of grammatical reference to make the reader stop and consider how disturbing it can be when speakers change customary valuations of moral and emotional terms both relative to the deeds they describe and at the same time with a view to furthering those deeds.
ἀντήλλαξαν literally means “exchange” rather than “change,” but the latter translation better conveys the import of the sentence, for “exchange” requires that what a thing was exchanged for be specified, which Thucydides does not do. He only implies that the customary senses of words were exchanged for new ones. The sentence may now be translated: “Men changed the customary valuation of words in respect to deeds in judging what right was.”
Thucydides’ full meaning becomes clear in an examination of his examples: τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής (“Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice,” 3.82.4). The traditional interpretation of these clauses originates with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who understood the introductory sentence to mean: τά τε εἰωθότα ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι λέγεσθαι μετατιθέντες ἄλλως ἠξίουν αὐτὰ καλεῖν (“Changing the names customarily applied to deeds they deemed it right to call them by new names”). They gave new names to the erga.
Friedrich Solmsen asks the following question about the examples Thucydides offers:
The longer we look at the sentences purporting to acquaint us with the new meanings of words, the more we are bound to wonder whether people really developed the habit of praising a man for ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος (“the courage of a loyal ally” [translation Crawley]) or blaming him for δειλία εὐπρεπής (“specious cowardice” [Crawley])
Had they ever, when discussing ruthless daring, spoken of τόλμα . . . ἀλόγιστος? (“reckless audacity” [Crawley])21
No satisfactory answer to this question can be given unless it is kept in mind that Thucydides does not use the verb “to call” or “to name” but rather νομίζω, which means to “think” or to “consider.” If he had used “was called” or “was named,” this would have supported Dionysius’ interpretation: deeds were called by new words and a change in referent occurred.
But ἐνομίσθη (“was considered [to be]”) invokes not what men said but what they thought,22 and Dionysius’ interpretation is not so much wrong as incomplete. During stasis citizens confounded in thought previously distinguishable concepts. This confusion revealed itself in two different ways. When men saw an action that was objectively τόλμα ἀλόγιστος (“reckless audacity”), either they thought (or pretended to think) that it was ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος (“the courage of a loyal ally”) and called it that (Dionysius’ interpretation), or they considered reckless audacity to be a good thing and when praising it called it by its right name. Certainly the latter is not an impossible occurrence, and Thucydides knew of examples similar to it. Cleon, for instance, in his speech concerning the Mytileneans, praises stupidity (ἀμαθία) (3.37.3–3.37.4) and urges the Athenians not to show themselves soft.23 In a similar fashion, during normal times men would consider μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς (“prudent hesitation”) a good thing, a sign of intelligence and wisdom, while in stasis they might sometimes have called it μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς (“prudent hesitation”), but used the phrase to express disapproval. It is precisely because Dionysius does not take account of this common phenomenon, in which there is no change of denotation or referent, that his interpretation is insufficient.24 Yet of course his interpretation is partly correct. Politicians very often call bad deeds by good names (or vice versa), as Thucydides was well aware: ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον (“Thus religion was in honor with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation,” 3.82.8).
To reinforce the point that in commenting on the change in the axiosis of words Thucydides has in mind a change in habits of praise and blame, that is, a change in values, it is instructive to consider several of his examples.
τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. (3.82.4–3.82.5)
[4] Words had to change their ordinary value and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defense. [5] The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. (3.82.4–5, Crawley, except that “meaning” has been replaced with “value”)
In the first example, words that normally have negative connotations acquire a positive cast. In the second, third, and fourth, a good quality is considered bad. Thucydides thus repeats his pattern in which a good phrase or concept acquires a bad connotation, or words of blame develop positive associations. With καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος (“The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected”), he turns from abstract noun formations to participial nouns referring to people, but still emphasizes a change in values.
Thucydides observes that as it overturns the values of a peaceful polis, stasis also makes people suspicious of one another (3.82.5). When he introduces suspicion, he moves beyond words to more general comments about how people act and feel in stasis, while at the same time emphasizing his remarks about the revolution of values in Hellas.25 He who anticipated an evil-doer, or who provoked someone who was not intending a crime, was praised (3.82.5).26 Kinship began to have a weaker hold on people than party or faction (3.82.6), while revenge was of more account than not suffering at all (3.82.7). Catching an enemy off guard was sweeter (i.e., ἥδιον or “sweeter,” 3.82.7) revenge than if it had been accomplished in the open. Oaths lost their power (3.82.7, 3.83.2). No longer did men practice piety, but those who used fair-seeming words had a better reputation (3.82.8).27 Finally simplicity (τὸ εὔηθες), in which honor holds the largest share, was ridiculed and disappeared (3.83.1). This clearly prefigures the death of Nicias and Thucydides’ comments on his virtue.
In Book 8 of the Republic, Socrates’ discussion of the democratic man and the stasis in his soul parallels Thucydides’ description
