up his claim with military force. Carter’s Libya policy, however, was influenced by his desire to maintain economic relations, avoid military confrontation, and prevent closer cooperation between Tripoli and Moscow. Carter rejected the FON plan out of a concern that a bold challenge to Qaddafi might provoke a military incident, endanger Americans living and working in Libya, or embarrass Arab and other Muslim leaders who were trying to negotiate the release of American hostages being held since 4 November 1979 by radical Iranian students at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.10
Despite Carter’s cautious policy toward Libya, relations between Washington and Tripoli rapidly deteriorated. On 2 December 1979 a large mob gathered outside the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, demonstrating against the United States and shouting pro-Iranian slogans. Before long the crowd overran, sacked, and burned the embassy while a single Libyan policeman looked on. The Carter administration immediately lodged a stern protest with the Libyan government. The United States demanded that Libya admit responsibility for the attack and destruction of the embassy, since it had not provided adequate protection for the facility. The Libyans responded with expressions of regret for the incident but denied any responsibility. After the Carter administration threatened to suspend operation of the U.S. mission in Tripoli the Libyan government agreed to compensate the United States for the damages. In April and May 1980 the Carter administration expelled six Libyan diplomats because they were engaged in a “campaign of intimidation” against Libyan exiles living in the United States. In May the administration finally closed the American diplomatic mission in Tripoli.11
On 16 September two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers allegedly fired missiles at an unarmed U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane flying in international airspace. The American plane escaped unharmed. Since the evidence surrounding the incident was not conclusive, the Carter administration neither acknowledged the suspected attack nor sent a formal protest to Tripoli. Five days later another confrontation took place when eight Libyan fighters flown by Syrian pilots attempted to intercept an RC-135 operating two hundred miles off the Libyan coast. This time, however, the electronic surveillance plane was accompanied by a trio of F-14 Tomcat fighters from the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). The Tomcats immediately challenged the aggressors, who wisely broke off the engagement and returned to base. Once again the administration did not publicly acknowledge the incident. Carter did not want to escalate tensions between the United States and Libya during his reelection campaign.12
On 22 October the Libyan people’s bureau in Washington purchased advertising space in the Washington Post and reprinted a letter from “Brother Leader” Qaddafi to Carter and his Republican opponent in the election, former California governor Ronald Reagan. Qaddafi claimed that “several aggressive measures have been taken by America against Libya, as represented in . . . the taking of very hostile political and media attitudes.” He stressed that an armed conflict between the United States and the Arabs could “only be avoided if America stops the military steps it has taken which threaten the independence of the Arab homeland.” He warned that if the United States persisted in its aggressive policies toward the Arab nation, the Arabs would be entitled to exercise the right of self-defense to protect their homeland. Finally, in regard to his own country, Qaddafi demanded that the United States stop its “surveillance planes from spying across Libyan borders.”13 In light of the recent Libyan attack on U.S. aircraft and the nearly identical one in 1973, administration officials were convinced that Qaddafi was prepared to use force to defend his airspace and obstruct American intelligence-gathering activities.
In the fall of 1980 the Pentagon again proposed a FON exercise for the Gulf of Sidra, but Carter could not risk another crisis in the Middle East. He was fighting for reelection and his attention was consumed by the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He ordered the Sixth Fleet to operate north of 32° 30’, and by doing so he granted implicit recognition to Qaddafi’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra.14
The Election of 1980
In the November election Ronald Reagan won the presidency in a landslide, capturing forty-four states and 51 percent of the popular vote. Jimmy Carter won only six states and the District of Columbia and 41 percent of the popular vote. A master of modern media politics and a champion of the conservative values of Middle America, Reagan campaigned against big government. He advocated lower taxes, fewer regulations, and less interference by government in business and everyday life. Radiating an unwavering faith in the abilities of the American people and in the potential of the free enterprise system, Reagan preached that all Americans could achieve unprecedented prosperity if only government would “get off their backs.” In the area of foreign affairs he called for a stronger national defense, the restoration of U.S. prestige around the world, and a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union (which he decried as an unrelenting enemy of American values and a threat to world peace). He also spoke out on the problem of international terrorism: “We must take a stand against terrorism in the world and combat it with firmness, for it is a most cowardly and savage violation of peace.”15
Carter suffered one of the worst electoral defeats by an incumbent president in U.S. history. Many Americans viewed the magnitude of the loss as a repudiation of his leadership. Others, including Carter himself, believed that the landslide was more an indication of the nation’s frustration over a set of circumstances that no president could have handled to the satisfaction of the public. In the latter half of his term these circumstances included rising gasoline prices, double-digit inflation, high unemployment, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and, most frustrating of all, the long captivity of the American hostages in Tehran. As a final insult to Carter and his presidency, the Iranian government did not release the hostages until moments after Reagan took the oath of office on 20 January 1981.
Reagan Grapples with the Terrorism Issue
President Reagan wasted no time making good on his promises to increase defense spending by huge amounts, to develop a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union, and to combat international terrorism. Since fighting terrorism would certainly involve Libya, that country was briefly discussed at the first meeting of the National Security Council on 21 January 1981. The new president and his chief advisers considered Qaddafi a genuine threat to American interests in the Middle East and Africa and were determined to thwart his efforts to destabilize friendly governments in the region. According to political scientist Lisa Anderson, the Libyan dictator “was selected for special attention by the United States as the symbol of all the United States finds repugnant in international affairs—support for international terrorism, opposition to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and support for a diminished U.S. role in the world.”16
Five days later, on 26 January, Reagan and his top national security advisers—Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen, FBI Director William H. Webster, and CIA Director William J. Casey—gathered to discuss state-sponsored and state-supported terrorism. This deadly phenomenon continued to claim more innocent victims with each passing year. Since 1968 when the CIA began compiling statistics on terrorism, the year just completed was in fact the bloodiest one on record. Particularly alarming was the rate at which Americans were becoming vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In 1980 nearly 40 percent of all terrorist incidents involved American citizens or property. Of the 278 attacks on U.S. citizens, ten people were murdered and ninety-four injured.
Reagan and his advisers regarded international terrorism as an issue of vital national importance, and combating it became one of the new administration’s highest foreign policy priorities. They reviewed the federal government’s programs and resources devoted to countering terrorism. They evaluated everything, from the secret antiterrorist Delta Force to the various interagency working groups and task forces responsible for carrying out U.S. policy on terrorism. They concluded that more had to be done, but they quickly realized that before they could develop new policies for confronting terrorism, they had to learn as much as possible about the nature of the enemy. They determined that greater
