leaders.
The GRR and many of Tan Malaka’s followers were not so reluctant to take up arms against the PKI and were widely reported as participating in the fighting. Major Sabaruddin in particular, with whom Tan Malaka was later to become closely involved, led one of the principal assaults on the city of Madiun and pursued the fleeing PKI leaders into the mountain areas of East Java.9
After the government had recaptured Madiun and wiped out the PKI, Tan Malaka proceeded once again to voice his criticism of the government’s policies.10 His position had a certain attraction at that time, for a second Dutch attack on the republic was indeed becoming more likely as the Renville Agreement proved ever more unworkable. During October and November, the government’s antagonism to the growing strength of the anti-diplomasi forces was manifested in a swing from specific anti-PKI moves to a general opposition to leftists of any stripe. As early as 5 October the leadership council of the GRR issued a statement demanding the least possible curtailment of democratic rights in the anti-Madiun actions, more care in making arrests, and a reaffirmation of the right to existence of all ideologies based on democracy.11
The following statement made by a republican representative in Jakarta reveals the government’s continued suspicion of Tan Malaka and the GRR: “These parties are supporting the government in its battle against the Muso communists. Their programme, however, is against the government. . . . These parties are against any form of negotiations with the Dutch.”12
Possibilities for Tan Malaka making a political comeback in this period were generated not only by the objective situation of increasing Dutch pressures, but also by a subjective factor: the elimination of his principal political opponents, those in the PKI. A large section of the PKI-dominated Front Demokrasi Rakyat (not to mention a number of PKI members themselves) had opposed the Madiun uprising and were probably quite open to joining a strong party oriented to pursuing the politics of perjuangan within a left-wing framework. On the other hand, it is obvious that the post-Madiun atmosphere was scarcely conducive to the construction of a left alternative to the republican leadership, and the vehemence of the PKI opposition and slander regarding Tan Malaka must have made it impossible for many former PKI members to consider joining forces with him under any circumstances.
On 3 October 1948 plans were announced for fusion of the principal parties constituting the GRR. The new party would include the Partai Rakyat (People’s Party), the largest element in the GRR and led by Maruto Nitimihardjo; the Partai Rakyat Jelata (Poor People’s Party), made up mainly of former militia fighters from West Java; and the Partai Buruh Merdeka (Merdeka Workers Party), recently established by Sjamsu Harya Udaya as a counter to the pro-PKI Partai Buruh Indonesia. In addition, AKOMA (Young Communist League), led by Ibnu Parna, and Partai Wanita Rakyat (People’s Women’s Party), led by Nyonya Sri Sulandari Mangunsarkoro, expressed their intention to join the new party provided their special status as sectional representatives could be maintained.13
Discussions on the nature and structure of the new party were held through the month of October. It was stressed that, while the party aimed to carry out the goals of the old Persatuan Perjuangan, the GRR would continue to exist as a broader front of parties, organizations, and militias within which the new party was to function as a disciplined element.14
The fusion took place on 7 November, the anniversary of the Russian revolution. The new party, announced as “anti-fascist, anticapitalist and anti-imperialist,” was called Partai Murba. Its office bearers were General Chairperson Sukarno, First Deputy Maruto Nitimihardjo, Second Deputy Sutan Dewanis, and Secretary-General Sjamsu Harya Udaya. Tan Malaka and Rustam Effendi (who had represented the Communist party of the Netherlands in the prewar Dutch parliament) were elected by the congress as “promoters” of the party, but were not given any official position within it.15
Partai Murba had both a minimum and maximum program. The Minimum Program followed that of the old Persatuan Perjuangan, with a few amendments to conform to current conditions. The Maximum Program was a completely new feature and charted a course towards construction of a socialist Indonesia. In structure, Partai Murba was to be democratic-centralist.16
There is some uncertainty about Tan Malaka’s precise role in the formation of Partai Murba. Most observers, at the time and subsequently, regarded it as “his” party, assuming that it was formed on his initiative.17 One of his close followers, Hasan Sastraatmadja, with whom he was staying after his release from prison, considers that Tan Malaka played a more passive role.18 Whether the party was formed on his initiative or not, the fact is that Tan Malaka strongly supported its formation, as can be seen from his articles of the time, which included a long explanation and defense of the Maximum Program.19
The Partai Murba did attract considerable support. On its formation it was estimated to have eighty thousand members, most of whom were originally members of Partai Rakyat.20 Two newspapers, Moerba and Massa, were considered to be official organs of the party, while Kedaulatan Rakyat (the largest paper in Yogyakarta) and Merdeka (from Solo) were regarded as pro-Partai Murba publications.21
The first mass action staged by the Partai Murba was planned for 15 November, the second anniversary of the Sjahrir-Amir government’s announcement that the Linggajati Agreement had been installed, to be commemorated as a “day of shame.” All party branches were instructed to hold meetings and, if possible, mass demonstrations. The provisional military governors of Solo, Madiun, Semarang, and Pati refused to allow mass demonstrations but did permit meetings, to be attended only by invited guests. However, even these were prevented at the last minute. In Yogyakarta a mass meeting was held with AKOMA leader Ibnu Parna as one of the main speakers, but he was arrested on 21 November as a result of that speech.22
Tensions between supporters of diplomasi and perjuangan rose as a result of reports that the republican government was prepared to “surrender key powers to the Dutch . . . during an interim period”23 and specifically that the republic would agree that the Dutch had the right to dispatch troops to an area that they unilaterally decided was becoming unstable—a right that the republic had previously adamantly opposed conceding.
The perjuangan forces were outraged by this ominous development and called for a political front against negotiations. Principal parties to this development were the left wing of the PNI, the Partai Murba, and the Partai Sosialis Islam Indonesia (PSII-the Indonesian Islamic Socialist Party). The formation was known as the Kongres Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Congress), and on 14 December it issued a call for a national congress to be held in Solo 24-26 December 1948.24
In early December the news agency Aneta reported mounting unrest and commented on the circulation of leaflets predicting that the revolution would break forth in greater intensity on 1 January 1949. Specifically it reported, “2 km from Probolinggo a field police went into action against the notorious Patjar Merah gang on Monday evening. . . .”25
The seriousness with which this challenge to the government was regarded in mid-December can be gauged by the following quotation from a liberal Dutch newspaper. Commenting on the fact that foreign countries had supported Hatta because he had proved he could hold his own against communism, Algemeen Handelsblad added, “They forget, however, that Hatta is under the domination of Tan Malaka’s Trotskyist radical front, which is but communism under a different name.”26
Throughout October and November, Tan Malaka and the Partai Murba had stressed the likelihood that the Dutch would launch a second attack, expected around 20 November.27 The government was criticized for maintaining a position of absolute confidence in the Dutch, believing that they would not attack while negotiations were in progress.
Tan Malaka was not the only person to articulate these views. In particular, a number of army commanders had long dissociated
