generation of collective identities in populist movements. As many case studies have shown, participation in a political machine does more than merely assure the delivery of goods and services. In addition, the sense of belonging to a movement is instilled. That is why it is important to study not only the material features of the clientelist exchanges (what is given), but also the symbolic dimensions of exchanges (how it is given) (Auyero 1998).
Populist leaders such as Gaitán, Haya de la Torre, and Velasco Ibarra appealed to both voters and people excluded from the franchise. Through their meetings, slogans, and posters their message transcended the restricted electorate. Thus rather than having to choose between political clientelism and charisma as the central explanatory variable in populism, this suggests that both phenomena must be studied, in particular through an analysis of the concrete political processes in which they are joined. The leader articulates values and challenges and creates new political idioms. Political organizations, in turn, articulate strategies for electoral success, as well as creating mechanisms through which solidarities and collective identities are generated. The ways that these processes complement each other in specific cases must be examined.
SOCIAL HISTORY OF POPULISM
A major preoccupation of students of populism has been to understand the actions of the followers of populist leaders. Some authors, like Germani (1971, 1978), have based their arguments on theories of mass society; others have challenged this interpretation with structural arguments that highlight the instrumental rationality of followers (Spalding 1977; Murmis and Portantiero 1971; Weffort 1998; Ianni 1973, 1975). Recent analyses have gone further by also taking into account the values, ideologies, culture, and actions of subaltern groups (French 1989; James 1988a, 1988b; Wolfe 1994).
Gino Germani’s studies of populism (1971, 1978) reflect the impressions made on him by “mass” movements such as Italian fascism, Nazism, and Peronism. Through the lenses of mass-society theories, he interpreted the collective action of Peronist followers as irrational and anomic. Rapid socioeconomic changes such as urbanization and industrialization produced anomic and available masses—mostly recent immigrants—who were easy prey for the demagogic and manipulative powers of Perón, becoming the social base for his movement. This perspective arbitrarily divides collective action and political behavior into normal and abnormal, such that whatever deviates from the theoretically prescribed path of development is denigrated.
