it does not. It simply asserts that someone who is loving is the only omnipotent being, and implies that some other being (the object of the first sentence) is not. The theory of descriptions is inadequate to capture the sense of “sameness” that is asserted or implied to hold between the subjects of different propositions. Of course, if we talk on different occasions about the Prime Minister of the Great Britain, we normally imply that the same person is in question. But that just relies on the assumption that we are talking about the same individual. Assertion of some unique attribute implies or suggests sameness, it does not assert it. Otherwise we would not be able to say that any other individual possessed the attribute.12
Reference Statements
The second thesis of this book, the reference thesis, is that the truth of a reference statement depends entirely upon co-reference, as I have defined it. I claim that the reference statement is true if and only if (i) the term mentioned by the statement co-refers with the term used in the statement, and (ii) the mentioned term is an anaphor, that is, has some antecedent in the chain of co-referring terms to which it belongs. Therefore, since co-reference (as I have defined it) is a purely semantic relation between the terms, and obtains whether or not there is an external object they are related to, its truth is independent of any such external relation. It is true that “Asmodeus” refers to the demon Asmodeus, whether or not there is such a thing as Asmodeus.
I argue as follows. If a story-relative meaning is not transportable, it follows that the meaning of the corresponding reference statement is not transportable either.
1. There was a young man called “Mark.”
2. Mark was wearing a linen cloth.
3. The name “Mark” refers to him.
The third sentence is a reference statement as I have defined it. The mentioning term is “The name ‘Mark’ above,” the mentioned term is the first token of the second sentence, that is, “Mark.” The used or referring term is the pronoun “him.” Clearly, the statement is true if and only if the used term and the mentioned term co-refer, as they do here. But both the mentioned and the used term refer back to the indefinite antecedent “a young man,” back-reference is not transportable, hence the meaning of the reference statement is also not transportable, and the standard theory of reference statements seems to be false.
Note the first “if” in “if and only if.” I claim that a reference statement is true if the term that is mentioned co-refers with the term that is used, and if the mentioned term is an anaphor, so that the statement can be true even if there was never any such person as the naked fugitive (e.g., if the author of the gospel invented the character). That is a strong claim, but it is a corollary of the co-reference thesis, as follows.
Both the anaphoric theory of reference and the standard theory of reference start with the pre-theoretical conception of reference, namely the “whichness” signified by singular terms. A singular term such as a proper name signifies which particular thing (as opposed to which kind of thing) the speaker or writer is talking about. The sentence “Moses led the people out of Egypt” tells us which person it was who led the people out of Egypt. Singular terms such as proper names, definite descriptions, and pronouns can perform this task of “signifying which,” and a proper name performs this function without signifying anything else. To paraphrase Mill, a proper name shows us, that is, signifies, which thing it is that we are talking about (or purport to talk about), without telling us anything else about it.
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