so on. See Alex Conte, Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010), p. 10.
23. Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, Links between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime (A Report Submitted to Foreign Affairs Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vancouver, 2004), p. 5.
24. Bantekas, above 16, p. 318.
25. Conte, above n 22, p. 11.
26. Ibid.
27. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 18.
28. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism, a Dangerous Mix: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, May 20, 2003 (U.S. G.P.O., Washington, DC, 2003).
29. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 12.
30. Tom Obokata, Transnational Organised Crime in International Law (Hart, Oxford, 2010), p. 14.
31. Bantekas, above n 16, p. 318.
32. UNGA, Replies Given on 22 March 1999 by the Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Questions Asked by the Delegations of Belgium and Mexico Regarding the Implications of Article 2, Paragraph 1 (B) (A/AC.252/1999/INF/2, March 26, 1999).
33. Financial Action Task Force, Follow-Up Report to the Mutual Evaluation Report of Greece (Paris, October 28, 2011).
34. Koh, above n 11, p. 21. See also Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation” 2001 24(1) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, p. 43.
35. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 5.
36. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Result of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries (September 2002).
37. In September 2003, pursuant to the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/136, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime sent a questionnaire to Member States of the United Nations regarding the “Nature and links between Terrorism and other Forms of Crime.” This quote is the part of analysis of the replies to the questionnaire done by Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 32.
38. Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2000–2001 (Paris, February 1, 2001), p. 19.
39. Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003 (Paris, February 14, 2003), p. 3. See also Paul Allan Schott, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (2nd ed., The World Bank: International Monetary Fund, Washington, 2006).
40. Stefan D. Cassella, “Reverse Money Laundering” 2003 7(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 92. p. 93.
41. Nick Kochan, The Washing Machine (Duckworth, London, 2006), p. 245.
42. Financial Action Task Force, above n 38, p. 28.
43. Stessens, above n 5, p. 3.
44. For example, the cost of two current terrorist attacks, 9/11 U.S. attacks and the Madrid bombings in 2004, cost $500,000 and $10,000, respectively. Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (2nd ed., Kogan Page, London, 2006), p. 129.
45. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, DC, 2004), p. 237.
46. Ibid., p. 528.
47. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 14.
48. Lilley, above n 44, p. 150.
49. Bantekas, above n 16, p. 321.
50. Goredema, above n 21, p. 16.
51. Alex Peter Schmid, Eithne Boland, and Rebekah Grindlay, Countering Terrorism Through International Cooperation: Proceedings of the International Conference on “Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced International Cooperation”: Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 22–24 September 2000 (ISPAC, Milano, Italy, 2001).
52. Mark Pieth, Financing Terrorism (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2002), p. 123.
53. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, above n 28, p. 88.
54. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 18. See also Lilley, above n 44, p. 188.
55. Kersten, above n 20, p. 306.
56. Cassella, above n 40, p. 92.
57. Dandurand and Chin, above n 23, p. 18.
58. Kersten, above n 20, p. 306.
59. Financial Action Task Force, above n 1 p. 37.
Ambiguity in the Definition of Terrorism
In the absence of an international consensus on the definition of terrorism, it seems that the effectiveness of the convention depends, among other things, on a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist groups, the financing of which should be countered. In other words, unlike other counterterrorism conventions in which certain classes of terrorist-type conduct such as aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or hijacking are addressed without need to define or even apply the term terrorism, the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention could not define the new crime of terrorist financing without precisely clarifying the scope of the definition of terrorism. The aim of this chapter is to examine whether the counterterrorism financing regime provides a solid platform for understanding who should be considered terrorists or what constitutes terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist groups.1 The reason for such an examination is self-evident: the financing of terrorism is the subject matter of the counterterrorism financing regime, and it rests on the definition of terrorism.
In the next section, the peculiarities of the nature of terrorism will be illustrated. In section “The Terrorist Financing Convention and the Definition of Terrorism,” the attempt of the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention to define the elements of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist groups will be examined. The main argument of this chapter is that, with the exception of certain classes of offenses regarded as terroristic, there is a difficulty with the nature of the concept of terrorism in relation to criminal law, which makes a consensus of opinion as to what it means unlikely. Even the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention and others such as the FATF and the UN Security Council involved in the fight against terrorist financing have provided a poor basis for a shared understanding of what is terrorism. In other words, they have left vague all of those controversial aspects of terrorism which hinder reaching an agreement on a convention on terrorism. This may jeopardize the purposes that the convention has in view as there is no common or clear understanding of, or guidance on, whose money or, more accurately, financing for what purpose should be countered.
The Peculiarities of the Nature of the Concept of Terrorism
Logically,
