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GREEK MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE AND
THE CRESCENT
Estimating the
Turkish Threat
Crises, Leadership and Strategic
Analyses 1974-1996
Panagiotis Dimitrakis
Contents
Chapter II Turkey: Greek Strategic-Intelligence Estimates
Chapter III The Greek-Turkish Aegean Confrontation
Chapter IV The 1987 Greek-Turkish Crisis
Chapter V The 1996 Greek-Turkish Crisis
Chapter VI The Threat
References
Bibliography
This ebook edition first published in the United Kingdom in 2013 by University of Plymouth Press, Portland Square, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon, PL4 8AA, United Kingdom.
eBook ISBN 978-1-84102-337-3
© University of Plymouth Press 2013
© Panagiotis Dimitrakis 2010
The rights of Panagiotis Dimitrakis of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
A paperback CIP catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library 978-1-84102-192-8
Publisher: Paul Honeywill
Publishing Assistant: Charlotte Carey
Production Assistant: Rebecca Drees
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of UPP. Any person who carries out any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
Cover and images throughout © Courtesy of the Hellenic Navy General Staff 2010
Acknowledgments
I owe special thanks to Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman and Dr Joseph Maiolo, of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, my PhD supervisors for their advice and support. I would like to thank all of my interviewees who provided me with a rare insight into the Greek-Turkish relations and intelligence estimating. Without their personal interest and patience this research would have never been completed. Special thanks go to Olympia Wood, John Wood and Peter Barnes for their help in copy-editing. My publisher Paul Honeywill of the University of Plymouth Press deserves special credit for bringing into life this book.
Finally, I owe a great debt to my family, Yiannis Dimitrakis, Dimitra-Mimi Petropoulou-Dimitrakis and Timos Dimitrakis, for their moral and material support, for the insightful foreign-policy and history-oriented conversations we have, and for believing all these years in my work. This book is dedicated to them.
Author
Resulting from a doctorate submitted to the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London this is the first scholarly attempt to assess the role of Greek military intelligence in the strained relations between Turkey and Greece.
Panagiotis Dimitrakis is an historian and obtained his PhD in War Studies from King’s College, London. He is the author of Greece and the English: British Diplomacy and the Kings of Greece and Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to Middle East Crises.
Abbreviations
CFE Conventional Forces Europe Treaty
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
COMINT Communications Intelligence
FIR Flight Information Region
HUMINT Human Intelligence
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IMINT Image Intelligence
MFA Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Greece)
MIT National Intelligence Service (Turkey)
MI6/SIS British Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
MoD Ministry of Defence (Greece)
MoA Ministry of the Aegean (Greece)
MoI Ministry of Industry (Greece)
ND Nea Dimokratia Party (Greece)
NIMA National Imagery ad Mapping Agency (US)
NIS National Intelligence Service (Greece)
NOTAM Notice to Air Men
KYP/K Central Intelligence Service/Cyprus Republic
LOK Mountain Rangers/Greek Special Forces
PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement Party (Greece)
PKK Kurdish Workers’ Party
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
TGS Turkish General Staff
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Foreword Lawrence Freedman
With one step, Panagiotis Dimitrakis has extended the study of contemporary intelligence and crisis management into the Aegean, providing a unique account of how Greek policymakers forged their assessments of the Turkish threat during a tense two decades following the Turkish occupation of half of Cyprus. He draws on the conceptual literature on intelligence and surprise attack, largely developed in the AngloSaxon world with some notable Israeli contributions and uses it as a template against which to evaluate the performance of successive Greek governments. It soon becomes apparent that while the familiar dilemmas concerning the relationship between intelligence and policy may take on distinctive forms in quite different political cultures in many respects
