the need for greater hull strength to meet U.S. weather and rough ship handling compared to German practice. Following closely upon the loss of ZR-2, the Shenandoah disaster led to heated criticism of the program. U.S. Naval Institute photo archive
No negligence or culpability was found in the actions of any individuals, though the reduction of gas valves was deemed “inadvisable.” The Navy’s penchant of complying with publicity requests was criticized. The movement of naval craft should be limited to military operations “in so far as possible, especially in the case of new and experimental types.”
During the two-year career of Shenandoah the LTA program had taken its first, faltering steps. Personnel had been trained, valuable experience accumulated, and the potential (and liabilities) of helium and water-recovery demonstrated. The disaster forced a reevaluation of the strength requirements for rigid airships; the Akron and Macon were built far stronger as one result. As well, control cars were built directly into the hulls, the engines placed inside. Fewer publicity flights would interfere with the operating schedules of Los Angeles and of Akron and Macon.
Rosendahl had become an attractive public figure overnight. His naval career prospered, and his influence began to dominate the young LTA program. On the other hand, the experience, rank, and influence that Lansdowne could have exerted had been wrenched away—an incalculable loss to the cause.27
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
