front since October 1990, with France supporting Mobutu’s efforts and Belgium favoring OAU initiatives. Now, in the wake of the Bugesera massacres, Belgium had been particularly strenuous in its condemnation of the Habyarimana regime, while French patience with the Rwandan army’s performance was wearing thin. Both sought a more vigorous engagement as a way out of an apparent dead end.
The Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandan government had entreated Assistant Secretary Cohen to lead a new mediation. The United States, with its usual proclivity for regional approaches in conflict resolution, first suggested the EC as an appropriate mediating institution.63 The US government finally had agreed to provide some technical assistance to the peace process and to be linked formally to future talks as an “observer.” Thus, the parties were coming to Paris with the peace process now being managed by donor partners rather than by African states.
Two things remained constant in this protracted history of political change and military stalemate: the willingness of the Habyarimana regime to countenance or connive in ethnic violence at times of acute political tension, and the proclivity of the Patriotic Front to use military coercion to enhance its negotiating posture. A prime example of the former was the Bugesera massacres, perpetrated just as the Habyarimana regime was resisting pressure to form a coalition government. A good illustration of the latter came as the principals were on their way to Paris. On June 5, the day that peace talks were to begin, the RPF launched an attack in the center north at Byumba. France brought in an additional company of troops to protect its citizens in Kigali. It looked like the logic of war was again to win out over the logic of peace. Yet, though somewhat delayed, the Paris talks went forward on June 6. The US embassy in Paris concluded that “as far as we can ascertain neither the June 5 RPF attack in northern Rwanda nor the French deployment of an additional army company had any direct resonance in the talks.”64
THE UNITED STATES JOINS THE DIALOGUE
The United States accepted the invitation of the French government and the parties to be “present” at the Paris talks, sending Jeffrey Davidow, the senior deputy assistant secretary for African affairs. Davidow engaged both sides on the substantive issues facing the talks: the when and how of a ceasefire, the agenda for political talks, the relation between the process of democratization within the country and the RPF demands for inclusion within the polity, and how to deal with repatriation of refugees into an already overpopulated country.65
In the talks with Ambassador Davidow, the Rwandan government delegation reaffirmed its two-track approach, patching up relations with Uganda even as it initiated talks with the RPF. On the other side, RPF chief negotiator Pasteur Bizimungu held that “the transition government should be broad based and have the agreement of all parties, even those not included in it.” Regarding the talks, Davidow predicted that “successes, if there are any, will be minimal.”66 That is why, in his meeting with French director for African affairs Dijoud, Davidow noted that the Rwandans could not solve their problem alone. He urged the French to consider a mediation role, perhaps in conjunction with the Tanzanians, who did not have the resources to go it alone. “It is more important that the mediator be powerful than that it be neutral,” Davidow insisted.67 As for the United States, it was willing to be present in the process but would have difficulty contributing manpower or money other than some technical advice to the negotiators and assistance for refugees.
WHAT WAS CONCLUDED AND WHAT WAS NOT
The Paris talks finally began on June 6, 1992. Except for a French and US presence at the opening and closing sessions, the three-day talks were direct and closed-door. The closing communiqué reaffirmed the mediation of Mobutu while reserving the right to face-to-face “facilitated” talks. The parties asked neighboring countries as well as the OAU, France, Belgium, and the United Sates to be Observers to the negotiations. As regards the implementation of a ceasefire, the parties “affirmed their political will to put an end to the war,” reaffirmed the validity of the N’sele Accord of March 29, 1991, and asked the OAU secretary general to provide information on an OAU monitoring role. On a possible agenda for negotiations, the parties retained from the Rwandan government the question of national unity and the democratization process and from the Rwandan Patriotic Front the fusion of the two armies, a transitional government with an enlarged base, and political guarantees. The two parties agreed to meet again July 10–12 in Africa (either in Zaire or Tanzania) for substantive discussion on a ceasefire.68 Less than a month later, direct talks between Foreign Minister Ngulinzira and RPF chairman Kanyarengwe at the OAU ministerial in the presence of the Senegalese foreign minister (Senegal had just taken over as chair of the OAU) firmed up these understandings.
What was not in the communiqué was the very large arena still contested by the two sides. There was no agreement on how refugees should be repatriated. The coalition government wanted to preserve the institutions that the 1991 constitution put in place and expand them to include RPF participation; the RPF wanted to dismantle the current government and rewrite the constitution. The government wanted to move forward to new elections that would provide the basis for multiparty participation in government; the RPF wanted to hold national elections at the end of the interim period but insisted on immediate local elections to replace officials named by the current regime. The government would accept token integration of RPA officers into the Rwandan army; the RPF wanted to demobilize the government army and integrate RPF troops into a new force at a 50:50 ratio. As for the critical issue of moving forward on a sustainable ceasefire, the Rwandan government wanted an interposition force, whereas the Patriotic Front wanted a truce line monitored by a small observer force.
The Paris talks reflected, as well, positions of the international actors in this crisis. France’s role, solicited by the government and questioned by the RPF, was confirmed by the success, however limited, of the Paris talks. The United States, which had early staked out a middle ground on the crisis, was now being solicited by both sides as an honest broker. However, Ambassador Davidow had carefully delimited the modest role that the United States envisioned.69 His argument against an expensive interposition force, his urging of progress in democratization as the path to peace, and his enthusiasm for parallel interim institutions like a political military committee were positions to which the United States would continually return. Operationally, keeping the French forward in the peace process and keeping costs low became central planks in the US platform.
Senegal, by virtue of its presidency of the OAU, was assured of a voice at the table. Both France and Rwanda seemed to see Uganda as an essential part of the peace process, as witnessed by the border-assessment mission France had already deployed and the upcoming visit of Ugandan foreign minister Ssemogerere to Paris. The parties were ambiguous about potential African mediators. Neither side was particularly friendly with the Tanzanians. Both the internal opposition and RPF mistrusted Zaire. But both were determined that the ceasefire negotiations should move back to an African locale. Eventually, Arusha won out over Kinshasa, although the parties insisted on keeping Mobutu as mediator and the N’sele Accord as the founding document for the revived negotiation process.70
AN AMERICAN GAMBIT
Since the US policy review in March, the United States had been visibly active in the Central African region. An internal summation of the US position concluded that “with Hank Cohen’s high visibility as the promoter of dialogue and without a vested interest in the area, the USG is seen as the most objective party.”71 Cohen’s personal diplomacy had brought together the Rwandan government and the Front in Kampala. He had encouraged Museveni’s positive participation in the peace process and had secured an invitation to the United States to be present at the Paris talks in May. Now the French had invited the assistant secretary to be in Paris during the visit of Ugandan foreign minister Ssemogerere on June 20. The ostensible purpose of the foreign minister’s meeting was to be briefed on the French border survey. But Paris wanted Cohen’s help in pressuring the Ugandans to stop assistance to the Rwandese Patriotic Front.
At the meeting, the assistant secretary
