it is nevertheless able to serve as the moral guide.”109 But can it serve as a moral guide to those whose sense of right and wrong has been “effaced”? VanDrunen admits that “man still knows [natural law], though in a corrupted fashion” and “Sinful human beings will constantly pervert and reject the teaching of natural law.”110 But should we advance a “corrupted” and “perverted” ethic? And though Budziszewski admits that unregenerate man suppresses God’s revelation in nature, he never explains how they can properly handle it; he simply says that they know it.111 But should we encourage men to follow a suppressed and mishandled revelation? We see then, by divorcing word and nature—separating what God has joined together—natural theology, in effect, advocates a depraved ethic.
Conversely, the Lord’s sacred Word demands the Lord’s sacred Word for ethics. Overcoming men’s depravity requires the corrective gospel. Nature reveals to the sinner the wrath of God (Rom 1:18), not redemptive grace. Sinful man finds God’s saving message solely in his Word (Rom 10:14–17). Also, God’s Word objectively checks our interpretations of nature. “Man’s Creator has provided the linguistic framework for ‘exegeting’ the truth of God in natural revelation and in man himself.”112 So though natural ethicists mean well when they counsel us to follow our hearts, the Lord notifies us that “he who trusts in his own heart is a fool” (Prov 28:26), for our hearts deceive us all too easily (Jer 17:9). Consequently, God bids us to follow his commandments so that we will not follow the perversions of our nature (Num 15:39), even as Jethro knew that his advice to Moses should only be followed if God approved (Exod 18:23).
When men do not filter their experiences through God’s Word (a la Deut 6:6, 8), their studies of nature teach that same-sex civil unions should be recognized by the civil authorities,113 or that all marital sexual relations be “ordered per se to the procreation of human life,”114 or that sheepherding is a loathsome profession (Gen 46:34), or that men who survive snake bites are gods (Acts 28:3–6). Foolishness inevitably results from theories not founded on Christ’s rock-words (Matt 7:24–27). “Yet hence it appears,” agrees Calvin, “that if men were taught only by nature, they would hold to nothing certain or solid or clear-cut, but would be so tied to confused principles as to worship an unknown god [cf. Acts 17:23].”115
Critique: Tends to Idolatry
To understand this third criticism we must understand authority-hierarchies. In life we obey many authorities, ranging from personal authorities like fathers, policemen, teachers, and employers to impersonal authorities like sense perception, our faculties (rational, emotional, volitional), and principles of thought (logical, scientific, moral). How we arrange these authorities says something about our moral philosophy: whichever authority we reckon the ultimate and most authoritative is our god.
A righteous moral philosophy makes Yahweh the ultimate authority, for there is none greater (Heb 6:13). Accordingly, all our words and deeds must be done according to his authority (Col 3:17), subordinating all other authorities. Whatever is not brought “into captivity to the obedience of Christ” is not neutral but rather “against the knowledge of God” (2 Cor 10:5; cf. Matt 12:30). Wishing to avoid the sin of our first parents, therefore, we screen all of our thinking and doing through his authoritative Word (Deut 6:6, 8).
An idolatrous moral philosophy, on the other hand, makes something other than Yahweh the highest authority. We deify anything we make our ultimate authority. As ultimate, we believe it is self-author-izing.116 It requires no proof from any extraneous source; if it needed vindication from something else then it would not be ultimate. In the nature of the case, then, we treat it with unquestioning allegiance.
Moreover, we can exalt anything to an ultimate status—whether personal deities or impersonal principles. And though few have trouble seeing the idolatry of placing Baal, Molech, or Allah before Yahweh, we should see it no less idolatrous when impersonal principles are elevated above him. Additionally, it makes no difference whether these authorities are always unlawful or whether they are in themselves lawful. Authorities that are always unlawful to follow include personal deities like Baal or Allah, or impersonal principles like “We may lie in order to win arguments.”
But to see how authorities lawful in themselves become idolatrous requires more judicious reasoning. Take, for example, the principle to love your family (Titus 2:4)—a good principle in itself. However, when we place this love above Yahweh it becomes sinful (Deut 13:6–10; 1 Sam 2:29; Matt 10:37). Again, seeking help from others is in itself a morally permissible principle (Deut 14:28–29; 2 Sam 10:11; Luke 10:40), but when our hearts trust in man’s help more than the Lord’s help it becomes immoral (Jer 17:5). Laboring to gain financial profit is another honorable principle (Deut 8:18; Prov 10:4; 13:22; 31:10–31; Eph 4:28), but we idolize money when we place it before the Lord. Commenting on Jesus’ warning, “You cannot serve God and mammon” (Matt 6:24; Luke 16:13), Frame says, “Jesus personifies [money], as if it were the name of a god, enhancing the allusion to the first commandment.”117 Our reasoning faculties, moreover, are a gift of God, but when they are used as ultimate authorities they violate God’s instructions (Prov 3:5–6), as Calvin wisely understands:
For [the philosophers] set up reason alone as the ruling principle in man, and think that it alone should be listened to; to it alone, in short, they entrust the conduct of life. But the Christian philosophy bids reason give way to, submit and subject itself to, the Holy Spirit so that the man himself may no longer live but hear Christ living and reigning within him [Gal. 2:20].118
We have other gods before Yahweh when we serve anything instead of him, even things lawful in themselves.
Non-Christian philosophers make this especially noticeable. For if God condemns the practice of placing other authorities above his, then he all the more condemns practices that have no regard for his authority whatsoever. When philosophers encourage us to follow their ethic, they usually enjoin on us an ultimate principle. Often this principle can be found in the Bible, but by extracting the principle from biblical authority, they make an idol of it. Kant, for instance, says that a good action stems from a sense of duty; any action looking to beneficial consequences is an immoral action on Kant’s terms. Being motivated to behavior out of a sense of duty is quite biblical (Eccl 12:13; Luke 17:10; Rom 13:8). Kant, though, extracts it from God’s authority (contrary to 2 Cor 10:5; Col 3:17 et al.), seeing no need of him to make his ultimate principle obligatory. It is self-authorizing, thinks Kant. Egoism’s ultimate principle says “Act in your own best interest”—another biblical principle (Deut 6:24; Ps 1:2–3; Matt 6:20; 1 Tim 4:8). Utilitarianism exalts as its highest principle “Act so as to maximize happiness”—again, a Scriptural principle (cp. Deut 6:24 & Deut 28; Ps 2:10–12 & Ps 144:15). Yet, as with Kant, egoism and utilitarianism find no need for Christ in their ethic, and in this they err. These philosophies are no less idolatrous than Islam: “False worship may not involve rites or ceremonies, but it always involves the attribution of aseity [self-authorization] to something.”119 Yet Yahweh requires exclusive ultimate allegiance: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exod 20:3).120
With this background, Natural Law’s idolatrous tendency becomes clear. Though it does place nature under God’s authority, as when it says “the natural law is in fact given by God and bears its authority from him,”121 this is not consistently maintained. VanDrunen, for instance, sometimes appeals to common, agreed-upon notions to make a moral case:
By arguing that particular actions are wrong because they tend to promote killing or stealing (which most people admit are bad things), or by arguing that particular actions are right because they tend to promote life or the protection of property (which most people admit are good things), one may construct natural law arguments that have a certain chance for effectiveness.122
He sometimes makes these common notions the basis of moral arguments.123 He does not attempt to prove them, but simply uses these notions as building blocks to prove grander conclusions. These notions, then, are treated as authoritative in themselves. He obviously is not resting them
