to leave the original language intact in these documents for the sake of authenticity and to avoid the complications that can arise when trying to make anachronistic adjustments. So readers are asked to “translate” (converting the ubiquitous “he” to “he or she” and “his” to “her or his” as required) and, while doing so, to celebrate the progress that we have made in these matters in more recent times.
Author “Biographies”
Another problem arises when considering biographical information of the various authors whose works make up this special collection. Some of the selections included in this anthology were originally accompanied by biographical information about their authors. Others were not. Those “biographies” that do exist vary a great deal in terms of length and depth, some amounting to a single sentence pertaining to the author’s current duty station, others consisting of several paragraphs that cover the author’s career. Varying degrees of research—some quite time consuming and some yielding no results—are required to find biographical information from other sources. Because of these uneven variables, and because as a general rule we are more interested in what these authors have to say more than who they are or were, I have chosen to even the playing field by foregoing accompanying “biographies.” Relevant biographical information has been included in some of the accompanying commentaries, however.
Ranks
I have retained the ranks of the authors at the time of their publication. As noted above, some of the authors wrote early in their careers, and the sagacity of their earlier contributions says much about the individuals, about the significance of the Naval Institute’s forum, and about the importance of writing to the naval services—something that is sometimes underappreciated.
Deletions
Most of the articles included here are intact, appearing as they originally did in their entirety, but in a few cases some portions have been removed because they make suggestions or challenge policies/programs that no longer exist. Where these deletions have occurred, the following has been inserted: […]
In the interest of space, and because Wheel Books are intended as professional guides, not academic treatises, citations have been removed from some of the entries.
Other Anomalies
Readers may detect some inconsistencies in editorial style, reflecting staff changes at the Naval Institute, evolving practices in publishing itself, and various other factors not always identifiable. Some of the selections will include citational support, others will not. Authors sometimes coined their own words and occasionally violated traditional style conventions. Bottom line: with the exception of the removal of some extraneous materials (such as section numbers from book excerpts) and the conversion to a consistent font and overall design, these articles and excerpts appear as they originally did when first published.
In his classic treatise on power, The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli succinctly defined the inherent difficulty in promoting change and innovation when he noted:
[T]here is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit from the new order . . . (because of) the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.1
The purpose of this Wheel Book is to consider how the sea services have dealt with innovation and change in the past, as illustrated by selected articles that have appeared in the various periodicals and books published by the U.S. Naval Institute. It will also address the outlook for accommodating change in the future. If readers expect this to be a “cookbook” with a detailed and tried-and-true recipe for innovation, however, I acknowledge at the outset that no such recipe exists. The value derived from these pages will arise from the thoughtful consideration and assessment of ideas expressed by other maritime professionals in the first decade-and-a-half of the twenty-first century. (Other books in the USNI Wheel Book series will take a more historical approach, and will delve into USNI archives going back more than 140 years.)
At the most fundamental level, our topic relates to the only constant in life: change! Were it not for change, yesterday’s tactics and last year’s equipment would be adequate to provide for the common defense. But factors such as changes in political alliances, upheavals in cultural relations, and technological breakthroughs virtually guarantee that the path forward will be different from the path that brought us to the status quo.
I write these thoughts while serving on the faculty of the historic Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. It has been well documented that the College’s founding president, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN, embraced the changes he was witnessing in the Navy (and the world) when he founded the College more than 130 years ago. These changes were acknowledged in John Hattendorf’s centennial history of the College when he noted:
In 1884, the United States Navy was in a period of transition which reflected the broad developments in American intellectual perceptions, the growth of industrial power, technological progress, and general professional development. Change was in the air, and suggestions for future development were heard in many different areas.2
The issues facing today’s maritime leaders are, perhaps, not quite as transformational as those of Luce’s time, but I would argue that the rate of change is greater today than at any time in our history. As one tech-based example, the Apple iPhone first went on sale in 2007, and there have been seven updated replacement versions since then, an average of one per year. And in May of 2014, Apple sold its 500-millionth phone. Changes in other technologies, such as weapons systems or consumer electronics, and in culture—or even fashion—have moved at a similarly blistering pace. For this reason, I argue that this accelerated rate of change places a premium on adaptation and innovation in virtually every field.
Creative, innovative, and adaptive thinking is of particular importance today because of the highly fluid nature of world affairs. This period has been categorized by the acronym VUCA, a term developed at the U.S. Army War College in response to changes in the security environment over the last twenty years. The concept has garnered a wide following both inside and outside of government. The acronym represents the following characteristics of the modern world:
Volatility: the rate of change of the environment. Volatility in the Information Age means even the most current data may not provide an adequate context for decision-making. Beyond an ability to accurately assess the current environment, leaders must anticipate rapid change and do their best to predict what may happen within the time scope of a project, program, or operation. Volatility in the environment coupled with the extended timelines of modern acquisition programs creates a unique challenge for strategic leaders and their advisers.
Uncertainty: the inability to know everything about a situation and the difficulty of predicting the nature and effect of change (the nexus of uncertainty and volatility.) Uncertainty often delays decision-making processes and increases the likelihood of vastly divergent opinions about the future. It drives the need for intelligent risk management and hedging strategies.
Complexity: the difficulty of understanding the interactions between multiple parts or factors and of predicting the primary and subsequent effects of changing one or more factors in a highly interdependent system or even system of systems. Complexity differs from uncertainty; though it may be possible to predict immediate outcomes of single interactions within a broader web, the non-linear branches and sequels multiply so quickly and double back on previous connections so as to overwhelm most assessment processes. Complexity
