he felt the pressure needed to be kept on them, so in the absence of a plan from Eisenhower’s headquarters, he devised one of his own which would provide ‘a really powerful and full blooded thrust’. Montgomery’s audacious plan was untypical of his usual slow, considered, meticulously-built-up approach; it was bold, risky, even reckless.
With the success of D-Day, the Battle of Normandy, and the collapse of German resistance in France and Belgium, the end of the war was within sight. Monty’s Operation Market Garden was undertaken to further this end. Imaginative, daring, simple – the ‘Market’ part of the operation was the surprise element, involving US and British paratroopers who were to seize some seven main bridges, laying a carpet, as it were, for the ‘Garden’, or speed element, of the British XXX Corps, who were to advance rapidly up this ‘corridor’ – a single sixty-four-mile access road to Arnhem. This was to be the start line for a further operation, avoiding the defences of the Siegfried Line (the Western Wall), instead heading into the Ruhr, the German industrial heartland. This, it was hoped, would end the war before Christmas 1944, saving tens or even hundreds of thousands of lives. The US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions seized and held their objectives, although it was not in total keeping with the planned timeline. The most difficult task, the seizing and holding of the bridge farthest away at Arnhem, fell to the British 1st Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade. There were Irishmen throughout the Operation Market Garden formations, and not least at Arnhem, where hundreds were involved in the fierce fighting.
D-Day was planned over months, even years. The planning for Operation Market Garden took place over days, scarcely a full week. It was the first time the Allies used airborne troops strategically. Nothing like it, in terms of scale, had ever been attempted before. Thirty-five thousand airborne troops were flown a distance of three hundred miles from England. It was the first time the First Allied Airborne Army was to be deployed after nine previous cancelled operations; they were itching to get into the fight before the war was over. There had been an over-optimism and over-simplification of the situation, and a belief by some – Lieutenant General Frederick Montague ‘Boy’ Browning chief among them – that all the airborne army had to do was get airborne and victory would follow. Then came the realisation that there were simply not enough aircraft to drop three-and-a-half airborne divisions in one day. Thereafter, Lieutenant General Lewis Hyde Brereton’s air plan shaped how the airborne insertion would happen. In the event, the plan was overly weighted toward the consideration of loss of aircraft; the drop zones selected were too far away from the objectives and the Allies lost the essential element of surprise, tying up manpower having to protect the landing and drop zones instead of fighting for the bridge. It was a day drop and there was no fighter or fighter bomber support – a stipulation by Major General Paul L. Williams, IX Troop Carrier Command that handed air superiority to the Germans. The asset of fire power was lost, as was the Allied ability to help break deadlock situations, protect troops and press home advantages. Bad luck, poor weather and ineffective radio communications all played their part, but another significant factor in the unsuccessful seizure of Arnhem bridge was regarding intelligence – the known presence of two German Panzer divisions in the vicinity was ignored. Dutch underground reports, photo reconnaissance and Ultra code interceptions all gave strong indications of their existence. Any delays, however, did not suit the many prevailing agendas at play. Chief among them was that Allied Command wanted to test the capability of the First Allied Airborne Army’s capacity; its commanders wanted to get into the war before it was over and be able to point towards their operational experience. Churchill wanted the German V-1 and V-2 rocket launching sites overrun while Montgomery wanted to regain control of Allied strategy; Eisenhower wanted an end to the squabbling between Patton and Montgomery, and maybe to get a Rhine crossing into the bargain. Overall, there was a sense that Germany had little left to offer by way of halting the Allied advance; they were on the ropes and one knockout blow was all that was needed to bring the war to a close; 1944 was 1918 all over again, and the dramatic collapse of German resistance was once again at hand. Caution was not a part of the prevailing mindset, and, given the top-down endorsement of the Market Garden plan, neither was it felt that the suggestion of such circumspection would have been appreciated.
On 17 September 1944, Lieutenant Colonel ‘Joe’ Vandeleur, Irish Guards, gave the order to his lead tank commander to cross the ‘start line’ and set in motion XXX Corps’ advance up the route that became known as ‘Hell’s Highway’ – the ‘Garden’ part of Operation Market Garden commenced. Progress up Hell’s Highway was marred by delay, ambushes and blown-up bridges; the rate of advance fell well behind schedule. So much so that, in Arnhem, those who were tasked with holding the bridge for two days were still there eight days later, fighting in vain, not only to establish an alternative bridgehead at the Oosterbeek perimeter, but also for their very lives. This fight against a rapidly reinforced German opposition saw the 1st Airborne Division suffer enormous casualties (fatalities and wounded), and prisoners of war were taken. Only a dramatic, organised withdrawal back across the Lower Rhine, under the cover of darkness and artillery covering fire, saved what remained of the shattered airborne division. Thwarted in their efforts to secure the last bridge – the major objective of the operation – the Allies now had to reconcile themselves to the fact that the war would extend beyond Christmas, likely well into 1945.
John O’Neill, from Bere Island off Castletownberehaven in County Cork, was one among those who had lost their lives. He had followed two brothers to Worcestershire in 1933 and three years later enlisted in the British army. He fought with the Northumberland Fusiliers and was killed in action; he was 29 years of age, and is buried in Overloon War Cemetery in the Netherlands.
Sergeant John Daly from County Waterford, 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, was one who received reward for his efforts; he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for providing covering fire with a Bren light machine gun, allowing Major Robert Cain, South Staffordshire Regiment, to successfully stalk and ambush Tiger tanks – for which Cain was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC). Cork man John Stout served with the Irish Guards Armoured Division, which raced to Arnhem and came agonisingly close to capturing the key bridge.
Brigadier General John ‘Shan’ Hackett, Officer Commanding 4th Parachute Brigade, was one of the very last back across the Lower Rhine, well after the organised withdrawal; he was the son of a Tipperary man and Trinity College graduate who had immigrated to Australia. He had hidden out, with the help of local Dutch residents, for weeks after the battle. The Germans had imposed restrictions on the distribution of food against these same local residents, along with others in the urban areas of the western part of the Netherlands, leading to severe shortages in what became known as the ‘Hungerwinter’, during which people starved and died. Their already perilous plight was added to by a bitterly cold winter, the freezing conditions exacerbating their suffering. A plan – Operation Manna – was devised by the British to airdrop food supplies to the needy population. Belfast-born Air Commodore James Roy ‘Paddy’ Forsyth was one of the pilots who took part in this RAF humanitarian mercy mission, which succeeded in dropping some 6,500 tonnes of supplies.
Lieutenant Colonel John Place from Foxrock, Dublin, Commanding Officer No. 2 Wing RAF Glider Pilot Regiment, was the pilot of a Horsa glider during Market Garden; while map-reading, he suddenly had to take over the controls when a piece of shrapnel from an exploding shell outside the cockpit window pierced the fuselage of the glider and fatally wounded co-pilot Ralph Alexander Maltby, from Belfast, who was flying the glider at the time. As they neared the landing zone, machine-gun fire ripped through the plywood fuselage, wounding another of the occupants. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonel Place managed to bring the glider down in a safe and successful landing.
Another Dublin connection involved the actress Audrey Hepburn, whose mother was a Dutch noblewoman. Both her parents were sympathetic towards the British Union of Fascists in the mid-1930s, and her father suddenly left the family to become more deeply involved in their activities. Hepburn and her mother went to Kent, where she was educated, before moving to her mother’s farm in Arnhem. Her parents divorced in 1938. It is believed that while there Hepburn raised money for the Dutch resistance through her performances in silent ballet dance and witnessed the transportation by train of Dutch Jews
