protest or disregard with which philosophical ethics usually rejects theological ethics carries with it for the latter the temptation to enter into debate with the former in the form of apologetics. This is the first possibility that we must oppose here. Apologetics is the attempt to establish and justify theological thinking in the context of philosophical, or, more generally and precisely, nontheological thinking. In our own case it is the attempt to establish and justify the approach of theological ethics in the context of philosophical ethics.
Schleiermacher does apologetics when he maintains that, if not the Christian self-consciousness, at least the general religious self-consciousness which underlies it, is with its moral content or orientation an unavoidable element even in the inquiry of philosophical ethics, and when he thus aims at least indirectly to justify Christian ethics at the bar of philosophical ethics (Chr. Sitte, pp. 29, 75). De Wette does apologetics when he extols the Christian revelation from which Christian ethics derives as manifested and actualized reason (Lehrbuch, p. 2). Hagenbach does apologetics when he has philosophical ethics aiming at Christianity, in which alone it finds its fulfillment because belief in God is the supreme shoot of the moral life (Enzykl. 12th ed., p. 436).2 W. Herrmann does apologetics when he thinks that without further ado he can claim that every ethics that wants to deal not only with the concept of the good but also with its achievement by man must see to it that the Christian religion is understood as a morally liberating power and must itself at its peak become Christian ethics (Ethik, 4th ed., p. 3). G. Wünsch does apologetics when he wants Christian ethics to be understood as a possibility, foreseen in philosophical ethics, of reflection on values, as the affirmation of a particular position on values, namely, that the really acknowledged holy in the form of the personality is the chief value anchored in the transcendent, Christian ethics also commending itself to philosophical ethics because its formal criteria are identical with those of the latter (Theol. Eth., p. 59f.).3 Finally A. Schweitzer does apologetics when with reference to Indian ethics he thinks he can trace back the distinction between religious and philosophical thinking to the relative distinction between a more intuitive and a more analytical knowledge of the basic moral principle (Kult. u. Ethik, p. 24f.).4
These and similar linkages cannot achieve what explicitly or implicitly they are meant to achieve, namely, the establishment and justification of theological ethics in the framework of the inquiry of philosophical ethics. Two possibilities exist.
First, the linkages may be taken seriously on the assumption that it is fitting to measure theological ethics by philosophical ethics as its appointed judge, as the court where the question of truth must be answered, because from the very first the distinctive content of the inquiry of theological ethics, or the empty space for it, is contained in a superior and original way in philosophical ethics, and has to be brought to conscious development—this is the business of apologetic argumentation—in order that the desired validation of its existence might be thereby achieved. If the linkages are intended in this way, they simply mean that the distinctive content of the inquiry of theological ethics is surrendered from the very outset. What is intended, established, and justified is something other than this inquiry with its distinctive content. Apologetics may then succeed, but it has become irrelevant before it has even commenced. The philosopher who really thinks he knows a higher principle by which to ask and answer the question of the whence and whither, and who thinks he can meet the theologian as a judge in the question of truth, is absolutely right when he feels that in a true theological ethics he is in an alien world. He can really be annoyed here. Theological ethics is no longer a proper theological ethics when it falls into the disorder in which it can no longer irritate such a philosopher. The theological question of the whence and whither, and the answer to it, consists neither of a necessary moment in our spiritual life, nor of the actualization of human reason, nor of the achievement of the good by man, nor of even the highest position on values, even though it acknowledges the holy in the form of personality and anchors the latter in the transcendent, nor of the moral principle known intuitively for a change instead of analytically. It consists of the truth of the Word of God, which as such cannot be derived from any other word, nor measured by any other word, nor tested as to its validity, nor spoken by man to himself, but which can only be spoken to him, which perhaps he may not hear, but which, if he has heard it, he can have heard only in obedience, without being in any position to find out why he must obey. The enterprise of a real theological ethics would not be vindicated in relation to philosophical ethics by the proof that philosophical ethics in some way contains it in itself. The principle of a real theological ethics would be concealed by this proof. Working with this principle, it would still be irritating to the philosopher. Philosophical ethics could accept that apology, ⌜be satisfied with those conditions of its existence,⌝ and give to a ⌜pseudo-⌝ theological ethics the desired license without for a single moment feeling disturbed in its verdict that a true and proper theological ethics, which the apologetic renounces as such, is something impossible and insignificant.
The second possibility is that the linkages ⌜between the problem of philosophical ethics and that of theological ethics⌝ are not meant in such a way ⌜that the latter must be given a basis in the former but⌝ rest on the very different assumption that the philosophical inquiry contains the theological inquiry within itself to the extent that philosophizing takes place on the premise of the knowledge that characterizes theology, namely, knowledge of the revelation of God’s Word. Philosophy has here come down from its judicial throne and set itself and its questions and answers on the same ground as theology—the conflict of the faculties is childishness—sharing the whence and the whither with theology and yet not ceasing on this account to be philosophy. On this assumption all the linkages might be more or less significant, not as an apology for theological ethics—philosophy itself would decree that such an apology is not needed—but rather to show clearly the justification and even the necessity of philosophical ethics alongside theological ethics. A philosophy which with theology and just as well as theology—for why should theology have any precedence or advantage in this respect, since it, too, is a human work?—has the hearing of the Word of God as its presupposition, can come to the side of theology as an equal partner, and in regard to these and similar linkages can raise the question and offer some indication of the possibility of the concept with whose reality theology methodologically starts. Often, too, it may perhaps be its living conscience, e.g., when recollection of the possibility of this concept ought to be calculated to invite to knowledge, to new knowledge of the constantly forgotten reality. This is the definition of the relation between theological and philosophical ethics that we actually have in view here. But when the linkages are meant in this way, they cannot signify a grounding and justifying of theological ethics in the sphere of philosophical ethics. It is admitted on both sides that the annexation is right. How can the distinctive starting point and goal of theological ethics be grounded or justified in terms of philosophy when with theology, philosophy itself, as in its own way Christian knowledge, is not rebellion but obedience? The result of our first discussion, then, is that in no case can a serious debate between theological and philosophical ethics have anything whatever to do with apologetics. Theological ethics cannot spare the philosopher vexation at its own conduct, for it will always be strange enough even to itself. From the philosopher’s standpoint it is an unheard-of annexation. It cannot please him as though there were no danger in it. It cannot make its distinctive whence and whither innocuous in order to ensure for itself a place in the sun. By its existence as true theological ethics it has to put the philosopher, like the theologian, like everybody, before the decision whether its enterprise is to be rejected as impossible and insignificant or whether he will adopt the presupposition on which this enterprise rests. It can come to a meaningful and mutually fruitful agreement with him only when it is and remains determined to show its colors as true theological ethics. ⌜There can be no apologetic of theological ethics in relation to a philosophical ethics that sets itself with it on the ground of its own presupposition. A philosophy that does this does not ask for any such apologetic. Whatever philosophy may say to its efforts, from the standpoint of theology apologetic means a veiling of the decision in which alone theological statements can and will be valid.⌝
2
The apologetic attitude of theological ethics vis-à-vis philosophical ethics
