in the 1990s. Given the massive investment and the opportunity-cost choices confronting both governments, what do the past fifty-five years tell us? What is the interaction between the US-UK SSBN forces’ strategic underpinnings, program elements (technical, operational, force structure, and financial) and other choices, and the past? The continuity of institutionalized naval thinking may be challenged in ways that were simply not present when President John Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan signed the agreements that shared US submarine nuclear technology with the Royal Navy and led to the creation of the UK’s Polaris submarine force. Political will and funding interact with both navies’ concerns about lost programs and diminished force levels as a result of the inevitable high cost of SSBN replacement. Based on our knowledge and experience, what is the best outcome for both countries and their navies?
Bookshelves and e-systems are full of outstanding works on both the US Navy and Royal Navy during this period. This book will not attempt to replicate what is easily available elsewhere. For example, the technical details of both navies’ force structure down to the unit level, in extraordinary fine and accurate detail, can be found in works like Jane’s Fighting Ships and the myriad publications of the U.S. Naval Institute, by distinguished authors such as the late Royal Navy captain John Moore and the American civilian author Norman Polmar. The histories of all the main conflicts, local wars, and other engagements are well documented and analyzed in multiple sources. Where this book hopes to contribute and stimulate is in the nonquantifiable domains that relate to the question why. In particular, it will cast light on themes where the author has unique knowledge and insight, hitherto unexamined and highly relevant areas. To illustrate from the past, the British government only released in 1974 a limited amount of information of the Ultra secrets of World War II and the Enigma code, together with the existence of Bletchley Park. Within a few years the data, which was released very slowly, changed completely our understanding of World War II, as exemplified by Sir Harry Hinsley’s masterful volumes published by the British government on the history of British intelligence in World War II. The point is self-evident. There is much that naval professionals and those associated with the political-military process do not know or consider. This is no one’s fault. It is the nature of the way security-conscious navies conduct business. What is key is to ensure that all salient factors are considered. When either navy engages in a critical event like a national strategic defense review that will lead to resource allocations and changes in national defense priorities, policies, and programs, there is likely to be generational impact. Here is an illustration. The British government decided in the 1960s to not replace the Royal Navy’s fleet aircraft carriers, thereby ending major carrier-launched fixed-wing aviation (with the exception of the three small, 20,000-ton, Invincible-class Harrier carriers or through-deck cruisers). Two new Queen Elizabeth fleet carriers will enter service in the early 2020s. There has been a gap of over forty years since HMS Ark Royal was decommissioned. The consequences of decisions made in the 1960s were witnessed in the Falklands campaign and more recently in operations off Libya.
The themes are selected for good reasons. They are based on criteria that reflect what drives change at all levels: from the high-level institutional and organizational aspects of political-military decision making down to the effects of hugely significant technical changes that in due course impact policy making and operations. A few obvious examples of the latter are nuclear-reactor technology in submarines; underwater cruise- and ballistic-missile launch; multispectral missile and warhead seekers that permit precision strike to within CEPs (circular error probabilities) of just a few feet or less; unmanned stealthy, long-range reconnaissance vehicles; distributed, real-time intelligence systems; and Aegis-like combat systems. The list is huge. All make a significant difference, some make quantum leaps. Fifty-five years have witnessed monumental technical changes: the digital revolution alone is in retrospect quite mind-boggling. When Allen Turing made his revolutionary applications of basic computer technology at Bletchley Park in World War II, he was in the van of technologies that will see no slowing down beyond current “cloud,” cyber, and digital communications and signal-processing technologies in the coming decades. The questions for readers that will be posed as this book unfolds is how should we best exploit these emerging technologies for the strategic and tactical benefit of both navies and that fit optimally the national security needs of the United States and United Kingdom.
The dialogue that occurred in our period of interest between the various editors of Jane’s Fighting Ships and US and UK intelligence officials was responsible and collegial. Retired Royal Navy captain John Moore had been a head of one of the United Kingdom’s intelligence agencies when he was a serving officer and later, indeed, regularly visited your author to discuss content for his annual volume. What this says is that many of the publications that readers are familiar with are simply outstanding and do not require embellishment or updates, certainly not replacement.
The structure of this book has been determined by its key themes, and these are reflected in the chapter titles. The themes cover the important relationship between both navies, manifested by their intelligence organizations, technology developments, political-military restructuring, selected key operations, and their joint and overarching reactions to the various global threats that they faced from 1960 to 2015. The abiding thread that connects these themes comprises the core issue, concepts, and furtherance of a global maritime strategy to protect the vital national interests of the United States and the United Kingdom.
A Tale of Two Navies draws on the unique knowledge and experience of the author, who had the privilege of serving in uniform with both the US Navy and the Royal Navy while working closely with their respective intelligence agencies. As a result, the substantive material that forms the basis for this book is both selective and focused; there is no intent to cover the waterfront, across each and every domain of naval activities that the two navies embraced. Thus, the author does not review all the major US and British naval operations, technology developments, or details like orders of battle and weapon capabilities. There are bookshelves of excellent sources that cover these topics. What you have in the following twelve chapters is the author’s insider perspective of critical themes that will endure for the foreseeable future. Please do enjoy the dialogue, for the goal is to provoke your own thoughts and opinions, for you to carry forward to support an enduring US-UK global maritime strategy.
Organizational Change and Strategic Priorities Impact the US Navy and the Royal Navy
In 1960 the US Navy and the Royal Navy were emerging from a fifteen-year post–World War II period that had solidified the Cold War in geographic, political, military, and economic boundaries. Both navies underwent major organizational changes in ways that have influenced their development ever since.
Before exploring the detail of the various postwar organizational transformations, it is important to understand and evaluate some fundamental differences in the political systems of the United States and the United Kingdom and how these impact their navies. The United States is a republic with separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and financial provider, and the judiciary. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy in which the legislature and the executive are one and the same thing, with a cabinet system of government. The executive is formed from the winning party at election time, with the elected leader of the winning party becoming prime minister after Her Majesty the Queen invites that person to form a government—a constitutional
