maxim for US MG.46
The points of agreement at Charlottesville reflected principles for MG in the Judge Advocate General’s 1940 Basic Field Manual: Military Government (FM 27-5).47 “Military government is executed by force,” wrote the authors of FM 27-5. Therefore, “it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by … justice, honor, and humanity.” Failure to do so could affect the social cohesion of occupied territory and MG control in turn because “a military occupation marked by harshness, injustice, or oppression leaves lasting resentment.” By contrast, “just, considerate, and mild treatment … will convert enemies into friends.”48 Although the terminology “winning hearts and minds” had not entered the military zeitgeist in 1940, this idea infused the approach described in the manual.49
FM 27-5 grew most directly from interwar interest in the military science of occupation after the apparent success of US MG in the German Rhineland after World War I. Germans appeared to have cooperated with the Americans, and US forces relied heavily on them. There were problems in the American-controlled Rhineland, to be sure, but they did not approach the looting, rioting, and racial tensions that characterized the British, Belgian, and French areas.50 Although continuing from 1918 to 1923, the US military’s experience in the Rhineland led to the publication of two influential studies in 1920. The first was colloquially known as the Hunt report after its author Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, adviser to the occupying Third Army in the Rhineland and later the officer in charge of civil affairs of the American Forces in Germany, its successor. The second was by another staff officer, Colonel Harry Alexander Smith. The antecedents to later US military thinking about MG reside in these documents. Smith partially credited the building of positive relationships with Germans to the selection of officers with “zeal and vision,” those “more likely to create than follow precedents.” Hunt emphasized the military governor’s independence from regular command.51
Hunt and Smith acknowledged that the American approach to MG in the Rhineland at least partially reflected a long history of foreign excursions that began with General Winfield Scott’s occupation of Mexico during the Mexican-American War (1846–48).52 Later writers like Nobleman—a civilian lawyer before entering the army in 1942 who, after leaving Bavaria, returned to New York and wrote his doctoral thesis on the American occupation of Germany—found the origins for American MG even earlier in the country’s military history.53 He noted briefly that the equation between “military government” and “martial law,” which was adjudicated through military tribunals, was evident during the First Seminole War (1817–18).54 But for Hunt, Smith, and many of the instructors at Charlottesville, the occupation of Mexico was the historical archetype to aspire toward. Scott had faced a mammoth challenge. The entire US deployment to Mexico was just thirty thousand soldiers, and Scott’s occupation force never exceeded ten thousand.55 He asserted control by imposing strict martial law while also leaving other Mexican institutions and government intact.56
Scholar Francis Lieber codified the ideal form of arch-occupation in a series of lectures at Columbia University, where he was a professor, just prior to the Civil War. A former Prussian soldier who was wounded at Waterloo, Lieber was particularly concerned with the potential for draftee Union armies to brutalize occupied people and create local hostility, which could undermine battlefield victories. In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln promulgated Lieber’s ideas as General Orders 100—commonly known as the Lieber Code—which created rules for Union soldiers occupying Confederate territory. Minimal intervention, including respect for local populations and existing institutions, was central to the Lieber Code, and although Union forces did not always adhere to it perfectly, it nonetheless provided a framework for conciliatory occupation that extended into the post–Civil War Reconstruction of the South.57
Hunt did not universally praise the American occupation of the Rhineland. His recommendation against using regular soldiers for MG was perhaps his most important contribution. He noted that “tactical” soldiers are not trained in civil affairs. They retain a potential combat role, hindering their ability to build collaborative relationships with occupied peoples. For him, the lack of officers trained in governance was a major failing of US MG in the Rhineland, and he suggested copying the British and French colonial styles of indirect administration by specialist officers.58 The genesis of the Charlottesville school partly lies in the military’s adoption of Hunt’s suggestions. FM 27-5 also clearly differentiated between the security provided by tactical troops and the administration of military government, which was the purview of MGOs.59
In keeping with the importance placed on MGOs, FM 27-5 elevated officer discretion. According to the writers, “military government must be flexible. It must suit the people, the country, the time, and the strategical and tactical situation.” Officers had to be “capable of change without undue inconvenience.”60 This flexibility was the conceptual keel for the minimalist American approach to MG. It revealed a recognition that occupation is unpredictable. Conditions would vary from region to region—as Hamilton and Joublanc found in Nuremberg and Augsburg—let alone from nation to nation. The mission was therefore distilled to enforcing order. An MGO’s instruments were martial law and respectful use of existing people and institutions. But beyond these core elements, the only thing linking different instances of MG was a pragmatic recognition that the outcomes legitimized the methods.
Thought in Practice: The Axis Threat and Military Government in Hawaii
The bombing of Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 accelerated preparations for foreign occupation already underway in the War Department. The attack also meant putting MG into practice. That Sunday afternoon, as smoke and debris filled the air, Territorial Governor of Hawaii Joseph B. Poindexter declared martial law using powers in the 1900 Hawaiian Organic Act, which had created the territory. Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, head of the US Army’s Hawaii Department, became military governor.61 Martial law, Poindexter announced, would apply to “all persons … whether residents … or not, whether citizens of the United States or not.”62
Short’s tenure as military governor was brief. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall recalled him to Washington on 17 December to answer for the Japanese surprise, demoting him in the process.63 Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons replaced him and Thomas H. Green—later a guest instructor at Charlottesville—became Emmons’s executive officer.64 At Charlottesville, Green used Hawaii as a living example of MG in the courses he delivered, providing insight into the thinking that guided the operation.65 Following the Pearl Harbor attacks, military command in Hawaii had believed that Japanese invasion was imminent and that Japanese subversives on the islands posed a real threat. These together were rationales for martial law and convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to authorize it.66
MG in Hawaii continued until late 1944. The Supreme Court ruled in February 1946 that subjecting Americans to martial law was unconstitutional.67 During the war, however, Hawaii was an important touchstone for the conduct of MG, modeling principles for trainee MGOs. These principles were apparent in Hawaii, where the stated aim was ensuring that the territory’s resources and people were mobilized for defense, which included evacuating women and children and “building fortifications and airfields.”68 But strict enforcement of martial law was MG’s first priority, both to enforce civilian compliance and to identify possible pro-Japanese subversion. The army moved quickly once martial law was declared, following the doctrine in FM 27-5. Civilian government offices and courts were closed, and the press was censored. Military law replaced civilian law and was adjudicated through military tribunals. Habeas corpus was suspended.69 The army also adhered to the manual’s intellectual spirit and imposed additional limits on civil liberties. Blackouts were established and curfews announced; all residents were required to register with MG and thereafter carry identification cards.70 Strict controls were placed over the economy. Green explained to students at Charlottesville that it was necessary to bind workers to their jobs
