Father, which is illustrated by several metaphors—a lamp, for example, which communicates its light to another lamp and through that lamp to a third lamp. The Spirit alone shone in this way, he taught, eternally through the Son.34 The result of this argument was a “new” view of the Spirit as deifier or sanctifier, the one who transforms various common or material elements through his sanctifying power. In turn, humans are transformed by partaking in the sacramental provision of the Spirit. It is “the visitation of the Spirit that comes sacramentally to set us free.”35
Gregory of Nazianzus (ca. 330—ca. 385) is often called “the theologian” by the Eastern Church, and was the first of the Cappadocian Fathers to declare that the Spirit is “God.” He proclaimed, “Each [of the three persons] is God by reason of ‘consubstantiality,’ the three are God by reason of monarchy.”36 He was called in 380 by the emperor to clarify the doctrine of the deity of the Spirit (which was considered the key debate of the day). Gregory’s Fifth Theological Oration was as much of an attack upon the Orthodox Church (which seemed ambivalent on this issue) as it was upon the Arians. He argued, somewhat like Gregory of Nyssa, that there is one light that comes to us from the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit:
Light, and light, and light, but one light, and one God. David anticipated this when he said, “In your light shall we see light.” But now we have seen and we preach, receiving the light of the Son from the light of the Father, in the light of the Holy Spirit.37
For Gregory of Nazianzus, this divine outreach cannot be divided up between creature and Creator. The light that is received by the creature must be true God in itself—for if the Spirit in whom the light comes to us is not God, how can we be saved? “If he is ranked with me, how can he divinise me?”38 he asks. Then he poses the rhetorical question, “Is the Spirit God?” to which Gregory answers, “Most certainly,” and adds, “Is he homoousios ? Yes, if he is God!”39 Whereas the Arians objected that the plurality of the Father, Son, and Spirit is on the same level as the plurality of “three crabs,” Gregory rebuts that consubstantiality makes such a ridiculous comparison impossible because “the fact that the three are consubstantial is affirmation enough of the divine unity, while also making simply numeration along creaturely lines logically and metaphysically inappropriate.”40
One would think that the council of Constantinople (ca. 381) would recognize the impenetrable logic of Gregory’s argument. However, because of the fear of a tumultuous reaction from the newly excommunicated Arians, their expansion of the Nicean creed settled on a via media position: “[We believe] in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and the Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, who is worshipped and glorified together with the Father and Son, who spoke by the prophets.”41
The “Divine Authority” of the Spirit—Definition and Storyline
Is there a provisional definition of the Holy Spirit’s authority that we are able to infer from these defenses of the Spirit’s divinity? If so, how might this definition: (1) correlate with our principle and pattern of divine authority? (2) provide a beginning or basis for the “storyline” of the Spirit’s authority in theological history?
In order to assess these questions, we will need to borrow a bit of logic regarding authority from some contemporary theologians. Frame, for example, defines divine Lordship as “covenant headship.”42
[All created things] are appointed to be covenant servants, to obey God’s law, and to be instruments of His gracious purpose. If God is covenant head, then He is exalted above His people; He is transcendent. If He is covenant head, then He is deeply involved with them; He is immanent. Note how beautifully these two concepts fit together when understood biblically.43
Divine Lordship thereby provides a key window into our understanding of divine authority and Personhood. According to Frame, Lordship involves control, authority, and presence.44
Control is evident in that the covenant is brought about by God’s sovereign power. . . Authority is God’s right to be obeyed, and since God has both control and authority, He embodies both might and right. To say that God’s authority is absolute means that His commands may not be questioned (Job 40:11ff.; Rom 4:18–20; 9:20; Heb. 11:4, 7, 8, 17, passim), that divine authority transcends all other loyalties (Exod 20:3; Deut. 6:4f.; Matt. 8:19–22; 10:34–38; Phil. 3:8), and that this authority extends to all areas of human life (Exod.; Lev.; Num.; Deut.; Rom 14:32; 1 Cor 10:31; 2 Cor 10:5; Col. 3:17–23). Control and authority—these are the concepts that come to the fore when the Lord is present to us as exalted above creation and they are as far removed as possible from any notion of God as “wholly other” or as “infinitely distant.”45
Several arguments in patristic pneumatology clearly allow us to infer the Spirit’s “divine authority” as a Divine Person. Each looks to the Spirit as one whose supreme right with respect to the world can be described in both transcendent and immanent terms. Athanasius’ argument from Gen 1:1–23 and 1 Cor 2:11–12 allows us to infer his belief in the Spirit as a first cause. Classical theology recognizes God to be the principium essendi (“first cause”), the foundation that underlies all activity. This attribute displays divine transcendence and yet is centered in immanence (as the divine causation of all creation). God is the beginning and the end, the “author” of all things and all authority. However, “this metaphysical absoluteness does not (as in non-Christian thought) force God in to the role of an abstract principle.”46 Athanasius’ “absolute” language regarding the Spirit’s divine immutability and divine supremacy over all things provides valuable contributions as well to our understanding of the Spirit’s divine Personhood.
Basil’s inductive reasoning (from the Spirit’s activity as the breath of God and sanctifier to the Spirit’s infinite power, eternality, and moral supremacy) employs similar logic. Basil’s insistence on the Spirit’s equality (with the Father and the Son), dignity, and demonstration of divine goodness also confirms the Spirit’s authority as a divine Person. Here Basil does expose his platonic leanings, pointing to his preference for transcendence in theology. Nevertheless, Basil’s thought did serve to pave the way for the popular notion of divine ousia and accounted for the “oneness” of the three “hypostases.” The implication of a shared divinity is the sharing of divine authority amongst the three hypostases.
Gregory of Nyssa’s theological anthropology demonstrates the Spirit’s divine Personhood as well. Gregory’s understanding of the Spirit’s sanctification is described as an internal process within us arising from an external source that descends upon us. Forsythe clarifies this key distinction:
An authority must be external, in some real sense, or it is none. It must be external to us. It must be something not ourselves, descending on us in a grand paradox. . . . [It] must reveal itself in a way of miracle. It does not arise out of human nature by any development, but descends upon it with an intervention, a revelation, a redemption.47
Such an authority, according to Forsythe, is not foreign or alien—it is “other.” It represents a kind of pressure upon our souls. Gregory’s
