East can be transferred mainly to its western frontiers.” TASS is authorized to state that this suspiciously strident Domei Tsusin report…is the fruit of the sick imagination of its authors….
Suvorov, op. cit., p. 188.
On May 15,1941, the People’s Commissar of Defense, Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Zhukov sent a memorandum to Stalin titled “Consideration of the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces in Case of War with Germany and Its Allies.” The following are excerpts from the memorandum:
“Taking into account the fact that at the present time Germany can maintain its army in mobilized readiness together with its deployed forces in the rear, it has the capability of preempting us in deploying and mounting a surprise strike.”
“In order to prevent this from happening while destroying the German army, I consider it necessary that in no way should we yield the initiative for starting hostilities to the German command.”
“We should preempt (upridit’) the enemy by deploying and attacking the German Army at the very moment when it has reached the stage of deploying (in order to wage an attack) but has not yet organized itself into a front or concentrated all units of its armed forces along the front….”
“In order that the above may be carried out in the way indicated, it is necessary in timely fashion to take the following measures without which it will not be possible to deliver a surprise strike against the enemy both from the air as well as from the ground.” (There follows a list of measures relating to the locations along the Western Front for deploying Red Army infantry, tank, etc., divisions and the number of days or weeks the various measures will take to execute the Red Army’s “surprise strike.”)
Yakovlev, op. cit., pp. 215-220.
Weeks, op. cit., Appendix 2, pp. 169-170.
A large number of post-World War II official reports document the massive build-up of Soviet forces on the western frontier during this period. On 26 May 1941, the Trans-Baikal Military District and the Far Eastern Front were ordered to send nine divisions, including three tank divisions, to the west. The 16th Army was on the Trans-Siberian Railway and the 22nd and 24th Armies were headed toward it.
General A. Grylev and Professor V. Khvostov, Kommunist,1968, No.2, p.67.
Suvorov, op. cit., p.191.
Marshal Bagramyan wrote: “we had to prepare all the operational documentation needed for moving five rifle and four mechanized corps out of the areas where they were stationed permanently into the frontier zone.…On 15 June we were ordered to begin moving all five rifle corps to the frontier…They took with them everything necessary for combat operations. For purposes of secrecy, these movements took place only at night.”
Tak Nachinalas Voina, Moscow Voenizdat 1971, pp.54, 77
Suvorov, op. cit., p.203
In the 1930s, during the first two five-year plans, the Soviet Union had built an impregnable line of fortifications, comparable to the Maginot Line, but longer and deeper, that ran from Leningrad to Odessa – it was called the Stalin Line. In the spring of 1941, Stalin began dismantling this powerful line of defense. A defensive line would not be needed if one were planning to launch the greatest offensive operation in history.
“The situation was becoming absurd. When we were faced by weak armies of comparatively small countries, our frontiers were really well and truly safe. When Nazi Germany became our neighbor the defensive installations put up by the engineers along the former frontier were abandoned and even partially dismantled.”
“At the beginning of May 1941, following Stalin’s speech at the reception for military academy graduates, the brake was applied even more strongly to all work that was being done to build engineered defenses and to lay down mines.”
GRU Colonel Ilya Starinov, Miny Zhdut Svoego Chasa, p.186.
Suvorov, op. cit., pp.28, 175.
On 13 June 1941, the greatest mass movement of troops in history began. The First Strategic Echelon had 170 divisions; 56 of these were stationed right up against the western frontier. The remaining 114 divisions were in the western districts, a short distance from the frontier. “Between 12 and 15 June, the western military districts were ordered to move all divisions in the interior of the country into positions close to the state frontiers.”
V. Khvostov, Major-General A. Grylev, Kommunist 1968, No. 12, p.68.
Before May 1941, Soviet newspapers had glorified war in general and happily celebrated Germany’s victories in Europe. Pravda waxed poetic about “modern war in all its terrible beauty!”
Pravda, 19 August 1940.
Suvorov, op. cit., p.176.
The day after Stalin’s secret May 5th speech, everything suddenly changed:
“The fire of the Second Imperialist War blazes beyond the frontiers of our Motherland. The whole weight of its incalculable misfortunes is laid on the shoulders of the workers. The people do not want war. Their gazes are fixed on the countries of socialism which are reaping the fruits of peaceful labor. They see with every justification a solid bastion for peace in the armed forces of our Motherland, in the Red Army and Navy. In the present complex international situation it is necessary to be ready for surprises of all kinds….”
Pravda, 6 May 1941, leading article.
Suvorov, op. cit., p.176.
This same terminology prefaced every Soviet “liberation.” In May 1941, the whole gigantic communist propaganda apparatus suddenly began sounding the alarm “to be ready for unexpected events.” The People’s Commissar for Defense issued order No. 191 to “all companies, batteries, squadrons, air squadrons and on ships”…“to be ready for unexpected events.”
General S. P. Ivanov, Chief of the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and a group of leading Soviet historians, produced a comprehensive study entitled The Initial Period of the War (Nachalnye Period Voiny.) The study indicated that Red Army westward troop movements began in February, were increased in March, reached enormous proportions in April and May, and became a flood in June. The full build-up of Soviet forces on the German frontier was planned to be complete by July 10th. The railroads were paralyzed for almost six months by these secret military movements.
There were many indications that the planned launch date for Soviet Operation GROZA (Thunderstorm) was 6 July 1941. Zhukov and Stalin liked to launch surprise attacks on Sunday mornings, and 6 July 1941 was the last Sunday before the concentration of Soviet forces would have been complete. Soviet military doctrine dictated that an offensive should begin before the concentration of troops was completed.
The study not only admitted that Hitler launched a preventive attack, but also put a time to it: “the Nazi command succeeded in forestalling our troops literally in the last two weeks before the war began.”
General of the Army S. P. Ivanov, Nachalnyi Period Voiny, Moscow Voenizdat 1974. pp. 211-212.
Suvorov, op. cit., pp. 206, 327.
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