Scourge of Malice re-emerged in March 1598, with Cumberland onboard for what was to be his last and in many ways most successful voyage. The plan, as always, was based on the seizing of carracks, this time off the Tagus. The plan, as so often, failed when the fleet was sighted and the carracks stayed. A few small ships were attacked, as Cumberland related:
I ceased not working day nor night, and by Saturday at night was readie to set saile, when within night I heard the Ordnance goe off betwixt me and the shoare, and well knew it was a small ship of Hampton and my little Pinnace the Skout, that were in fight with a ship which they chased to windward of mee before night, and fearing their match too hard, as in truth it proved. I, for losing time let slip mine anchor, and soone came to helpe the poore little ones much over-matched. At my first comming up shee shot at me; yet forbare I, and went so neere that I spake to them, and demanding of whence they were? answere was made, of Lisbone. Then assuring my self shee was a Biscaine, and would fight well, I came close to her, and gave her my broad side, which shee so answered that I had three men killed, five or sixe shot, and my ship in sixe or seven places, some of them very dangerous. So I laid her aboard and tooke her, shee proving a ship Ship of Hamburgh, laden with Corne, Copper, Powder, and prohibited commodities. I made the more haste to end this fight, for that I would be out of the sight of the Land before day, which as I desired I was, and there met with a French man laden with Salt.11
Knowing that he had been sighted off Iberia, Cumberland attempted to take advantage of his failure by sailing fast to the Indies, leaving the Spanish to believe that he was still lying just over the horizon from Lisbon. The result was that he was able to use surprise, along with flair, daring and bold execution, to take San Juan de Puerto Rico, a feat that had eluded Drake. The reward was little, the loss of life through disease high, but the honour was great, and made the more so, for it was with the shame of that loss fresh in his ears that King Philip of Spain died on 13 July 1598. Had he lingered on he might have been cheered to learn that Cumberland, as so often, had failed to intercept his convoys off the Azores, but he did not, and the war, his war, which had begun to all intent and purpose with the defeat of the pirate John Hawkins at San Juan de Ulua in 1568, had ended for Philip, after the loss of hundreds of ships, thousands of men and millions of ducats, with the victory of the pirate George Clifford at San Juan de Puerto Rico.
Like the Ark, the Scourge was to prove the professionalism of her Deptford builders by her own longevity. In September 1600, having hung up his sea-boots, Cumberland offered the East India Company first refusal on the purchase of Malice Scourge. Following a survey to ‘search into all her defects’, an offer of £3,000 was made ‘for the said ship and all her ordnance, sails, cables, anchors and furnishings, as she now is’ (Appendix 4). Cumberland stated he would take not less than £4,000, but the company knew its man and his means, and they settled for £3,700. To prepare her for her long voyage to the Far East, she had her bottom cased in cement to prevent worm, and almost 800ft of timber replaced: much of it ‘borrowed out of her Majesty’s storehouse at Woolwich.’ To oversee the refit and then take command of the vessel, the company appointed the pirate, James Lancaster, who had already already made one voyage to the east, in 1591 in Edward Bonaventure. It had been a disastrous voyage. Lancaster had struggled to reach Penang, raiding and trading in equal measure, before turning for home that November. After refreshing his weary and depleted crew at the Cape of Good Hope, he was driven to the Indies where after much hazard he was marooned when, with just six men onboard, his ship sailed away and disappeared forever. Eventually, thanks to a passing French vessel, Lancaster and eleven colleagues managed to land back in England in May 1594. Shortly afterwards his fortune changed when he led a raid on Pernambuco in Brazil, in which so much booty was seized that the pirates could not find sufficient hulls to haul it away.12
Lancaster’s new command was relaunched in December 1600 and renamed Red Dragon. On 13 February 1601 she led a fleet of five ships out from Woolwich on the company’s first venture to the East Indies. She returned in September 1603, fully laden with spices, having proved her seaworthiness – just. For, on approaching the Cape on her return journey, Red Dragon had been struck by a storm so violent that she lost her rudder, while the mizzenmast, which was taken down to provide substitute steering, was also unshipped. The strain placed on a ship’s rudder by heavy seas made these vital components very vulnerable, mounted as they were to the hull only by a number of iron hinges which could rust unnoticed underwater. Frobisher had had a similar incident while returning home from the Labrador coast. Spanish vessels used to rove a line through the rudder, secured to the deck at both ends, so that should the fastenings snap, the rudder could be recovered. Furthermore, many also carried a spare, while the measurements of the rudder were marked out on the deck so it was easy to build a replacement. The English did not adopt these sensible measures, thus committing their rudders to the deep and themselves to the mercy of the elements. Onboard Red Dragon the crew demanded that the ship be abandoned and they be transferred to their faithful consort, Hector, but Lancaster had faith in the refitted vessel and persuaded them to stay. The next day dawned with a welcome calm and Red Dragon came home without further incident. The seamanship that Lancaster had learned as a pirate thus proved to be invaluable to him as a merchant seaman.
Lancaster’s stubbornness in the South Atlantic and his faith in Red Dragon served the East India Company well, for the ship made five further voyages to the East Indies before ending her days, as a good fighting vessel should, when she was attacked and sunk by a superior Dutch force in October 1619.
Yet stout timbers alone did not make a good ship: what was essential for success was a strong leader able, often by example, to encourage his men, not only in the excitement of the fight, but in the long bitter weeks of a slow homeward journey when provisions were failing. There is little doubt that this quality was possessed by Drake and, because it involved adversity, Cumberland, who met these challenges with bravery and devotion to his crew. Returning from his voyage of 1589, with his numbers inflated by the presence of some captives, he met with heavy weather which kept his Victory at sea overlong so that food, but most especially water, had to be severely rationed, Cumberland made sure that there was:
equall distribution of the small store they had as well to all his prisoners as to his owne people. By this time the lamentable cryes of the sicke and hurt men for drinke was heard in every corner of the ship: for want whereof many perished (ten or twelve every night) then otherwise had miscarried in the whole Voyage . . . His minde was yet undaunted and present, his bodily presence and preventions readie. The last of November hee spake with an English ship, which promised him the next morning two or three tunnes of Wine, but soone after unfortunately came on ground. The next day hee had some supply of Beere, but not sufficient to enable him to undertake for England. Hee therefore put into Ventre Haven [Bantry Bay], in the Westermost part in Ireland, where having well refreshed, the twentieth of December he set sayle for England.
Such experiences might have persuaded a lesser man to return to land management, which Cumberland’s neglected estates badly needed, but the earl had a spirit, ‘further kindled and enflamed by former disasters’ or, as his daughter wrote, ‘though the miseries of sickness, death, famine and many other misadventures were sufficient to have moved his Lordship to have abjured for ever those marine adventures . . . such was his natural inclination . . . he could not be diverted from attempting another sea voyage.’
The Navy Royal
Far from deprecating the desires of her private, piratically-inclined shipbuilders, Elizabeth was most willing to lend them vessels of her own, to become in fact a joint conspirator and partner. However, the queen had just one caveat when leasing out her vessels to her pirateers, but it was a bit of a stopper, for she decreed that they were not to be used for boarding, for fear of their destruction by fire, or serious injury while grappling. She did, however, also stipulate that any booty seized by her ships would be hers by right, thus requiring the return while denying the means of acquisition. She was also more willing to loan out her older models than the sleek new galleons that John Hawkins
