discern how theology takes up that problem on its own ground and works it out in its own way in accordance with the requirements of its own object.
There can be no doubt that theology and natural science overlap in so far as the critical reflection of both takes place within space and time, and within the world of concrete objectivity in nature and history, and yet they differ both in regard to the source of their knowledge and the nature of their object. Theology, as we have seen, is essentially a thinking from a centre in God and not from a centre in man, nevertheless it is not thinking of some ‘God in himself’, but of a God who has revealed himself to man within the same sphere of actuality to which he belongs, and therefore within the world of concrete objectivities in nature and history accessible to man’s observation and reflection. That is the actuality which natural science investigates, but it observes it and reflects upon it as purely contingent existence that is to be known only in its phenomenology and not in its ontology. Natural science by its very nature confines itself to the investigation of phenomena. Theology operates within that same area, but it is concerned with the living God who reveals himself in the midst of phenomenal objectivity as the Creator and Lord of it all and as the ground of its being and reality. Theology is not concerned with the phenomena as such, but with the central relation of it all to God, and is a form of thinking that derives from God’s Word and follows the movement of God’s Word in its creative and redemptive operation—only incidentally, therefore, does it concern itself with the knowledge of phenomena as such, derived from empirical study alone. In the doctrine of man, for example, it is not concerned as theology with what medical science, with what physiology or chemistry, have to say about him, for it is concerned about the central relation of man to God which constitutes his reality as man, that is his being a child of God; but what it has to say here on the border of what empirical science discovers of ‘the phenomena of the human’, as Barth speaks of it, does illuminate the world of man within which alone empirical science is pursued. That does not mean that theology can offer any information of the kind that is assimilable to the knowledge acquired by natural science or that is therefore of any use to it in its empirical activity, although it may serve to remind man of the limits and boundaries of his existence and of his knowledge, and help him to restrict his reflections within the limits set by empirical approach to his object, that is, help him to retain strict objectivity as empirical science.
Because theology operates with the Word of God that has become flesh within the world of space and time, it must recognize that there is an aspect of its object that is open to empirical observation and reflection—and to that extent it must reckon on the justice of historico-critical investigation and its relevance to the concern of theology. But theology is concerned with the Word become flesh, with the activity of God in space and time, and therefore it is concerned with these concrete objectivities that are necessarily open to empirical and critical observation only in their relation to the ultimate objectivity of God who has come to us in their midst to reveal himself to us and reconcile us to himself. It is that fact that differentiates theological science so radically from natural science, for it is concerned with the outward objectivities of space and time as the form in which it encounters the Object of knowledge who is indissolubly Subject, and which it only knows as Object in so far as it knows it as Subject—although, of course, it does not know the Subject except so far as he makes himself Object of human knowledge within the realm of man’s nature and existence.
It is this essential and profound polarity of its given object—which Barth calls its primary and secondary objectivity—that distinguishes theological knowledge from every other kind of knowledge or science. This differentiation, however, is a scientific difference, that is, a difference arising out of precise and exact behaviour in accordance with the nature of its proper object. Thus theology differs from natural science both in regard to the direction and source of its knowledge and in regard to the nature of its object, but within that difference it is still true that methodologically theology stands closer to the empirical sciences than to philosophy, and is indeed better described as theological science than as sacred philosophy.
The closeness between theological science and natural science becomes apparent when we note the formal points which they have in common, and the scientific way in which theology develops its own peculiar method.
Barth notes three main points which theological and empirical science have in common, over against philosophy.
(a) They do not operate with a world-view or necessarily develop a cosmology. By their very dedication to their object, they renounce all prior understandings of the universe, and refuse to construct a cosmological interpretation which will serve as a guide to further investigation. Natural science confines itself strictly to phenomena, and refuses to mix its studies up with philosophy, although, of course, it may well listen to philosophical questions in so far as they help it to get free from presuppositions and so help it toward purer objectivity. Theology likewise is dedicated to its proper object, and it is precisely its attachment to its object that detaches it from all presuppositions arising from philosophy or tradition or any other source—not, of course, that the theologian, or the natural scientist, is ever without these or can ever ultimately escape them, but that methodological renunciation of presuppositions (except the one presupposition of its object) is scientifically demanded of it. It is for that reason that neither theological nor empirical science can properly lead to or result in cosmological constructions, or speculative ontologies of the universe.
(b) Both theological science and empirical science recognize the centrality of man in the cosmos—both recognize that they are human endeavours, aspects of human thinking and research, and cannot transcend the human correlate in that activity. Thus inevitably and practically empirical science describes the cosmos as the cosmos of man, the cosmos of human observation and inference, knowledge of which is limited accordingly. For theology, too, the cosmos has an anthropocentric orientation, not because the starting-point of man’s knowledge is from man himself, and not simply because he can engage only in human thinking, but because his thinking takes its rise from and is determined by the Word of God which is addressed to man in the midst of the cosmos. Theology cannot and must not try to, but does not need to, usurp God’s standpoint, for God has come to give man knowledge both of God and man himself from within the sphere accessible to and knowable by man, who may thus have knowledge of God without renouncing his human standpoint. Indeed, it is because God addresses his Word to man in the world, and loves the world which he has made, that theology looks in the direction of the address and love of God—toward the world, as well as toward God. Only because it must travel with the Word the road from God to man in the world, does it and may it travel the road from man in the world to God as the goal of all its knowledge.
(c) Theological science and empirical science resemble one another in that both recognize two fundamentally distinct realms, the realm of the observable and objectifiable, and the realm beyond, which is outside the range of human observation and comprehension. Theology calls these heaven and earth, Barth says, but although empirical science uses different language, it no less than theology respects the difference between heaven and earth; that is to say, it respects the limited range of human observation, investigation, and description, and therefore also reckons with the realm of what is inaccessible to man. As exact science it cannot deny that realm, but acknowledges it at least as the frontier of its knowledge, where it calls a halt precisely in order to be exact science. Therefore, as empirical science, it maintains a respectful silence about what lies on the other side of its frontier, and does not seek to extend its method (built up in correlation with the observable and objectifiable) beyond its range and so to corrupt it.
With the exact sciences that maintain strict scientific faithfulness theological science can engage in fruitful discussion, but it is also the responsibility of theology to take cognizance of what these other sciences have to teach especially about the phenomena of the human or the characteristics of man as a creature, and to relate to it its own knowledge of the reality of man derived from the Word of God; for it is precisely to this man, with his scientific endeavours that the Word of God is addressed, and upon the whole of his existence that it lays the claim of the divine grace.
