subordinate device and formal category in the service of analogy. Analogy redescribes “conceptually and by means of a series of fluid juxtaposition (of figures, images, events, persons, points of view) the teleological, temporal flow of the divine-human relation, of which the New Testament depiction of Jesus Christ gives at once the foundation and the aim.”8
However, unlike Jüngel, Spieckermann has discovered a form of analogy in an earlier phase of dialectical theology (Romans II) that would serve as a basis for the analogia fidei in Barth’s later stage. In her view, the analogy of the cross that can be found in Romans II is the original form of the analogia fidei.9 Close to Spieckermann, Michael Beintker finds evidence of analogical thought in Barth’s early writings of 1919 and the 1920s. Barth’s reflection on a form of analogy can be traced back to his Tambach lecture (1919). As Beintker says, “the Denkform of the analogia relationis sive proportionalitatis, which sets forth a correspondence between the God-human relation and the human-human relation, forms a constant in Barth’s work from the time of the Tambach lecture onward.”10
Drawing upon Spieckermann and Beintker’s studies, Bruce McCormack makes a contribution to understand the theology of Karl Barth in a critical, realistic, and dialectical fashion. For him, talk about a radical turn or shift from dialectics to analogy is out of the question. On the basis of Realdialektik, a dialectic in objectively real relations, in Romans II, and by viewing the analogia fidei as grounded in the dialectic of veiling and unveiling in revelation, McCormack asserts the thesis that “in truth, the Realdialektik of veiling and unveiling is the motor which drives Barth’s doctrine of analogy and makes it possible.”11 As far as Barth remains a dialectical theologian in his Church Dogmatics, Christliche Dogmatik deserves, for McCormack, a special focus in continuity with Church Dogmatics (1932) rather than to be regarded as a false start.
However, concerning the coexistence of dialectics and analogy in Barth’s thought,12 it was Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt who, before Spieckermann and Beintker, first perceived and attested to Barth’s reflection on a relationship between dialectics and analogy in Barth’s earliest lecture, “Faith in a Personal God” (“Der Glaube an den persönlichen Gott” [1914]). A material development of analogy comes from the Ursprung onwards. At a minimum, Barth’s concept of analogy stands materially as well as temporally before the conceptualization of dialectics in Romans II. Marquardt argues that analogy and dialectic for Barth can be seen as simultaneously grounded in his thought of Ursprung. This formulation is the basis for the Ursprung of analogy in 1914. This coexistence comes to the surface in Barth’s Tambach lecture in such a way that his reflection on analogy is not merely of scholastic character but of a social-critical and inclusive dimension from the start.13 In this regard, Marquardt takes Balthasar’s model of Barth’s turn from dialectic to analogy to be untenable. According to Marquardt, analogy and dialectic for Barth can be grounded co-originally in his thought of Ursprung.14
When it comes to a radical turning point in Barth’s thought, it seems that a significant paradigm change occurred from 1915 to 1916. In his important article “The Humanity of God” (Die Menschlichkeit Gottes”), Barth gives an indication of his meeting with Christoph Blumhardt (April 1915): “Was it—this has played a decisive role for me personally—precisely the failure of the ethics of the modern theology of the time, with the outbreak of the First World War, which caused us to grow puzzled also about its exegesis, its treatment of history, and its dogmatics? Or was it, in a positive sense, the message of Blumhardt concerning the Kingdom of God which, remarkably enough, was only then becoming timely?”15
In a letter from April 1947, Barth mentioned his background and his subsequent turning away from it. Here he makes reference to his former position as a middle place between Kant and the young Schleiermacher. From autumn 1908 to autumn 1909, Barth was an assistant editor to Martin Rade at the Christliche Welt. After that he came into the church and developed his theological thought not as a half-minded adherent but as a thorough adherent of the school of Marburg. However, seven years later (also in 1916!), Barth made a new discovery, and his relationship with theological liberalism finally came to an end.
Barth’s entrance to the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS) on January 26, 1915, his meeting with Blumhardt in that same month, and finally the beginning of the commentary on Romans (1916) mark Barth’s break with liberalism between 1915 and 1916. Regarding Barth’s correction of his previous position (from his Safenwil period), he deals with mostly in Romans II, but not very much in Romans I.
Barth’s discovery of Reformation theology in 1921 in Göttingen does not revoke his discoveries as expressed in Romans I during his Safenwil period but only deepens and radicalizes them. Barth’s personal report of 1916 indicates his understanding of Romans I as his initial break with his liberal background. Barth stood in the tradition of Blumhardt’s message of the kingdom of God and remained faithful to it. Even toward the end of his life, in his Ethics fragment The Christian Life (Das Christliche Leben [1959–1961]), Barth makes a fundamental affirmation of Blumhardt’s message, which was also his position in Romans I.16
Therefore we cannot ignore the relevance of Romans I for Barth’s subsequent works, especially for Romans II and his dogmatic work. In his Church Dogmatics he tries to overcome the limitation of the Romans II eschatology in terms of Romans I.17 It is important to point out that Barth himself, in an interview, denied any break between the theology of Romans and Church Dogmatics, saying that “there are people who say there was a break in my theology between the Römerbriefe and now. For me, there was never a break there! In the Römerbrief I drew back the bow, took aim at a definite target, and let the arrow fly and the subject-matter which was there in question changed in the process—and afterwards, appeared quite differently.”18
Barth’s eschatological Christology or christological eschatology in Romans I has been overlooked and marginalized. As a matter of fact, Barth takes the event of resurrection to be a perfected future of world-consummation (R I:60, 122), or as a present reality of the in-breaking of the coming world-salvation. In this light, the cross is understood as the event of reconciliation with the world and as a fundamental transformation of the relation between God and humans. Therefore, Barth develops an eschatologia crucis in terms of an eschatologia resurrectionis. This eschatological concept of cross and resurrection provides a basis for a universal/inclusive dimension of eschatological Christology in Barth.19
Karl Barth and Political Radicalism
As for Barth’s social-critical dimension of hermeneutics in the second commentary on Romans, we need to note a fundamental remark: “the historical critics, it seems to me, need to be more critical!” (R II:x). This was Barth’s response to his critics’ charge that he was a “declared enemy of historical criticism.” Barth’s response reveals that his approach to hermeneutics constituted a breakthrough to a new relationship to theology, its subject matter, and political relevance. Barth’s critics of Romans I accused him of eliminating history from his interpretation of Romans. They argued that in place of historical-critical exegesis Barth had applied biblicism and pneumatic exegesis. In the foreword, Barth states that Paul “addressed his contemporaries as a child of his age.” But more importantly, “he speaks as a prophet and apostle of the Kingdom of God to people of every age” (R I:v).
According
