and strafe the Fort de France infantry and gun positions north of the beaches; thirty minutes before H-Hour, the light cruisers would fire 800 rounds of 6-inch and the support destroyers 1,414 rounds of 4-inch shells at the beach defenses. Then the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Fifth Marines would land abreast on Beaches N1 and N2 in the Basse Terre area, near Fort de France. The reserve consisted of 1st Battalion, Fifth, embarked in the Henderson, less the reinforced company in the Manley.
Supported by air cover as practicable, the Marines would drive north to secure the Fort de France area; when the major objectives had been taken, the Army would make an administrative landing, cope with such resistance as remained, and supply an occupation force. Then, if necessary, Guadelope could be blockaded or attacked.2
Backed by the Ranger, Admiral Greenslade was able to persuade Admiral Robert to grant the United States ninety-six hours’ notice of ship movements, accept American naval and air patrols within French territorial jurisdiction, and permit a naval observer at Fort de France. Robert rejected American suggestions that he transfer the French sailors off the islands, incapacitate his ships by removing vital parts, and permit regular inspection of the harbor at Fort de France by U.S. warships. Thus, the basic problems posed by the presence of the French warships in the Caribbean were not permanently solved but temporarily postponed. The Americans agreed to see that the islands were supplied with food, paid for out of blocked Vichy funds in the United States.3
Also that fall, plans were hastily improvised for the “protective occupation” of the islands of San Miguel, Terceira, and Fayal in the Azores in the event a German strike at the Portuguese possessions appeared imminent. Plans called for the still-building, understrength First Marine Division to make the assault landing, escorted and protected by a fast, compact naval task force built around the Ranger, four modern cruisers, and a squadron of new destroyers. There was little Portuguese military strength on the islands, the troops “badly armed, trained, and equipped”; it was expected that they would “offer little resistance.” No assault force was assembled to strike at the Azores because shipping and equipment for such a major operation were in short supply and, anyway, the Fuehrer had abandoned Operation Felix; for as long as Gibraltar and Dakar remained out of German hands, distance (the German bases nearest the Azores were 1,200 miles away, in France) protected the weakly held central and southern Atlantic island approaches to the United States.4
In the fall and winter, the atmosphere of crisis dissolved. Most of the ships of the Atlantic Squadron returned to routine Neutrality Patrol duties and elements of the Fifth Marines returned from readiness at Guantanamo Bay to help shape development of the First Division. But some American ships and planes continued to patrol off the French islands.
Destroyers patrolled close off Martinique, at the three-mile limit, steaming monotonously through the blue-green sea, crews lulled by the warm golden sun and pale tropical sky. Working out of San Juan and “Gitmo” were four of the old, poorly designed Omaha-class light cruisers, patrolling steadily, officers and men longing for more challenging duty.5
But some of the fliers had their hands full. As the Caribbean base facilities were still under construction that fall and winter, tender-based PBYs operated off Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad, watching the French. High seas and gales hampered the water-based flight operations, and it was often hard to fuel and arm the planes from bowser boats; normally, it took about five hours’ hard work to refuel and, perhaps, three more to arm six PBYs. It was difficult to do the necessary work on the planes because beaching and maintenance facilities were lacking. Nevertheless, the operations of the tender-based flying boats compared favorably with the record made by patrol planes using the prepared bases at San Juan and Guantanamo. The PBYs continued to overfly the French islands, sometimes landing in the bay off Fort de France to pick up reports from the naval observer. In late March, a low-flying PBY passed directly over the Béarn, and the French threatened to open fire if a similar incident occurred.6 But, for the time being, the Greenslade-Robert modus vivendi worked, for neither side wanted to fight the other, save as a matter of compelling necessity.
Meanwhile, the American Navy was taking the lead in forcing the reluctant President and the preoccupied Army to reach definite conclusions concerning America’s strategy in the impending war, thus advancing American strategic planning well beyond the summer’s logjam of hemispheric defense, containment of Japan, and material aid to Britain. By the fall of 1940, Admiral Stark and his naval planners were prepared to revolutionize the fundamental assumptions of prewar American strategy and set the foundation of the basic American strategy of World War II.
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