in the next two years. Some were so powerful and sweeping, they will require bigger design changes in future blocks of Virginia SSNs [nuclear-powered attack submarines] and the new SSBN [nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine] class. We’re also looking to expand this approach to other submarine problems.
Innovation in Naval History
History offers a priceless cache of previously purchased lessons to those who will mine it and apply it forward. The Navy of the interwar years and early Cold War periods faced mesmerizing opportunities and challenges similar to those we face today. We must heed their lessons and adopt their innovative zeal to gain advantages in future operating environments.
The period of 1919–39, known as the interwar years, provides a fascinating glimpse at how innovation emerges in challenging environments. The primary constraint of that time was the Washington Naval Treaty that among other things limited the production of battleships and undercut forward-basing options. To overcome those challenges war planners began to think creatively. In building “War Plan Orange,” Navy planners unleashed a torrent of new ideas, such as options for aircraft carrier use, long-range logistics at sea and floating drydocks.
To keep pace with the surge in new ways to prepare for conflict at sea, Navy leadership created the General Board which, as author John T. Kuehn notes, “was the locus where treaty preparation, building policy, and war planning all intersected. The board addressed strategy, the recommendations of the bureaus, policy-making, NWC [Naval War College] wargaming results and studies.”4 The board helped cut through the complexities and uncertainties of the day. It focused innovation by defining the problems, and its largely untethered efforts resulted in the advance of amphibious warfare, carrier aviation, and the formation of a complex campaign of “island hopping,” as leaders considered how they would seize and hold new bases across the vast distances of the Pacific. Their efforts culminated in a clearly defined experimentation and wargaming process that yielded significant results. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz was to later remark: “The wargames with Japan had been enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people . . . that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war.”5
Embracing Change
Before zeroing in on the future, it is important to look at how we currently innovate. Today, the U.S. military is just a small slice of the global industrial complex and as such is no longer in a position to keep pace with the creation of cutting-edge technology. What’s more, attempts to “in-source” new ideas and concepts face the bureaucracy of the acquisition process, the influence of Congress, and the size and focus of Navy staffs. These things tend to stifle the generation and development of new ideas and concepts. The current configuration of the military was largely shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. That legislation shifted power to the combatant commanders, all of whom have a very real need to meet the demands of their theaters on a daily basis. Much of this contributes to what many have called a “lethargy of the mind” when thinking about innovation in the Navy.6
Like the interwar years, we need a clear understanding of the issues we face. Theoretical physicist Albert Einstein said, “If I had an hour to save the world, I would spend 55 minutes defining the problem and five minutes finding solutions.” John Kao describes this as an “Innovation Audit”—understanding what we have and what we need.7 The first part is easy, the second more difficult. In defining “needs,” the pattern today is to default to things—weapon systems and other material items that can fill a perceived capability gap. Now, more than ever, it is essential to recognize that innovation is much more than technical—it involves broadly questioning how we will organize and execute warfare in future environments. For the Navy, it means thinking, again, about being challenged at sea.
In 2011, senior military leaders, academic experts, and industry representatives converged in Norfolk, Virginia, to spend two days discussing the state of innovation as it relates to our maritime forces. The audience included leaders from all sea services and the joint world. The large local audience was nearly doubled by participants on Defense Connect Online. The purpose of the conference was to begin a larger campaign to reinvigorate the conditions for an innovative culture and overcome our internal barriers to innovation. Admiral John Harvey, Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command at the time, made his views clear:
The organizations and processes we use are purposefully designed to maintain course and speed—not to allow significant change. Most of what I have seen regarding innovation in our Navy has been activity driven, more focused on getting a program through another step in the process than solving real problems. Our choice is simple. We can either innovate today, or be forced to rapidly adapt in the middle of conflict.8
With the tone and expectations set, the forum concentrated on three lines of discussion: (1) We would need to create conditions conducive to innovation; (2) we would need to identify the type of problems to be addressed; and (3) we would need a channel to develop innovative ideas and concepts.
The issues discussed at the conference are not exclusive to the Navy. At a recent Naval Institute/Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Joint Warfighting Conference, retired Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula commented that the biggest challenge we face as a military has nothing to do with any particular weapon system, nor is it programmatic or budgetary. “Our biggest challenge will be to overcome organizational inertia, open our minds, and get out of the box.” Concepts such as Air-Sea Battle are good starting points to define future capabilities, yet they will need to avoid the seemingly inevitable descent into a shopping list—especially in today’s austere environment. Instead, it is important to ask deeper questions that could spawn a more innovative examination of future issues.
Looking ahead, to move innovation from a cerebral activity to a practice will require a dispassionate review of how we currently organize, train, and equip our forces. The general theme remains: Future battles will be fought in the context of being challenged at sea. The following questions may help frame how we think about our future:
• Do we train our forces against a thinking opponent? The central piece of maritime power projection remains the carrier strike group (CSG). The incredible range, lethality, and flexibility of the CSG are undeniable. The process of preparing these forces for deployment is a well-defined, qualification-driven process resulting in a high state of readiness for the group. The question is, are we building real tactical capabilities in our main battery or just preparing them for the most likely day-to-day operations they currently face? We need to develop a thinking “red cell” that can use a wide array of capabilities to create new and different high-end scenarios.
• Wargaming is another area ripe for examination. Is our approach on target? During the interwar years, wargaming was a major venue for vetting innovative ideas and discovering new ones. These games were played at the Naval War College pitting flag officers against each other in scenarios mainly focused on the Pacific. Debriefs were detailed and often brutal. As we begin to look at future challenges across multiple domains, the value of operational-level wargaming could be significant.
• Where do integrated tactics live? A large part of responding to challenges at sea will be new and innovative tactics. While plenty of organizations are developing concepts of operation in the important areas of antisubmarine warfare, integrated air and missile defense, and power projection, little attention is being paid to how we will integrate these efforts in the future battle space. Incorporating disparate sets of tactics into our warfighting whole should be a key area of any innovation effort. The challenge may be to successfully integrate platforms and procedures to fight in higher-end environments across multiple domains.
• Are we training our commanding officers to have the personal initiative to succeed in future environments? The ability to execute while cut off from higher authority is often a key to victory
