long will you stay?” asked Dark.30 It was an important question. The tactics and force dispositions of American units sometimes changed with the decisions of rotating commanders. Roussell considered this “playing the clock”—that is, based on a Marine unit’s six- or seven-month deployment—rather than “playing the game.” One unit’s forward operating base might be shuttered by the next at the discretion of a commander on the ground or direction from senior officers.31
In early January, just prior to President George W. Bush’s announcement of the “surge,” U.S. forces were still playing out a strategy of pulling back to let Iraqi security forces take the lead. In Fallujah’s case, as in many other areas, the effort was premature. Besides the fact that the Iraqi Army and police were operationally unready, the peninsula’s tribes considered the Iraqi security forces untrustworthy competitors. To many of the Sunnis of Anbar, the Iraqi Army units were Shia outsiders from Baghdad and the south of the country; the police were variously suspected of being sellouts, tools of the Iraqi government, the Americans, or competing tribes.32
Khamis’ and Dark’s tribesmen did not yet have the manpower, weapons, or official permission to openly arm and defend themselves against any inevitable revenge for cooperating with Americans.33 Retribution from al Qaeda was one of Dark’s and Khamis’ repeatedly expressed worries about an alliance. Dark knew that if he was going to stand up to the insurgency, he needed both license to fight and for Americans to agree to stay nearby and help protect his people.34
Roussell was impressed with Dark’s enthusiasm for action, which was a rarity among sheikhs in the area. He also viewed the young sheikh as an opportunist who craved advancement and aggressively projected the image of a brave fighter, as epitomized by his frequent choice to wear a dark blue ammunition-carrying vest draped over “combat casual” clothes. In truth, Roussell judged Dark to be more of an organizer than a gunfighter, but organization was something the Albu Issa needed to marshal their forces against the radicals dedicated to insurgency. Organizers also lived longer; many day-to-day combatants, including two of the young toughs who made up the core of Dark’s security forces in those early days, wound up maimed or killed. It was a common price paid by the gunfighters of Iraq.35
Dark had also formed equally perceptive opinions of the Americans. In a later interview with U.S. researchers, he summarized them in words that perfectly mirrored Roussell’s working philosophy: “We have a theory,” explained Dark. “The Americans don’t have continuous friendships. They always have their interests. Their relationships with people are based on how much benefit they can get from a person.”36 In essence, he and his American counterparts varied little in their perception of the utilitarian nature of their new “friendship” with one another. Dark asked for the release of fellow tribesmen being held by the Americans, as well as for some cars, radios, and construction contracts to create jobs for his tribe. One of his requests continued to stand out in terms of repetition and forceful expression: his men needed weapons and the license to carry them.37
Having received permission from their superiors prior to the meeting, Saint One and Whisnant were finally able to offer Dark something concrete. They asked him for a list of thirty trusted fighters who would be vetted for permits to openly carry weapons. In addition, other men in his village were granted the right to brandish rifles only, and only at checkpoints or while stationed on the rooftops of their houses. This would enable them to defend their homes while still differentiating them from insurgent fighters traveling through the area. After the meeting, Whisnant made a recommendation to higher command to fulfill most of Dark’s latest requests for cars, contracts, weapons, and ammunition. The major also agreed to stick around and protect his new allies: he directed his men to establish a new, permanent patrol base in an abandoned mansion near the village of Albu Aifan. Some of the Marines nicknamed it FOB [Forward Operating Base] Dark.
Saint One, Whisnant, and Roussell now dared to be optimistic. They thought they could “make this work.” If locals identified the bad guys and took ownership of the fight against insurgents, the bleak war for the peninsula could swing in favor of the Americans and their new Iraqi allies. The agreements of the two preceding weeks marked the start of a genuine working relationship.38 Like many relationships, however, this one would be tested—severely and soon.
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
