is on the ramparts in Ukraine, Georgia, and the Middle East. Its Baltic State ambitions are no secret. NATO’s failure to respond in a real crisis means the end of the alliance and a maturing Russian hegemony that stretches from Central Asia to the Atlantic. China actively seeks to become Asia’s hegemon, while its unruly satellite North Korea has become a nuclear power. Iran’s rulers, armed with missiles of increasing range, added financial resources, and the likelihood of nuclear weapons, have their eye on dominating the strategic space between Moscow’s influence and Beijing’s.
A single hegemony on the Eurasian land mass threatens U.S. markets, our ability to keep conflict at a distance, regional stability, and democracy. At a minimum, the three hegemonies would overturn the current liberal international order. If the United States does not take effective action to prevent this, its run as a preeminent global power will end. Proximity to the oceans and seas offers the United States the opportunity to leverage its still-dominant seapower as the key to countering or, if necessary, opposing the three would-be hegemons.
Since Woodrow Wilson, the goal of American foreign policy has been to prevent regional hegemony. Two decades after Wilson, President Franklin D. Roosevelt led the United States in another global conflict, against Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan. Both Europe and Asia were—and remain—critical to our hopes for greater prosperity, security, and an increasingly democratic world. The United States and its allies destroyed both totalitarian hegemons. Finally, the United States contained the Soviet Union for almost half a century, blunting its threat to Europe, and confronting its expanding influence in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Emerging from this century of nearly continuous global conflict, the United States was the unquestioned global power. No state could challenge it economically, politically, or militarily. The United States destroyed the Iraqi military twice in slightly over a decade, and put a stop to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.
New threats have ended this brief period of America’s benevolent international leadership. Three competitors are at odds with the American-led international system. The sum of their ambitions is to undermine U.S. global power.
A resurgent Russia aims to reclaim its previous glory and capitalize on the current U.S. administration’s idea that America can make itself great again with a minimum of cooperation from others.
The European refugee crisis and potential destabilization in the European Union challenge the American alliance system in Europe—the cornerstone of American security policy since the end of World War II. America’s remaining allies show little resolve. Meager European defense budgets make matters worse. They offer ammunition to demagogic politicians who seek to exploit the undercurrent of American isolationism.
In Asia, a rising China focuses on cultivating and marshaling its economic resources to develop its military power. China’s island-building campaign aims to extend its territorial claims into international waters and directly confronts the international order. As Admiral Harry Harris, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, told Congress in early 2017, “China has fundamentally altered the physical and political landscape in the South China Sea.”7 Beijing combines its land reclamation campaign with high-tempo presence operations conducted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and coast guard in contested areas of the South and East China Seas. The Chinese are also accelerating their ability to project naval power and control the seas by constructing troop transports, large surface combatants, and a second aircraft carrier.
This situation bears a resemblance to the world America faced before World War II, when Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan initially overwhelmed the European powers that had refused to rearm following World War I.
But the semblance is passing. America faces not two aspiring hegemons, but three. The Middle East is the critical link between Europe and Asia. Its oil-rich states supply a large amount of the world’s energy resources and facilitate exchange between the two hemispheres. With the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Sea in the south, the Mediterranean to the west, and the Caspian and Black Seas to the north, the Middle East is more like an island than a contiguous land mass.
On this island, Iran attempts to assert its dominance. Russia aids Iran with weapons transfers and its support of Iranian proxy Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Relieved of sanctions, the Islamic Republic has begun to receive massive financial inflows and has actively directed some of its profits toward obtaining dual-use military technology such as jet engines. Iranian Special Forces, known as the Quds Force, conduct paramilitary operations in Iraq and Syria, expanding Tehran’s influence over its neighbors.
Although America’s adversaries have worked with one another in the past, the current degree of cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran is a strategic terra incognita. Iranian oil shipped into Chinese ports generates financial resources that the Islamic Republic uses to purchase advanced weapons from Russia. Russia helps Iran fight its proxy wars, while Iran supports growing Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
America’s three strategic competitors oppose the United States in similar ways. China, Russia, and Iran understand the lessons of the First Gulf War. Since the Cold War’s end, America’s style of warfare has been to build coalitions, amass men and resources in neighboring countries, and launch combined arms assaults that overwhelm the enemy technologically and operationally. In the First Gulf War, the American-led coalition of nearly 1 million soldiers eviscerated an entrenched Iraqi army of more than 1.5 million. However, without neighboring Saudi Arabia’s willingness, the United States would have been unable to conduct the operation. A naval assault would have been smaller, and Kuwait’s crowded coastline could have meant high casualties.
The First Gulf War suggested a clear strategy to counter the United States. Deny American forces access to a region, and the United States loses power. Chinese, Russian, and Iranian efforts have all focused on denying America access to their respective regions. As it turns up the heat on the Baltic States, Russia is proscribing options for a rapid buildup by deploying long-range air-defense and strike missiles at NATO’s borders.
This is consistent with U.S. European Command commander General Philip Breedlove’s February 2016 statement to Congress that “President Putin has sought to undermine the rules-based system of European security and attempted to maximize his power on the world stage.”8 China’s land reclamation campaign, increasing naval power, and anti-ship missiles aim to keep American forces at a distance from which effective combat power cannot readily be applied. Iran’s low-cost missile boats, midget subs, large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as mines, and its influence at the Strait of Hormuz seek to offset American escalation. Instability in Iraq and America’s shaky relations with Pakistan further restrict staging points for an American attack.
Declining U.S. military budgets and a shrinking force combined with poor treatment of critical allies have made things worse, calling into question the ability of the United States to honor its commitments. The Obama administration’s 2009 abrogation of ballistic-missile defense agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic; its prolonged interruption of defensive arms sales to Taiwan; and its failure to keep the Saudis informed about its 2015 deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are examples of treating allies shabbily. Thus, the United States is less able to rely on adequate basing rights where they are needed both to deter and, if necessary, to fight.
President Trump faces a new challenge to U.S. national security that calls for changes to American strategy. The access that once allowed us to deter the Soviets has been eroded. Its resurrection in today’s Europe is unlikely. Such access is largely nonexistent in the Middle East and is tenuous in East Asia.
Coalitions of allied and partner nations remain extremely important—as they have since the United States became a major power. U.S. ground forces will not go it alone. They rarely have. Even the 1994 operation to remove Haiti’s military junta engaged coalition partners: Poland and Argentina.
