href="#ulink_3f116e9f-7c1c-5de1-8cd2-f702768f7b58">45. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 15–16.
46. Ibid., 17.
47. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, 271, 299.
48. Ibid., 190.
49. Ibid., 58.
50. I would argue that Arian pneumatology not only sought to strip the Spirit of divinity, but, perhaps even more so, of divine authority. This intention seems apparent in various metaphors and conciliation: the Arian analogy of the Father, Son, and Spirit to gold, silver, and brass makes the Spirit seem inferior. According to Swete, Eunomius’ reference to the Spirit as a created Person implies that “Spirit” remains “destitute indeed of Deity and of creative power” (Swete, On the Early History of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 62).
51. As we shall see in the subsequent theological periods, such a parameter seems to provide a very specific limitation upon further discussion. The Medieval Church, for example, will require that subsequent investigations into the nature and work of the Spirit in relation to Christ conform to this foundational doctrine. Postmodern theology, on the other hand, will often violate this fundamental limitation.
52. Badcock concedes, “Although one had to admit . . . the fact that any creed must be economical in order to be functional, a great deal about the work of the Spirit—about the relation between Spirit and Church, for example—has been left unsaid. Perhaps this is wise, as doctrinal definition is intended to point the way rather than to exhaust all possibilities, but perhaps it also reflects a general uncertainty concerning the Spirit’s role in human salvation and in the spiritual life” (Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love, 61).
53. Could it be that the Spirit’s Lordship—his control and authority—are more recognizable in Scripture that his divinity? A brief perusal of pertinent Old Testament and New Testament passages seems to demonstrate this to be the case, but it also seems that, in Scripture, the Spirit’s divinity is extrapolated, in part, from his divine authority.
54. Filioque is Latin for “and the Son,” and was inserted into the Nicene Creed after the statement, “I believe . . . in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father.”
55. Ramm, The Evangelical Heritage, 17.
56. Inch, Saga of the Spirit, 221.
57. Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 3:xvi.
58. Berman, Law and Revolution, 167–68.
59. Ibid., 168.
60. Ibid., 169.
61. Charlemagne tried to have it formally confirmed at Frankfurt (794). He was attempting to correct the Second Council of Nicaea (787), which had received the profession of Tarasius, who stated that the Spirit proceeds “from the Father per (‘through’) the Son.” The two Churches remained in communion through these challenges. It wasn’t until Florence, when the East felt it views were unrepresented, that the departure become official.
62. Berman, Law and Revolution, 105.
63. See Berman, Law and Revolution, 99–106.
64. Berman points out that many historians mark this as the beginning of the modern era. See Berman, Law and Revolution, 87–88.
65. Augustine’s approach, according to Badcock, “suggests a certain priority of the Father-Son relation over everything else; indeed, strictly speaking, the Spirit is this Father-Son relation” (Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love, 77–78).
66. Augustine, “De Trinitate,” VI:7–9.
67. Gregory of Nazianzus developed the concept of “divine procession.” Referring to such Scriptures as John 15:26, Gregory says that the Spirit is neither Father nor Son; he is neither unbegotten (as is the Father), nor begotten (as is the Son), but proceeds—and none of these three concepts can be understood rationally. Thus, the Spirit is not a “second son” or a “grandson.” See Gregory, Select Oracles, 31:8.
68. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV:17, 27.
69. See Congar, The Word and the Spirit, 1:107–8. See Anselm for further detail.
70. Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 3:81.
71. Therefore, an Augustinian conception of the Trinity contains both relational and absolute aspects, and each Person exists by a relationship of “eternal source” or “eternal procession.” Defining “Person” in terms of relationship actually coincides closely with the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers, on whom Augustine was possibly dependent. There are, however, important differences. Basil, for example, deduces from the divine relationships the unity of the divine essence, while Augustine begins with the divine identity and then deduces from this the divine relationships (See Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 3:82–83).
72. Augustine, Sermo 71:18.
73. Augustine, Commentary on John the Evangelist, XCIX:8–9.
74. John of Damascus, De fide orthod. I:8 (emphasis mine).
75. “In his essence, God remains the unattainable, incomprehensible mystery; and at the heart of that mystery lies the generation of the Son and the sending forth of the Sprit, both issuing in their different modes from the Father. But God also reaches out by activity of his uncreated energies to create and to involve the creation in participation in the movement of his triune being. At the level of the energies . . . the Spirit shines out in the Son, reflects the Son, and manifests the glory incarnate in him. And what enables and underlies this activity of imaging and displaying the Son is the primal springing
